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nor its authors shall be responsible for any errors, omissions, or 
damages arising out of use of this information. 
This work examines inter alia  technical, legal, and ethical 
dimensions of behavior regarding Biological defenses, Biological 
Threat Agents, information warfare,  electronic warfare, 
cybersecurity, directed energy weapons, acoustical 
countermeasures, UUVs, Maritime Cybersecurity, UAS and Counter 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS), emerging and disturbing 
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investigators, drone operator / pilots or any related professionals 
into lawyers. Many of the topics discussed will be concerned with 
the law and legal implications of certain behaviors. Every effort is 
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understanding that the authors are supplying information but are 
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in the appropriate jurisdiction. All scenarios discussed in this work 
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information contained herein is from the public domain and to 
Disclaimers  |  9
the greatest extent possible no information of a confidential or 
classified nature is set forth herein. Additionally, this misuse, re-
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Foreword 
By 
Julie JCH Ryan, D.SC. 
CEO, Wyndrose Technical Group 
 
 
It cannot be denied: the inventions and uses of technologies over 
the long eons of human existence have both improved and 
disrupted our existence.  Cooking food improved the efficiency of 
caloric intake, freeing up time and energy for other pursuits 
(Wrangham, 2009).  Mastering symbolic representation by painting 
on the walls of caves enabled the capture and transfer of intellectual 
capital (Mthen, 2006).  Over the centuries, curious inventors have 
improved, replaced, and combined technologies in ways that have 
radically altered the way we interact with and live in the world. 
With each step forward, it may seem like only small bits of progress 
are being made.  It is only when one sits back and considers where 
we are, and what technologies are rapidly being integrated into 
our living experience, that the magnitude of disruption becomes 
apparent. 
 
With the publication of this book, Disruptive Technologies With 
Applications In Airline, Marine, Defense Industries, the writing team 
assembled by Professor Randall K. Nichols takes a hard look at 
the autonomous technologies that are being incorporated into the 
dimensions of air, land, and sea, the potential disruptive effects 
of those technologies, and the implications to societal norms and 
rules.  While this book is primarily intended to be a textbook, it 
should be of interest to anyone who needs to understand the 
changes that are being unleashed by the revolutions in size, 
capability, and diversity of autonomous vehicles.  The authors come 
from an extremely diverse background, ranging from law to science, 
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and bring a wealth of experience, knowledge, and opinion.  Why are 
these important?  Knowledge is the fundamental understanding of 
something, experience is a sophisticated appreciation of real world 
impacts, and opinion is the application of experience to knowledge 
with a view to the future. 
 
Foretelling the future — what will happen — is an interesting 
problem: the only thing the forecaster can possibly know is that 
they will be wrong about the forecast.  The question is how wrong. 
Forecasts are important and useful even though they will get 
aspects wrong.  Good and lucky forecasts get only minor details 
wrong while other forecasts can be subverted through sloppy 
analysis or simply bad luck.  But every forecast brings useful 
information to the table.  Thinking about what could potentially 
happen in the future informs our ability to make choices.  These 
choices could include policies to make a potential future more likely, 
or they could include policies to keep a potential future from 
happening.  Understanding and thinking about disruptive 
technologies and what futures they can possibly bring about is 
important for students, educators, and leaders in every field.  This 
book provides an underpinning for that type of analysis by bringing 
together the diversity of topics in one sweeping consideration of 
technological development. 
 
The future is upon us.  We simply need to understand the 
implications. 
 
Julie JCH Ryan, D.SC. 





Mthen, S. (2006). After the Ice: A Global Human History, 
20,000–5000 BC. Harvard University Press. 
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Wrangham, R. (2009). Catching Fire: How Cooking Made Us 
Human. Basic Books. 
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Preface 
Disruptive Technologies With Applications in Airline, Marine, 
Defense Industries is our fifth textbook in a series covering the 
world of Unmanned Vehicle Systems & Operations On Air, Sea, 
Land;  Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems Technologies and 
Operations;  Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain: 
Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets, 2nd edition; and Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the Cyber Domain Protecting USA’s 
Advanced Air Assets, 1st edition; have seen considerable global 
recognition in the field. (Nichols R. K., et al., 2020) (Nichols R. , et al., 
2020) (Nichols R. , et al., 2019) (Nichols R. K., 2018) 
 
The authors have expanded  their purview beyond UAS / CUAS 
/ UUV systems we have written extensively about in our previous 
four books. Our new title shows our concern for the emergence of 
Disruptive Technologies and how they apply to the Airline, Marine 
and Defense industries. 
 
There is a difference between emerging technology trends and 
disruptive ones. Emerging technologies are technologies whose 
development, practical applications, or both are still largely 
unrealized, such that they are figuratively emerging into 
prominence from a background of nonexistence or obscurity. (Wiki, 
2021) Some sources say that emerging technologies are taking over 
the world by a storm and if misused, it could turn out to be our 
worst enemy. (Rose, 2019) Toward Data Science magazine lists 
Drone Swarms as number one in their list. The topic covered in 
detail in (Nichols R. , et al., 2020). Smart home devices that spy, ex. 
IoT or AI / IoT is number two, followed by facial recognition, spy 
dust and autonomous robots. (Rose, 2019) 
 
A Disruptive technology is one that displaces an established 
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technology and shakes up the industry or a ground-breaking 
product that creates a completely new industry. (Rouse, 2021) 
That is what our book is about. We think we have found 
technology trends that will replace the status quo or disrupt the 
conventional technology paradigms. 
 
We have written some explosive chapters in Book 5. Dr. Hans 
Mumm has written about the advances in Automation & Human 
Machine Interface. Wayne Lonstein, JD has given the reader a solid 
look at Social Media as a Battleground in Information Warfare (IW). 
CEO Bart Shields has delivered a viable, less risky, more robust 
 cyber-security alterative / replacement for the popular Blockchain 
Algorithm and a clean solution for Ransomware. Professor Randall 
Nichols has written about the advanced sensor technologies that 
are used by UUVs for munitions characterization, assessment, and 
classification.  He reports on their counter hostile use of UUVs 
against US capital assets in the South China Seas.  In a second 
chapter, Professor Nichols has challenged the status quo and 
debunked the climate change fraud with verifiable facts. In his third 
chapter, he explodes our minds with nightmare technologies that if 
they come to fruition may do more harm than good. Some of them 
might reach Black Swan event status. [1] 
 
Dr. Mark Jackson has written authoritatively about Propulsion 
and Fuels: Disruptive Technologies for Submersible Craft Including 
UUVs. CEO Randall Mai has penned a chapter to challenge the 
ammunition industry by grassroots use of recycled metals and an 
alternative propellant – air.  Captain John – Paul Hood writes about 
the changing landscape of UAS regulations and privacy. 2021 will 
prove to be challenging for owners and manufacturers of UAS. CEO 
& Dr. Suzanne Sincavage and Professor Candice Carter have teamed 
up to scare the pants off of us – especially during the COVID-19 
pandemic – by detailing  Bioterrorism Risks, Biodefense, Biological 
Threat Agents, and the need for advanced sensors to detect these 
attacks. 
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Over two years of solid research by a team of nine SMEs is 
incorporated into our book. We trust you will enjoy reading it as 
much as we have in its writing. 
 
Best 
Randall K Nichols, DTM 
Professor of Practice 
Director, Unmanned Aircraft Systems – 
Cybersecurity Certificate Program 
Managing Editor / Co-Author 
Kansas State University Polytechnic Campus & 




Illi nunquam cedunt. 
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[1] A Black Swan is an unpredictable event that is beyond what 
is normally expected of a situation and has potentially severe 
consequences. Black swan events are characterized by their 
extreme rarity, severe impact, and the widespread insistence they 
were obvious in hindsight. (Scott, 2021) 
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experience in UAS filed operations; Dr Mark Jackson, SME in UUV, 
naval architecture,  and nanotechnologies, Sgt Jeremy Shay, Dragon 
student, COVID-19 expert, RET USAF, Fabrication Production 
Manager, Spirit AeroSystems; Joel Coulter, President, Mobile 
Sciences Consortium, LLC; and Bart Shields, Inventor and CTO of 
Olympus Sky, Inc. Special shoutout to NSWC PCD and Robert 
Leasko, PI for the NSWC PVD 2011 Demonstration and Report on 
UUVs and MCM Sensors. 
Last, Professor Randall K. Nichols is managing editor / author 
/ co-author of ten prior books and developer of six Masters and 
Certificate programs in Cybersecurity at Utica College and Kansas 
State University. He has five decades of Cybersecurity experience. 
Finally, Montine Nichols deserves a commendation for her help 
on the final drafts and copy edit work for our book (and living 
with a real Dragon). Several KSUP UAS pilot – students helped with 
the “student view,” and made valid suggestions for improvement, 
Vincent Salerno, Senior Airman in Kansas Air National Guard, John 
Boesen, (our handwriting expert); Diana K. Nichols, UAS Pilot; Josh 
Jacobs, Jorge Silva, Sr. UAS Safety Engineer,  and Jordan McDonald. 
 Special thanks go Kira C. Miller who professionally developed (more 
like “nailed”) our cover art.[1] 
The team especially thanks Assistant Professors Ryan W. Otto, and 
Emily Finch Scholarly Communication Librarians, for their expert 
assistance with the NPP final efforts. 
Randall K Nichols 
Professor of Practice 
Director, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) – Cybersecurity 
Graduate Certificate Program 
Managing Editor / Co-Author 
Kansas State University Polytechnic Campus & 
Professor Emeritus – Cybersecurity, Utica College 
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[1] Kira on October 27, 2020 will be Kira Nichols, marrying my 
youngest son. 
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graduate UAS- Cybersecurity Certificate program at KSUP.  Nichols 
is internationally respected, with 50 years of experience in 
leadership roles in cryptography, counterintelligence, INFOSEC, 
and sensitive computer applications. Throughout his career, Nichols 
has published ten best-selling textbooks. Nichols has provided 
counsel to the United States government and is certified as a federal 
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certificate graduate – level programs for KSU and Utica College. To 
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Systems (UAS) -Cybersecurity 
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• Co-Author / Developer: MPS – Risk Assessment and 
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• Author / Developer: MS Cyber Surveillance and Warfare 
 
Previously, Nichols was COO of INFOSEC Technologies, LLC, a 
consulting firm specializing in Counterterrorism, 
Counterespionage, and Information Security Countermeasures to 
support its 1700 commercial, educational and U.S. government 
clients. 
Nichols served as CEO of COMSEC Solutions, a Cryptographic 
/ Anti-virus / Biometrics Countermeasures Company, which was 
acquired by a public company in 2000. He served as Vice President 
of Cryptography and Director of Research of the acquiring firm. 
Nichols served as Technology Director of Cryptography and 
Biometrics for the International Computer Security Association 
(ICSA), President, and Vice President of the American Cryptogram 
Association (ACA). 
Nichols holds a 3rd Dan Black Belt (R) in Chung Do Kwan Tae 
Kwon Do and permanent rank of 2nd Dan Black Belt (D). He refereed 
the National Tae Kwon Do Championships in 1994 in San Antonio , 
TX. 
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This is Professor Nichols eleventh published book. Disruptive 
Technologieswith Applications in Airline, Marine, Defense is 
Nichols’ 5th textbook as managing editor / contributor in the 
series on UAS /CUAS / UUV / special technologies all published 
by New Prairie Press. Others include: 
 
Unmanned Vehicle Systems & Operations on Air, Sea, Land 
New Prairie Press (published on October 2, 2020) 
Available as free eBook at: https://www.newprairiepress.org/
ebooks/35/ 
 
Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems Technologies and Operations 
New Prairie Press (published on February 1, 2020) 
Available as free eBook at:  https://www.newprairiepress.org/
ebooks/31/ 
 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in Cyber Domain: Protecting 
USA’s Advanced Air Assets, 
New Prairie Press (NPP 2nd Edition published on July 26, 2019) 
Available as free eBook at:  https://www.newprairiepress.org/
ebooks/27 
Areas of Expertise / Research Interests 
 
• Counterterrorism / Counter- Intelligence /Counterespionage 
/ Computer Security 
• Countermeasures Asymmetric Warfare and Attack / Defense 
Scenarios against National Critical Infrastructure 
• Computer Forensics and Cryptography SME & Federal Expert 
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• Risk Assessment / Threat Analysis / Vulnerabilities Analysis / 
Countermeasures 
• Cybersecurity / Surveillance Technologies: Aerial, Infrared, 
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• SCADA – Advanced Cyber-weapons Creation / Deployment / 
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Deployment / Defense 
• UAS- Integrating Unmanned Aircraft Systems into National 
Airspace System 
• Designing Acoustic Countermeasures against hostile -actor 
UAS SWARMS & developing dual purpose IFF sound libraries. 
Contact Prof. Randall K Nichols at 717-329-9836 or 
profrknichols@ksu.edu. 
*Direct all inquiries about this book to Prof. Randall K. Nichols at 
profrknichols@ksu.edu 
 
Dr. Hans C. Mumm (Co-Author) 
 
Dr. Hans C. Mumm holds a Doctor of Management with a 
concentration in Homeland Security from Colorado Technical 
University (CTU) and an MS in Strategic Intelligence from American 
Military University (AMU).  He gained notoriety during Operation 
Iraqi Freedom as the officer in charge of the “Iraqi Regime Playing 
Cards; CENTCOM’S Top 55 Most Wanted List” which was touted by 
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) as one the most successful 
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Information Operations (IO) in the history of Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA). Dr. Mumm is the former Division Chief for Cyber 
Security at the Office of The Director of National Intelligence 
(ODNI) programming and executing a budget of over $140M. Dr. 
Mumm has earned twenty-three personal military ribbons/medals 
including six military unit medals/citations, and two Directors 
Awards, from the DIA. In 2016 he was awarded the People of 
Distinction Humanitarian Award as well as being granted a US 
Patent and Trademark for How to Harmonize the Speed of 
Innovation and Change with the Human Spirit’s Need for 
Leadership. In 2005, Dr. Mumm was recognized as one of the “Ten 
Outstanding Young Americans,” and in 2003 he was awarded the 
National Defense PAC “American Patriot Ingenuity Award” for his 
service during “Operation Iraqi Freedom.” 
He co-authored an international best-selling book titled 
“Lightning Growth” which is a follow up to his best-selling book 
in 2015 titled “Applying Complexity Leadership Theory to Drone 
Airspace Integration.” 
He is a published researcher in both the scientific and social 
science arenas and has won grants and contracts to further test 
and evaluate his original research. He has notable experience in 
research and systems engineering which includes contracts for UAV 
research and the creation of an advanced multiple fuel system 
which operated the world’s first and only helicopter that can fly 
on five separate fuels without engine modifications. His research 
extends into emerging and disruptive technology for offensive and 
defensive missions supporting US and coalition operations. His UAV 
and robotics expertise has focused on determining the specific 
uses, exceptions, and allowances for robotics operations; including 
studying the unintended consequences, future use, and misuse of 
such technologies. Dr. Mumm’s presentations and publications 
support his research into autonomous systems in the virtual and 
physical worlds. Additionally, he serves as an adjunct professor at 
California University of Pennsylvania (CALU) instructing Homeland 
Security courses in the Criminal Justice Department. 
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2017; and “Drone Technology: The Good, The Bad And The Horrible,” 
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Dr. Julie J.C.H. Ryan, D.Sc. (Co-Author Books 1-4 in Series)/ 
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with the Defense Intelligence Agency.  Upon leaving government 
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engineer, consultant, and senior staff scientist with companies 
including Sterling Software, Booz Allen & Hamilton, Welkin 
Associates, and TRW/ESL supporting a variety of projects and 
clients. 
She is the author /co-author of several books, including 
Defending Your Digital Assets Against Hackers, Crackers, Spies, and 
Thieves (McGraw Hill 2000), and a Fellow of the American Academy 
of Forensic Sciences (AAFS).  At Wyndrose Technical Group, she 
focuses on futures forecasting and strategic planning with an eye on 
technology surprise and disruption. 
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Ms. Candice Carter is a cybersecurity expert with over 15 years 
of hands-on experience in the areas of counterterrorism, 
counterintelligence, and criminal cyber investigations. She 
conducts Classified/Unclassified briefings in the areas of 
Terroristic Cyber Capabilities using Social Media and 
Counterterrorism for the Intelligence Community (IC). Ms. Carter 
conducts research and constructs Asymmetric Warfare and Attack 
/ Defense Scenarios against National Critical Infrastructure. She 
is the Team Lead and for NASA Aeronautics Research Institute for 
Transformative Vertical Flight (TVF) Commercial Intra-City On-
Demand VTOL group. Ms. Carter is an invited speaker for key 
organizations including BSides London and (ISC)2 Security 
Congress. She is an Assistant Professor/Chair MSc Cybersecurity 
program at the Wilmington University. Ms. Carter holds a MSc 
Cybersecurity Forensics and Intelligence from Utica College, Utica , 
NY and a PMT Cybersecurity UAS from Kansas State University. 
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Aris has 30+ years of IT experience and earned a BS in 
Cybersecurity from Utica College, Utica, NY while working full 
time.  He has provided editing skills for Professor Nichols for 10 
years now. His approach is all encompassing, as opposed to strict 
grammar rules. Reading ease, topic flow, clarity, and being succinct 
are the focus. 
 
Kurt Barnhart, Ph.D. (Associate Dean & Foreword to 1st Edition) 
Dr. Barnhart is Professor and currently the Associate Dean of 
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Research at Kansas State University Salina. In addition, he 
established and serves as the executive director of the Applied 
Aviation Research Center. He oversees the Unmanned Aerial 
Systems program office.  Dr. Barnhart previously served as the Head 
of the Aviation Department at Kansas State University. 
Dr. Barnhart is a member of the graduate faculty at K-State. He 
is eminently qualified with 1) a commercial pilot certificate with 
instrument, multi-engine, seaplane, and glider ratings; 2) a certified 
flight instructor with instrument and multi-engine ratings; 3) an 
airframe and power plant certificate with inspection authorization. 
Dr Barnhart’s educational pedigree is outstanding:   an A.S. in 
Aviation Maintenance Technology from Vincennes University, a B.S. 
in aviation administration from Purdue University, an MBAA from 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, and a Ph.D. in educational 
administration from Indiana State University. 
Dr. Barnhart’s Research agenda is focused on aviation psychology 
and Human Factors as well as the integration of Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems into the National Airspace System.  His industry experience 
includes work as a R&D inspector with Rolls Royce Engine Company 
where he worked on the RQ-4 Unmanned Reconnaissance Aircraft 
development program, as well as serving as an aircraft systems 
instructor for American Trans-Air airlines. Formerly, Dr. Barnhart 
was an Associate Professor and Acting Department Chair of the 
Aerospace Technology at Indiana State University where he was 
responsible for teaching flight and upper division administrative 
classes.   Courses taught include Aviation Risk Analysis, Citation II 
Ground School, King Air 200 Flight, Air Navigation, Air 
Transportation, Instrument Ground School, and many others. 
 
CPT John-Paul Hood USA (Co-Author) 
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CPT John-Paul Hood is a researcher focused on the development 
of future counter unmanned aircraft technologies, theories and best 
practices for both government and civilian applications. CPT Hood 
has commanded in the US Army Field Artillery with a background 
specializing in the coordination and delivery of conventional / 
smart munitions as well as achieving desired battlefield effects 
through the integration of lethal and non-lethal assets. CPT Hood 
holds a BS in Geospatial Information Systems from the United States 
Military Academy, West Point NY, and a Professional Masters in 
Technology UAS from Kansas State University. 
 
 
Dr. Alysia Starkey (CEO & Dean Kansas State University 
Polytechnic; 2nd Ed. Foreword) 
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Dr. Starkey is a Professor and currently serves as the CEO and 
Dean for the Kansas State University Polytechnic Campus.  As Dean, 
she oversees the College of Technology and Aviation academic 
programs and campus research centers.  Dr. Starkey holds an A.A. 
in Social Work from Colby Community College, a B.S. in Psychology 
from Fort Hays State University, a M.L.S. from University of North 
Texas, and a Ph.D. in Curriculum and Instruction from Kansas State 
University.  Joining Kansas State Polytechnic in June 2002 as a 
technical services/automation coordinator and assistant professor, 
Starkey was promoted to library director and associate professor 
in 2007, and to assistant dean of continuous improvement and 
distance education in 2010. She was named associate dean of 
academics and promoted to full professor in 2014. She gained the 
additional duties of interim CEO and Dean in June 2018 and 
continues in that capacity today. 
 
Joel D. Anderson Colonel USMC (Ret), OVPR, C-UAS Foreword 
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Mr. Anderson has more than 30 years’ experience in military, 
industry, and academia.  He currently serves as Development 
Director for Kansas State University within the Office of Research 
Development (ORD).  Prior to joining KSU, he served as a Technical 
Director, Innovation Evangelist, and Senior Subject Matter Expert 
for ManTech International in support of HQMC Intelligence 
Department and its Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities 
(TENCAP) office and Technology and Innovation Directorate; and 
as the Director for Mosaic ATM, Inc.’s Autonomous Systems Group. 
Between 1984-2010, he served in the United States Marine Corps 
where he rose in rank from Private to Colonel. During his career, 
he served as an (0231) intelligence analyst while enlisted where he 
was meritoriously promoted to Corporal, and as an officer he held 
military occupational designations as an (0202) Marine Air Ground 
Task Force Intelligence Officer, (0240) Imagery Officer, (0540) Space 
Operations Officer, and (8058) Acquisition Professional earning 
DAIWIA Level III Certification as Program Manager and member of 
the acquisition community while PM-Marine Intelligence Systems 
for the Marine Corps Systems Command.  He held command 
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Commander, Commander of the 2nd Force Imagery Interpretation 
Unit (FIIU) and was Commanding Officer Company E. Marine 
Security Guard Battalion (Department of State).  He served as the 
Marine Corps Senior Departmental Requirements Officer (DRO) and 
as the Imagery and Collections Section Head while serving with the 
Marine Corps Intelligence Activity; as the Branch Head for HQMC 
Intelligence Departments Imagery and Geospatial Plans and Policy 
Branch, and concluded his career as a Strategic Intelligence Planner 
for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 
(OUSD-I) and as the Chief of Staff for Secretary Gates Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance Task Force (ISRTF).  He has served 
at every operational level of the Marine Corps from Battalion, 
Regiment, Division, Wing, MEU and MEF; within the Marine Corps 
supporting establishment, HQMC and on the OUSD-I staff.  Mr. 
Anderson has spent a career supporting efforts to address the 
complexities of the intelligence community and interagency 
information management, decision making, talent acquisition, 
educational and operational environments. 
His personal awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal; 
Bronze Star; Meritorious Service Medal with four gold stars in lieu of 
5th award; Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal; Navy and 
Marine Corps Achievement Medal; Joint Meritorious Unit Citation; 
Meritorious Unit Citation; Navy Unit Citation; Marine Corps 
Expeditionary Medal; National Defense Medal with one device in 
lieu of second award; Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal; 
Southwest Asia Service Medal with three stars in lieu of additional 
awards; Global War on Terrorism Service Medal; Sea Service 
Deployment Ribbon with three stars in lieu of additional awards; 
Overseas Deployment Ribbon with one device; Marine Security 
Guard Ribbon; Kuwaiti Liberation Medal (Saudi Arabia); Kuwaiti 
Liberation Medal (Kuwait). 
 
Jeremy S. Shay, PMP (Co-Author) USAF SMSGT (Ret) 
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Jeremy is an expert in aerospace maintenance, manufacturing, 
modification, and maintainability.  He specializes in advanced 
composite structural maintenance and advanced coatings.  He 
recently completed the requirements to earn his PMT 
Cybersecurity UAS from Kansas State University.  His other 
academic holdings are a Graduate Certificate in Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems Information Assurance and a Bachelor of Science Degree in 
Technology Management with a focus on Engineering Technology 
which is ABET accredited from Kansas State University, an Associate 
of Science in Aviation Maintenance and Professional Managers’ 
Certification from the Community College of the Air Force, and 
Project Manager Professional certification from Project 
Management Institute. 
Jeremy currently serves as a Senior Principle Manufacturing 
Engineer at Northrop Grumman.  He recently retired from the 
United States Air Force as a Senior Master Sergeant with 26 years 
of service.  During this time, he served as a Structural Maintenance 
and Low Observables mechanic on F-111, F-15, F-16, and B-2 aircraft. 
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Dr. Mark J. Jackson (Co-Author) 
Doctor Mark James Jackson is the McCune and Middlekauff 
Endowed Professor and University Faculty Fellow at Kansas State 
University. Born in Widnes, Lancashire, England, in 1967, Doctor 
Jackson began his engineering career in 1983 when he studied 
O.N.C. part I examinations and first-year apprenticeship-training 
course in mechanical engineering.  After gaining an Ordinary 
National Diploma in Engineering with distinctions and I.C.I. prize for 
achievement, he studied a degree in mechanical and manufacturing 
engineering at Liverpool Polytechnic and spent periods in industry 
working for I.C.I. Pharmaceuticals, Unilever Industries, Anglo 
Blackwells, Unicorn International and Saint-Gobain Corporation. 
After graduating with the Master of Engineering (M. Eng.) degree 
with Distinction under the supervision of Professor Jack Schofield, 
M.B.E., Doctor Jackson subsequently conducted research for the 
Doctor of Philosophy (Ph. D.) degree at Liverpool in the field of 
materials engineering focusing primarily on microstructure-
property relationships in vitreous-bonded abrasive materials under 
the supervision of Professors Benjamin Mills and H. Peter Jost, 
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C.B.E., Hon. F.R.Eng..  He was subsequently employed by Unicorn 
Abrasives’ Central Research & Development Laboratory (Saint-
Gobain Abrasives’ Group) as materials technologist, then technical 
manager, responsible for product and new business development 
in Europe, and university liaison projects concerned with abrasive 
process development.  Doctor Jackson then became research fellow 
at the Cavendish Laboratory, University of Cambridge, working with 
Professor John Field, O.B.E., F.R.S., and Professor David Tabor, F.R.S., 
on condensed matter physics and tribology before becoming a 
lecturer in engineering at the University of Liverpool in 1998.  At 
Liverpool, he attracted a number of research grants concerned with 
developing innovative manufacturing processes for which he was 
jointly awarded an Innovative Manufacturing Technology Centre 
from the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council in 
November 2001.  In 2002, he became associate professor of 
mechanical engineering and faculty associate in the Centre for 
Manufacturing Research, Centre for Electric Power, and Centre for 
Water Resources and Utilization at Tennessee Technological 
University (an associated university of Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory), and a faculty associate at Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory.  Dr. Jackson was the academic adviser to the Formula 
SAE Team at Tennessee Technological University.  At Tennessee 
Technological University, Dr. Jackson established the NSF 
Geometric Design and Manufacturing Integration Laboratory.  Dr. 
Jackson collaborated with Nobel Laureate Professor Sir Harold 
Kroto, F.R.S., editing a book on ‘Surface Engineering of Surgical 
Tools and Medical Devices’ and a special issue of the International 
Journal of Nanomanufacturing on ‘Nanofabrication of Novel Carbon 
Nanostructures and Nanocomposite Films’. Dr. Jackson was 
appointed member of the United Nations Education, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) International Commission for the 
Development of the ‘Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems’ Theme 
on ‘Nanoscience and Nanotechnologies’,  (http://m-press.ru/
English/nano/index.html), and still serves in this capacity. The first 
edition of the encyclopedia was published 2009 and second edition 
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published 2018. In March 2017, the degree of Doctor of Science (D. 
Sc.) in mechanical engineering was conferred upon Dr. Jackson in 
absentia by congregation for sustained contributions made in the 
area of mechanical engineering and advanced manufacturing over a 
period of twenty years. 
 
Research Technologist – Randall W. Mai (Co-Author) 
Randall grew-up on the family farm in rural Kansas near Tribune. 
He spent a large sum of his summers helping on the family farm that 
was established by his great-grandfather in 1929.  Before graduating 
high school Randall was nominated to the United States Naval, 
Military, and Merchant Marine Academies by Congressman Keith 
G. Sibelius and Senator Bob Dole.  Randall earned an A.S. degree 
in Mechanical Engineering Technology and a B.S. in Biology / 
Chemistry minor.  Graduating Magna cum Laud.  Randall has 
worked as an engineer in agriculture equipment mfg., an Analytical 
Chemist / Validation Analysis of computer / software validation 
for Abbott Labs and currently works as a Research Technologist 
for Kansas State University.  He is now establishing himself in the 
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Cybersecurity field as he stands on his knowledge of Computer / 
Software Validation experience gained within the Pharmaceutical 
field.  He was responsible for leading the 21CFRpart11 program at the 
Abbott Labs facility in McPherson, Ks. and was also responsible for 
the validation of the Laboratory LIMS and Millenium32 software. 
The validation encompassed network security and disaster 
recovery. 
Randall will complete a Master program at Kansas State 
University in May 2020 in Professional Masters of Technology with 
concentration in UAS and Cybersecurity. 
 
Kurt J. Carraway, Col, USAF (Ret) [Foreword to Book 4] 
After serving 25 years with the United States Air Force, retired 
Colonel Kurt J. Carraway is the Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 
Department Head and Executive Director of the Applied Aviation 
Research Center (AARC) at Kansas State University’s Polytechnic 
Campus. As Department Head, Carraway leads UAS faculty in the 
university’s UAS program, which includes a Bachelor of Science in 
Aviation Technology program, a UAS Minor and a UAS Certificate 
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program. He also serves as a member of the graduate faculty on 
the campus. As Executive Director, Carraway provides strategic 
leadership in advancing Kansas State University’s UAS program 
goals. He directs the execution of research activities involving UAS 
through the AARC. Carraway also directs flight operations 
development and maturation of the UAS training program through 
direct supervision of the Flight Operations staff. He manages highly 
skilled UAS professionals that perform hundreds of UAS flights per 
year in civil airspace. He sets policies and procedures for unmanned 
flight operations. He serves as Principal Investigator (PI) on UAS 
activities through the AARC and is the University PI representative 
to ASSURE, the FAA’s UAS Center of Excellence. 
Before arriving at Kansas State Polytechnic, Carraway was 
stationed at Camp Smith in Oahu, Hawaii where he served first 
as Joint Operations Director and then Division Chief of Current 
Operations, both for the U.S. Pacific Command. Carraway worked 
with the Global Hawk UAS, as an evaluator and instructor pilot, and 
later became commander of the Global Hawk squadron. Carraway 
established standard operating procedures and composed technical 
manuals for the military’s use of the Global Hawk. 
A native of St. Louis, Missouri, Carraway received a Bachelor of 
Science in Mechanical Engineering at the University of Missouri 
Science and Technology in Rolla, prior to entering the Air Force. 
During his service, Carraway also completed a Master of Science in 
Systems Engineering at the Air Force Institute of Technology on the 
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, and a Master of 
Arts in Management from Webster University in St. Louis, Missouri. 
 
Bart Shields (Co-Author) 
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Bart Shields, BS in Computer Science-Scientific Option, MS in 
Computer Science-Thesis Option, Chief Technology Officer, 
Inventor, Co-founder 
Bart Shields is serial entrepreneur, long-time innovator, deeply 
technical product architect, with over 25+ years of technical and 
engineering management.  He has designed systems from concept 
to deployment for a wide variety of verticals, but has focused mainly 
on data communication, with multiple wireless communication 
products to his credit ranging from commercial wireless broadband 
routers to tactical radios for the U.S. government. 
Bart is a highly innovative, technology expert, having created 
designed multiple MAC layer protocols, including the design and 
implementation of a Wi-Max like protocol (WCOPP) in the late 90’s 
and more recently, a Sensor Node MESH network MAC based upon 
Distributed Queuing.  Bart has five patents to his credit, two for 
Wireless MACs based on Distributed Queuing and three for his 
recent cybersecurity protocol and cryptographic key management 
system, Autonomous Key Management (AKM). 
Bart has built multiple engineering teams and entire departments 
from scratch, and overseen all aspects of engineering, including 
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fabless ASIC design, communication systems algorithm 
development, and RF transceiver design and development. 
Bart is an expert in embedded development and has spent his 
entire career in the design and development of embedded systems, 
including both mission and safety critical systems.  Bart has focused 
the past six years entirely on cybersecurity and solving many of 
issues plaguing security today, with simple and elegant solutions 
built around his highly innovative technology, AKM. 
 
Dr. Suzanne Sincavage (Co-Author) 
Executive Summary 
On May 3rd , 2020 Dr Suzanne Sincavage was named Executive 
Director for the Institute for Biodefense Research (IBR). IBR is a 
nonprofit devoted to advancing the science of microbial forensics. 
Dr Sincavage, a PhD in public health epidemiology, with a focus 
on biological terrorism preparedness and response, has led her own 
consultancy, IDIQ Inc. since 2008, focusing on CBRNE Subject 
Matter Expertise in facilitating and integrating innovative 
technologies that counter biological terrorism. 
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Dr Sincavage received her PhD in Public Health, Epidemiology 
with specialization in Biological Terrorism from Union Institute & 
University. Dr. Sincavage’s career encompasses 16 years of 
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Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, G.D. Searle; Hoffman-La Roche 
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INSA Acquisition Management Council 
USGIF Small Business Working Group 
WOSB 8(m) Working Group, SPAWAR HQ, San Diego 
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Abbreviations and Acronyms 
ABBREVIATIONS: ACRONYMS [REV 91A] 01232021 C1 – C10 
The following terms are common to the UAS / UUV industries, 
defense / airline / marine industries / general literature, 
conferences on UAS/UAV/Drone/UUV systems and / or specific to 
Professor Nichols’ five (5) textbooks in the series on UAS / drones / 
UAV / UUVs. 
 
A-STAR          Heuristic search algorithm discussed in chapter 9. 
A2 / AD          Anti-access / Area Denial 
A /Aref            Amplitudes of source and reference points, see 
Eq-20-6,7. 
AA                  Anti-aircraft / Adaptive Antennas 
AAA               Anti-aircraft artillery 
AAIB              Air Accidents Investigation Board 
AAM              Air-to-air missile 
AAV               Autonomous air vehicle 
ABI                 Aviation Block Infrastructure 
ABMS             Advanced battle management system 
ABS                American Bureau of Shipping 
A/C                 Aircraft 
ACAS             Airborne collision avoidance system / Assistant Chief 
of the Air Staff 
ACL                Agent communication language / Autonomous control 
levels 
ACOUSTIC    Detects drones by recognizing unique sounds 
produced by their motors. 
ACRP             Airport Cooperative Research Project 
ACS                Airbome (defense) control station (system) 
ACTD             Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration 
AD                 Air Defense / Ansar Dine terrorist group. 
A/D                 Attack / Defense Scenario Analysis 
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ADAC            Automated Dynamic Airspace Controller 
ADAPs           Adaptive compute acceleration platforms 
ADC               Air data computer 
ADCP             Acoustic Doppler Current Profiler 
ADF               Automatic direction finder/finding. 
ADMS            Air defense missile (radar) system 
ADS                Air Defense System (USA) 
ADS-B            Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast 
systems 
ADT                Air Data Terminal 
AE                   Artificial Employee 
AESA             Active electronically scanned array 
AEW              Airbome early warning 
AF                   Adaptive Filtering 
AFCS              Automatic flight control system 
AFRICOM     US Africa Command 
AGL                Above ground level 
AGM               Air- to- surface missile 
AGARD         Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and 
Development (NATO) 
AGM-65         Maverick (USA) is an air-to-surface missile (AGM) 
designed for close air support. It is the most widely produced 
precision-guided missile in the Western world, and is effective 
against a wide range of tactical targets, including armor, air 
defenses, ships, ground transportation and fuel storage facilities. 
AGV               Autonomous Guard Vehicle 
AHA               Autopilot Hardware Attack 
AHD               Analog high definition 
AHRS             Attitude and heading reference system 
AI                    Artificial intelligence: “1. a branch of computer science 
dealing with the 
simulation of intelligent behavior in computers and 2: the 
capability of a machine 
to imitate intelligent human behavior.” (Merriam-Webster, 2020) 
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AIAA              American Institute of Aeronautics and Aerospace 
AIC                 Aeronautical Information Circular 
AIP                 Aeronautical Information Publication 
AIS                 Automated Identification System for Collision 
Avoidance 
AJ                    Anti-Jam 
AKM               Autonomous Key Management 
ALB                Air Land Battle 
ALERT           Advanced Low-observable Embedded 
Reconnaissance Targeting system. 
AM                  Amplitude Modulation / al-Mourabitoun terrorist 
group 
AMB               Agile Multi-Beam 
AMRAAM     Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile 
ANSP              Air Navigation Service Provider 
ANO               Air Navigation Order (UK) 
AO                  Area of Operations 
AoA                Angle of Attack 
APEC              Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
APG                Asia-Pacific Gateway 
APKWS          Advanced precision kill weapon system 
AQ                  Al-Qaida Terrorist Group – “the Base” 
AOA               Aircraft operating authority 
AQIM             al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
Ar                            Receive antenna effective area, m2 
AR                   Aspect ratio 
AR drone        AR stands for “Augmented Reality” in AR drone. AR 
Drone can perform tasks like object recognition and following, 
gesture following. 
ARM               Anti-Radiation Munitions 
ARS                Airborne Remote Sensing 
ART                Autonomous Rail Transport 
ARW               Anti-radiation weapons 
AS                   Airborne Sensing Systems 
ASB                Advisory Service Bulletin  / Air Sea Battle 
Abbreviations and Acronyms  |  49
ASBM             Anti-ship ballistic missile 
ASCM             Anti-ship cruise missile 
ASEA             Active electronically scanned arrays 
ASEAN          Association of Southeastern Asian Nations 
ASC                ALEXA /SIRI /CORTANA 
ASICs             Application specific integrated Circuits & circuit 
boards 
ASL                Airborne Systems Laboratory 
ASMS             Automated Separation Management System 
ASR                Chinese Air Silk Road 
ASOS              Automated surface weather observation system 
ASTM             American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) 
ASTER           Agency for Science, Technology and Research 
ASuW             Anti-surface unit warfare 
ASW               Anti-submarine warfare 
AT                  Aerial target 
ATC               Air Traffic Control 
ATHENA       Lockheed Martin Advanced Test High Energy Asset 
ATM               Air Traffic Management 
ATN                Aids to Navigation  (aka ATON) 
ATR                Automatic Target Recognition 
ATS                Air Traffic Service 
AUDS             Anti-UAV Defense System 
AUV               Autonomous Underwater Vehicle 
Avionics          Aviation electronics in manned or unmanned 
aircraft 
AUVSI            Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems 
International 
AV                  Air Vehicle 
AWB               Application White Boxing 
AWOS            Automated weather observation system 
AWSAS          All Weather Sense and Avoid System 
B                     IF equivalent bandwidth, Hz 
Backhauling    Intermediate links between core network or 
internet backbone and small subnets at the edge of the network 
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BA                  Bacterial agent 
BAMS             Broad Area maritime surveillance 
BATS              Bermuda Atlantic Time-series Study 
Bandwidth       Defined as the Range within a band of wavelengths, 
frequencies, or energy. 
Think of it as a range of radio frequencies occupied by a 
modulated carrier wave, assigned to a service over which a device 
can operate. Bandwidth is also a capacity for data transfer of 
electrical communications system. 
BDA                Battle Damage assessment 
BER                Bit error rate 
Black Swan     Black Swan Event- A black swan is an unpredictable 
event that is beyond what is. 
normally expected of a situation and has potentially severe 
consequences. Black 
swan events are characterized by their extreme rarity, severe 
impact, and the 
widespread insistence they were obvious in hindsight. 
(Black Swan Definition, 2020) 
BLOS              Beyond line-of-sight 
BMI                Buried Mine Identification 
BNF                Bind and Fly – with custom transmitter. 
BOSS              Buried Object Scanning Sonar 
BPAUV          Battlespace preparation autonomous underwater 
vehicle 
BRI                 Chinese Belt and Road Initiative 
BR&T             Boeing Research and Technology 
BT                   Biological toxins 
BTA                Biological Threat Agent 
BSR                Bilinear Signal Representation 
BSs                  Base Stations 
BVR                Beyond visual range 
BW                  Biological weapons 
c                      Speed of light ~ (3 x 108 m/s) [186,000 miles per 
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sec] in vacuum named after Celeritas     the Latin word for speed or 
velocity. 
c                      speed of sound (344 m/s) in air 
C                     Combined methods of CR 
C2 / C2W        Command and control / Command and Control 
Warfare 
C3I                  Command, control, communications, and 
Intelligence 
C4                   Command, control, communications, and 
computers 
C4I                  Command, control, communications and 
computers, intelligence 
C4ISR             Command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance &  reconnaissance 
C4ISTAR        Command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance, target 
acquisition and reconnaissance 
CA                  Collision Avoidance / Clear Acquisition (GPS) / 
Cyber Assault (aka CyA) 
C/A                 Civilian acquisition code for GPS 
CAA               Control Acquisition cyber attack 
CAS                Close Air Support / Common situational awareness 
CASA             Civil Aviation Safety Authority 
CASIC            China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation 
C of A             Certificate of Airworthiness 
CAP                Civil Air Publication 
CAT                Collision Avoidance Threshold /Connectivity & 
automation in transport 
CC / CyC        Cyber Crime 
CCCI/II          Classical Cryptography Course Volume I/II (Nichols 
R. K., Classical Cryptography Course Volume I / II, 1996) 
CCE                Cyber Counter Espionage 
CCI                 Command control interface / Cyber 
Counterintelligence 
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CCMCPS        Cooperative Cognitive Maritime Cyber Physical 
System 
CCS                Cyber Counter Sabotage 
CCT                Cyber Counter Terrorism 
CC-UAS         Counter-Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
CD                  Conflict Detection 
CDL                Common datalink 
CDMA            code division multiple access 
CDN               Content Distribution Network 
CDR                Collision detection and resolution systems 
(automated SAA in UAS) 
CEA                Cyber electromagnetic activities (Cyber, EW, 
Spectrum warfare) 
CEO                Chief Executive Officer 
CETC              Chinese Electronics Technology Group 
CF                   Computer Forensics 
CFTA              Continental Free Trade Area 
CFT                Certificate of flight trials / Cross-functional teams 
CHIMERA     Counter-electronic HPM Extended range base air 
defense 
CI / CyI           Cyber Infiltration 
CIA                 Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability / Central 
Intelligence Agency 
CIAD              Cyber- Multi-layered Integrated Air Defense 
Systems 
CIED              Computer improvised explosive device. 
CIN                 Common Information Network 
CIR                 Color Infrared – artificial standard where NIR bands 
shifted so that humans can see the infrared reflectance. 
CISA               Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency 
CLE                Airport code for Cleveland 
C/N                 Carrier to Noise ratio in HAPS, => C/ N0 
C/NA              Communication / Navigation Aid 
CM / CyM       Countermeasure / Cyber Manipulation 
CN3                Communications / navigation network node 
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CNI                 Critical National Infrastructure 
CNKI              China-North Korea-Iran technical weapons 
cooperation agreements 
CNO               Chief Naval Operations 
CNPC             Control and non-payload links 
CO2                      Carbon dioxide emissions 
COA               Certificate of Waiver or Authorization 
COB                Chief of the Boat 
COMINT        Communications intelligence 
COMJAM       Communications Jamming 
COMSEC       Communications Security 
CONOP(S)      Concepts of Operations 
CONUS          Continental United States 
COOP             Cooperative Observer Program 
COS                Continued Operational Safety 
COTS              Commercial off-the-shelf 
CPA                Closest Point of Approach 
CPA Spoof      CPA spoof involves faking a possible collision with a 
target ship. 
CPL                 Commercial pilot’s license 
CPNI               Center for Protection of National Infrastructure 
(UK) 
CPRC              Communist Party of the Republic of China 
CPS                 Cyber-physical systems 
CR                   Conflict Resolution / Close range / Cyber Raid (aka 
CyR) 
CRH                Coaxial rotor helicopter 
CRX                      Received Signal Power, watts 
CS                   Control station 
CSDP              Common Security and Defense Policy missions (EU) 
CSR                Compact Surveillance Radar 
CSfC               Commercial Solutions for Classified Program 
CSIRO            Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
Organization 
CT                   Counter Terrorism / Counter Terrorism Mission 
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CTOL             Conventional take-off and landing 
C-UAS            Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (defenses / 
countermeasures) 
CUAS             CSIRO Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
CV                  Collision Volume 
CW / CyW      Cyber Warfare 
D-STAR          Variation of A-STAR algorithm suitable for solving 
path planning problems in 
unknown environments 
D                     distance from transmitter in Range equation (Adamy 
D. -0., 2015) 
DA                  Danger area 
Danger Close 
Definition www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/
2013/May-June/Myer.html Nov 14, 2013 – 1) danger close is 
included in the “method-of-engagement” line of a call-for-fire 
request to indicate that friendly forces are close to the target. 
… Danger close is a term that is exclusive from risk estimate 
distance (RED) although the RED for 0.1 percent PI is used to define 
danger close for aircraft delivery.  Pi = Probability of incapacitation. 
2) Definition of “danger close” (US DoD) In close air support, 
artillery, mortar, and naval gunfire support fires, it is the term 
included in the method of engagement segment of a call for fire 
which indicates that friendly forces are within close proximity of 
the target. 
DARO            Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office 
DARPA          Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
DAS                Detection by Acoustical Signature 
dB                   decibels 
DC                  Direct Current 
DCL                Drone Champions League 
DCPA             Distance between vessels approaching CPA. 
DDD               Dull, dangerous, and dirty 
DDOS             Distributed Denial of Service cyber attack 
DE                   Directed Energy 
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DEF CON       DEF CON is the world’s longest running and largest 
underground hacking conference. 
DE / EP           Directed energy / Electromagnetic pulse. 
DEM               Digital elevation model 
DEW               Directed energy weapons. 
DF                   Direction finding 
DFCS              Digital Flight Control System 
DHS                Department of Homeland Security 
DIME              Diplomatic, information, military, and economy 
DIRCM           Directed Infrared Countermeasures 
DIY                 Do-it-yourself (amateur built drones or modified 
racing drones) 
D j                    Jammer location – to-target receiver location 
distance, in km, FM 34-40-7 
DJ                    Data Jamming / Drone Jammer 
DJI                  Popular and functional Chinese made drone series: 
Mavic, Phantom, Ryze, Matrix, Spark, Enterprise, Inspire, Tello 
{However, banned by USA Army} (Newman, 2017) 
DL                   Downlink in HAPS 
DLA                Date last accessed (usually a web reference) 
DLI                 Datalink interface 
DME               di-methyl ether 
DNA               Deoxyribonucleic acid 
DoD                Department of Defense 
DOF                Degrees of Freedom 
DOS                Denial of Service cyber attack 
DOT                Department of Transportation 
DPM               Direct power management / Dynamic Power 
Management 
DPRK             Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
D-R-O-N-E     FAA Guidance: Direct, Report, Observe, Notice 
&Execute 
DROV            Remote operating vehicle 
DSA                Detect, sense and avoid / Dynamic Sense-and-Act. 
DSR                Chinese Digital Silk Road 
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DSS                 Decision Support System 
DSSS              Direct sequence spread spectrum. 
D t                   Enemy transmitter location -to- target receiver 
location, in km, FM 34-40-7 
DT                   Directional transmission / Department of 
Transport (UK) 
DTDMA         Distributed Time Division Multiple Access (DTDMA) 
network radio system 
DTED             Digital terrain evaluation data 
DTF                 Drug Task Force 
DTH                Direct-To-Home 
DTI                 Direct Track & Identify 
DTRA             Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
DUO               Designated UAS operator 
DVL                Doppler Velocity Log 
EA                   Electronic Attack 
EARSC           European Association of Remote Sensing Companies 
EAS                Equivalent airspeed 
EAU                East Africa union comprising of Israel and six East 
African states, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, and 
South Sudan 
(Eb / No)         Thermal noise power spectral density ratio 
ECCM / EP     Electronic counter-countermeasures / Electronic 
Protection 
ECM               Electronic countermeasures 
ECR                Electronic combat reconnaissance 
EDC                Estimated Date of Completion 
EDEW            Effects of Directed Energy Weapons 
EEDI               Energy efficiency design index 
EEZP              Exclusive economic Zone protection 
EFF                 Electronic Frontier Foundation 
EHS                Enhanced surveillance 
EIRP               Effective isotopic radiated power 
Electrolaser     Electroshock weapon that is also a DEW. Uses 
lasers to form electrically conductive laser-induced plasma charge. 
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ELINT            Electronic Intelligence 
ELT                Emergency locator transmitter 
ECM               Electromagnetic compatibility 
EM                  Electromagnetic 
EMC               Electromagnetic compatibility 
EME                Electromagnetic environment 
EMI                Electromagnetic interference 
EMO               Electromagnetic operations 
EMP               Electromagnetic pulse 
EMR               Electromagnetic Radiation 
EMS                Electromagnetic Spectrum 
EMSVIS         Electromagnetic Spectrum Visible Light 
EMW              Electromagnetic Waves 
EO                  Electro-optical (sensing) / Earth Observation 
EOI                 Electro-Optical Imager 
EOTS              Electro-optical targeting system 
EPIRB            Emergency Positioning -Indicating Radio Beacon 
EQUAS          Explainable question answering system. 
ERPJ                Effective radiated power of the jammer, in dBm 
ERPS                Effective radiated power of the desired signal 
transmitter, in dBm 
ESC                 Electronic still camera 
ESM / ES        Electronic support measures / Electronic warfare 
support / Earth station  &             ESM                         Electronic 
Signal Monitoring 
EU                   European Union 
EUNAVFOR  European Union Naval Force’s anti-piracy naval 
mission 
EUTM             Somalia Military training mission in Somalia 
EVTOL           Electric Vertical Take-off and Landing 
EW                  Electronic warfare, see 9-15 & footnotes. 
F                      Field theory methods of CR 
F                      Fundamental frequency is defined as the lowest 
frequency of a periodic waveform 
f                       Frequency, cycles / second RRE) 
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Fo                    Resonant frequency of string, Hz see Eq. 20-5 
F                      Frequency in MHz, FM 34-40-7 
FAA                Federal Aviation Administration 
FACE              Future Airborne Capability Environment 
FAME             Fatty acid methyl esters 
FAR                False Alarm Rates 
FB                   Facebook© 
FBL                 Fly-by-Light, a type of flight-control system where 
input command signals are sent to the actuators through the 
medium of optical-fiber. 
FBW               Fly-by-wire 
FCC                Federal Communications Commission 
FCS                 Flight control systems / Flight Control Station 
FDF                 Frequency Domain Filtering 
FDM               frequency division multiplexing 
FHSS              Frequency hopping spread spectrum. 
FIIP                 Floating Integrated Information Platforms 
FIR                  Far Infrared (25-40) to (200-350) um 
FIRES             definition (US DoD – JP 3-0) the use of weapon 
systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target. 
FL                   Flight Level 
FLIR               Forward-looking infrared 
Fly-by-Wire     Predetermine flight mission path based on GPS 
coordinates. 
Floats              Floating sensors (USN) 
FMS                Flexible manufacturing system 
Follow-Me      UAS autopilot automatically follows operator. 
Fom                 HAPS Figure of merit in upload /download link 
FoV                 Field of view 
FFOV              Forward Field of View 
FRAGO          Fragmentary Order – to send timely changes of 
existing orders to a subordinate. 
FPV                 First Person View – live streaming video used in 
racing drones. 
FPGA              Field programmable gate array 
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FS                    Fixed service 
FSS                 Fixed satellite service 
FW                  Fixed wing 
FY                   Fiscal year 
G                     Geometric methods of CR 
G5S                 G5 Sahel (G5S) Joint Force, has membership of five 
states: Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad 
GAO               General Accounting Office USA 
gAR                Receiving Antenna Gain as a Factor 
GBU               Guided Bomb Unit 
GCHQ            Government Communications Headquarters 
(Britain) 
GCS                Ground control station 
GDP                Gross Domestic Product (USA) 
GDPR             European Union’s (EU) General Data Protection 
Regulation 
GDT                Ground data terminal 
GENie             General Electric Network for Information Exchange 
GEO                Geostationary Earth orbit satellite 
GEOINT         Geospatial-Intelligence 
GeoFence        A geo-fence is a virtual perimeter for a real-
world geographic area 
GIGO              Garbage in, garbage out 
GLOW            Gross lift-off weight for a missile / rocket 
GLONASS     Global Satellite Navigational System 
GNL                Galveston National Laboratory 
GNSS              Global Navigation Satellite System 
GPS                 Global Positioning System / Geo Fencing 
GPS/INS         Use of GPS satellite signals to correct or calibrate 
a solution from an inertial navigation system (INS). The method is 
applicable for any GNSS/INS system. 
GPSSPOOF    Hack of GPS system affecting UAS commands. 
GPWS             Ground proximity warning system 
G R                     The receiving antenna gain in the direction of the 
desired signal transmitter, dBi. 
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G RJ                    Receiving antenna gain in the direction of the 
jammer, in dBi. 
GS                   Ground segment of HAPs 
GSAA             Government Services Administration – audit division 
GSE                Ground support equipment 
GSHM            Ground Station Handover Method 
GSM               Global System for Mobile Communications 
GT                   Game Theory methods of CR 
G/T                  ratio of the receive antenna gain to system noise 
temperature. 
(G /Ts) dB      Represents the figure of merit of the HAPS receiver, 
in dB. 
GT                          Gain of the transmit antenna, dB. 
GTA                Ground -to -Air Defense 
Hard damage   DEW complete vaporization of a target 
Harmonic        Frequency, which is an integer multiple of the 
fundamental frequency. 
H                     Elevation of the jammer location above sea level, 
feet, FM 34-40-7 
HAE                High altitude endurance 
HALE             High altitude – long endurance 
HAPS              High Altitude Platforms (generally for wireless 
communications enhancements) 
HAPS UAVs  UAVs dedicated to HAPS service (example to 
communicate via CNPC links) 
HCE                Highly contested environment 
HEAT             High-explosive anti-tank warhead 
HELWS          High energy laser weapon system 
HITL               Human in-the-loop 
HMI                Human machine interface 
HO                  Home Office (UK) 
HPA                High power amplifier 
HPL                High powered laser weapon 
HPM               High powered microwave defense 
HSM               Hardware Security Module 
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H t                          Elevation of enemy transmitter location above 
sea level, in feet, FM 34-40-7 
HUD               Heads-up display 
Human            “a bipedal primate mammal (Homo sapiens), a 
person” (Merriam-Webster, 2020); Humanity        “the quality or 
state of being human.” (Merriam-Webster, 2020) 
Humanoids     “a humanoid being: a nonhuman creature or being 
with characteristics (such as the ability to walk upright) resembling 
those of a human.” 
HUMINT        Human intelligence (spy’s) 
HVT                High value target (generally, for assassination) 
I                       Sound intensity, W x m-2 [Source strength S / 4πr2] 
(Uni-Wuppertal, 2019) 
IA                    Information Assurance / Intentional cyber warfare 
attack 
I-actors            Intentional Cyber Actors 
IACS               Industrial automation and control systems 
IADS              Multi-layered integrated air defense systems 
IAI                  Israeli Aerospace Industries 
IAS                 Indicated airspeed 
IBM                International Business Machines 
ICAO              International Civil Aviation Organization 
I.C.B.C           International Center for Boundary Cooperation 
(China) 
ICBM              Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 
ICGs               Information centers of gravity 
ICS                  Internet Connection Sharing / Industrial control 
systems 
ICT                  Information & Communications Technology 
ID                    Information Dominance / Inspection and 
Identification /Identification 
IEC 62443       International standard for industrial automation 
and control systems 
IEDs                Improvised Explosive Devices 
IEEE               Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
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IETM              Interactive Electronic Maintenance Manuals 
IEWS              Intelligence, electronic warfare, and sensors 
IFF                  Identification, friend, or foe 
IFR                  Instrument flight rules 
I&I                  Interchangeability and Interoperability 
IIT                   Intentional Insider Threats 
Imaging Sensors ARS sensors that build images 
IL                    Intensity level of sound measured, dB, Eq. 20-2 
IMINT            Imagery intelligence 
IMM/IM&M   Interacting-multiple-models tracker / Integrity 
Management & Monitoring 
IMO                International Maritime Organization 
IMU                Inertial Measurement Unit 
INS                 Inertial navigation system 
INFOSEC       Information Security 
IO                    Information Operations, see Figure 9-11 & footnotes. 
IOB                 Internet of bodies 
IOC                 Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission 
IOR                 India Ocean Region 
IoT                  Internet of things 
IIoT                 Industrial Internet of things 
IPL                  Insitu Pacific Limited 
IR                    Infrared Sensors 
IRST               Infrared search and tracking 
IS                    Information Superiority 
ISCS               Integrated shipboard control systems 
ISIS                 Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) 
ISR                  Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance UAS 
Platform 
ISTAR            Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and 
reconnaissance 
IT/OT              Information Technology/ Operational Technology 
ITU                 International Telecommunications Union – 
Standards Organization 
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ITU-R             International Telecommunications Union – Radio 
Sector 
IW                   Information Warfare 
JADC2 Joint all-domain command & control 
JADO              Joint all-domain operations (Thatcher, 2020) 
JAGM             Joint-Air-to-Ground Missile 
JAUS              Joint architecture for UAS 
JDAM             Joint direct attack munitions 
JFO                 Joint fires observer 
JP                    Joint Publication – followed by military identifier. 
JDAM             Joint Direct Attack Munition 
JNIM               Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin 
JOAC              Joint Operational Access Concept 
JOPES             Joint Operation and Planning System / Execution 
System 
JP                    Joint Publication 
J / S                 = the ratio of the jammer power to the desired 
signal power at the input to the receiver being jammed in dB 
JST                  Japan Time zone 
JTAC               Joint Terminal Attack Controller. 
JTIDS              Joint Tactical Information Distribution System 
(JTIDS) is an L band DTDMA. 
K                     Boltzmann’s constant (Noise component, RRE) (1.38 
x 10 -23 J/K), Kelvin 
K                     2 for jamming frequency modulated receivers 
(jamming tuner accuracy), FM 34-40-7 
KAMIKAZI   Means “Divine Wind,” Tactic best known for Japanese 
suicide A/C attacks on Allied Capital Vessels in WWII. UAS TEAMS 
or SWARMS could be directed in the same way. 
KE                   Kinetic energy 
KEW               Kinetic energy weapons 
KM                  Katiba Macina Groups 
KMS               Key Management System 
KSU                Kansas State University 
L                      λ / 2 in Eq. 20-5 
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LAANC          Low Altitude Authorization and Notification 
Capability 
LASER           “A laser is a device that emits light through a process 
of optical amplification based on the stimulated 
emission of electromagnetic radiation. The term “laser” originated 
as an acronym for “light amplification by stimulated emission of 
radiation”. A laser differs from other sources of light in that it emits 
light coherently, spatially and temporally. Spatial coherence allows 
a laser to be focused to a tight spot, enabling applications such 
as laser cutting and lithography. Spatial coherence also allows a 
laser beam to stay narrow over great distances (collimation), 
enabling applications such as laser pointers. Lasers can also have 
high temporal coherence, which allows them to emit light with a 
very narrow spectrum, i.e., they can emit a single color of light. 
Temporal coherence can be used to produce pulses of light as short 
as a femtosecond. Used: for military and law enforcement devices 
for marking targets and measuring range and speed.” (Wiki-L, 2018) 
Laser JDAM   Laser Joint Direct Attack Munition – dumb bombs, 
all weather precision –guided munitions. Guided by an integrated 
inertial guidance system. 
Laser rangefinder Scope to assist targeting of munitions. 
Countermeasure: laser-absorbing paint 
LGWs             Laser-guided weapons 
Latency           Processing difference between time interval signal 
is transmitted and signal is received 
LCAC             Landing Craft Air Cushion Facility 
LCDR             Lieutenant Commander 
L/D                  Lift to drag ratio. 
LDCM            Low Duty cycle methods 
LEO                Low Earth Orbit Satellite / Law Enforcement Officer 
LGB                Laser-guided bomb, a guided bomb that uses semi-
active laser guidance to strike a designated target with greater 
accuracy than an unguided one. 
LGTF              Liptako-Gourma task force (LGTF) established by 
Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to secure their shared border region. 
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LIDAR           Light (Imaging) Detection and Ranging 
LFS                 Free- Space Loss as a Factor 
LIPC               laser-induced plasma channel 
LJ                     Propagation loss from jammer to receiver, in dBi 
LMADIS        Light Marine Air Defense Integrated System (family 
of C-UAS systems) 
LMM               Lightweight Multi-role Missile (by Thales) 
LNG                Liquid natural gas 
LORAN-C      Long Range Navigation, Revision C 
LOS                Line-of-sight / Loss of Signal / Loss of Separation 
LOSAS           Low-cost Scout UAV Acoustic System 
LPA                Log periodic array 
LPI                  Low Probability of Intercept 
LR                   Long range 
LRA                Long range artillery 
LRAD             Long Range Acoustical Device (Weapon) (Yunmonk 
Son, 2015) 
LRCS              Low radar cross section 
LRE                Launch and recovery element. 
LRF                 Laser rangefinder 
LS                            Losses existing in the system (lumped 
together), dB (RRE) 
LS                    The propagation loss from the desired signal 
transmitter, in dBm 
LSDB              Laser Small Diameter Bomb 
LSG                Real-time Tracking Laser Scalar Gradiometer 
LST                 Laser spot trackers 
LTA                Lighter than Air (airship) /Low noise amplifier 
LTE /LTE+     Long Term Evolution – refers to mobile 
telecommunications coverage. 
LUSV             Large Unmanned Surface Vehicles 
LWIR              Long wave Infrared (sensor or camera) 
M                     Mass in Eq. 20-5 
MA                  Multi-agent methods of CR 
MAC               Unique Media access control address assigned to a 
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network interface controller                      (NIC) for use as  a network 
address in communication with a network segment. 
MAD               Magnetic anomaly detection 
MADIS           Marine Air Defense Integrated System 
MAE               Medium-altitude endurance 
MAGTF          Marine air-ground task force 
MALDRONE Malware injected into critical SAA for UAS. 
MALE             Medium-altitude, long endurance UAS 
MALE-T         Medium altitude long endurance – tactical UAS 
MAME            Medium altitude, medium endurance 
MARIN          Maritime Research Institute Netherlands 
MARPOL       Marine pollution (prevention of) 
MAS               Mayflower autonomous system 
MASINT         Measurement and Signal Intelligence 
MATS             Mobile Aircraft Tracking System 
M-AUDS        Mobile Anti-UAV Defense System 
MAV               Micro-air vehicle 
Maverick        AGM -65 (USA) Missile 
MBES             Multi-beam Echo Sounder 
MCE               Mission control element 
MCM              Mine countermeasures 
MCU               Master Control Unit 
MCVs             Mesoscale convective vortices 
MDR               Missed Detection Rates 
Mesonet          network of  automated weather and environmental 
monitoring stations designed to 
observe mesoscale meteorological phenomena. 
MEB               Marine expeditionary brigade (14,500 marines and 
sailors). 
MEMS            Micro-electromechanical systems 
MEO               Medium Earth Orbit satellite 
MFD               Multifunctional display 
MGTOW         Maximum gross take-off weight 
MHT               Multiple-hypotheses-testing 
MIM                Man in the Middle cyber attack 
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MINUSMA    Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in 
Mali 
MIR                Mid Infrared 5 to (25-40) um 
MIT                 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
ML                  Machine learning techniques 
MLRS             Multi launch rocket systems. 
MLU               Mid-life upgrade 
MMI                Man-machine interface 
MORS             Military Operations Research Society 
Modulation     Signal Modulation is the process of varying one or 
more properties of a periodic waveform, called the carrier signal, 
with a modulating signal that typically contains information to be 
transmitted 
MPA               Maritime patrol aircraft 
MPI                 Message-passing interface 
MPC                Model-based predictive control 
MPO               Mission payload operator 
MR                  Medium range / Maritime Reconnaissance 
MRE               Medium-range endurance 
MS                  Mobile service 
MSL / AGL    MSL altitudes are measured from a standard datum, 
which is roughly equal to the average altitude of the ocean. So, an 
aircraft traveling 5,000 feet directly above a mountain that’s 3,000 
feet tall would have an altitude of 5,000 feet Above Ground Level 
(AGL) and 8,000 feet MSL. 
MSR                Maritime Silk Road (China) 
MSSM             Multi-step optimization method to achieve re-
planning for stealth UAV penetration of ADS. 
MTCR             missile Technology Control Regime 
MTI                 Moving target indication* 
MTOM            Maximum take-off mass 
MTOW            Maximum takeoff weight of an aircraft at which the 
pilot can attempt to take off, due to structural or other limits. 
MTS                Multi Spectral Targeting System /Maritime 
Transportation Systems / Sector 
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MTTR             Multitarget tracking radar/Mean time to repair. 
MUAV            Mini-UAV or maritime UAV 
MUJAO          Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa 
MUM              Manned-unmanned teaming. 
MUSV            Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicles 
MW                 Microwave 
MWIR             Midwave Infrared 
MW                 microwave towers 
N                     Available Noise power, watts for HAPS 
N                     Terrain and ground conductivity factor, FM 34-40-7 
5 = very rough terrain with poor ground conductivity 
4 = moderately rough terrain with fair to good ground 
conductivity 
3 = Farmland terrain with good ground conductivity 
2 = Level terrain with good ground conductivity[1] 
The elevation of the jammer location and the enemy transmitter 
location does not include the height of the antenna above the 
ground or the length of the antenna. It is the location deviation 
above sea level. 
NAC               Network Access Control 
NACA            National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics 
NAS                National Airspace (USA) 
NASAMS II   National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System 
NATO             North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NAV               Nano-air vehicle / NAV data message for GPS 
systems 
NAVSEAS     Naval Sea Systems Command 
NBC                Nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare 
NCO               Network-centric operations 
NCW               Network Centric Warfare 
NDRC             National Development and Reform Commission 
(China) 
NEC                Network enabled capability 
NEMESIS       Netted Emulation of Multi-Element Signature 
against integrated Sensors (USN) 
Abbreviations and Acronyms  |  69
NGA               National Geospatial Intelligence Agency 
NGO               Non-Governmental Organization 
NIEM              National Information Exchange Model 
NIR                 near Infrared 
NLOS             Non-line-of-sight 
NM                  Nautical Miles 
NMAC            A NMAC is defined as an incident associated with the 
operation of an aircraft in which a possibility of collision occurs as 
a result of proximity of less than 500 feet to another aircraft, or a 
report is received from a pilot or a flight crewmember stating that a 
collision hazard existed between two or more aircraft. 
NMLA            the National Movement for Liberation of Azawad 
(Tuareg Rebellion) 
NO                  Numerical Optimization methods of CR 
NOAA            National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 
Administration 
NOLO             No onboard live operator (USN) 
NOTAM         Notice to airmen 
NOx                Nitrogen emissions 
NPD                Near Peer Doctrine 
NPS                 National Park Service 
NSA                National Security Agency (US) 
NSRL              New Silk Road Sea / Land routes (Chinese) 
NSWC            Naval Surface Warfare Center 
NSWC PCD    Naval Surface Warfare Center Panama City Division 
NTIA              National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration 
NTM/NTOM   Notice to mariners 
NTSB              National Transportation Safety Board 
NTT                 Non-Threat Traffic 
NULLO          Not using live operator (USAF) 
NUSSRC        National Unmanned Systems Shared Resource 
Center 
O                     Other methods of CR 
OEM               Original Equipment Manufacture 
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OIO                 Offensive Information Operations 
OLOS             Out-of-the-line-of-sight 
OODA            Decision Loop: Observe, Orient, Decide, Act 
OoT                 Ocean of Things (USN) (DARPA) 
ONR               Office of Naval Research 
OPA                Optionally piloted aircraft 
OPAV             Optionally piloted air vehicle (aka OPV) 
OPSEC           Operations Security 
OSI                 Open systems interconnection 
OSS                 Office of Strategic Services (now CIA) 
OT                   Operational technology 
OTH                Over- the- horizon 
OVPR             Office of the Vice President of Research , KSU 
P                      Isotropic source of an electromagnetic pulse of peak 
power, Mw 
PACE              Primary; Alternative; Contingency; Emergency 
PANCAS        Passive Acoustic Non-Cooperative Collision Alert 
System 
PAR                Photosynthetically Active Radiation Sensor 
PB                   Particle Beams, Particle beams are large numbers of 
atomic or sub-atomic. 
particles moving at relativistic velocities. 
PBL                 Planetary boundary layer 
PCAS              Persistent close air support 
PCS                 Personal Communication Services 
PDV                Parameter Data Vector 
PEIRP             Transmitter’s effective isotropic radiated power, 
watts 
PFMS              Predictive Flight Management System 
PEMSIA         Partnership in Environmental Management of the 
Seas of East Asia 
PGB                Precision guided bomb 
PGM               Precision guided missile 
PHOTINT       Photographic intelligence (usually sky – ground) 
PHX                Airport code for Phoenix 
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PI                    Probability of Incapacitation 
PID                 Proportional-Integral- Derivative 
PII                   Personal Identifiable Information 
PIM                 Position of intended movements/Previously 
intended movements 
PIT                  Proximity Intruder Traffic 
P j                           Minimum amount of jammer power output 
required, in watts, FM 34-40-7 
PKI                 Public Key Infrastructure 
PL                   Power level, dB, Eq. 20-1 
PLA                Chinese People’s Liberation Army 
PLAN             Peoples Liberation Army Navy (China) 
PLC                 Programmable Logic Controllers 
PLOCAN        Research facility Oceanic Platform of the Canary 
Islands 
PMA               Post Mission Analysis 
PMIAA           Permissions Management: Identification, 
Authentication and Authorization 
PNF                 Plug and Fly with custom transmitter, receiver, 
battery, and charger. 
PNT                 Reliable communications; positioning, navigation, 
and timing 
PO                   Psychological Operations / Performance Objectives 
POS                 Position and Orientation System 
POV                Point of View 
PPP                 Precise Point Positioning 
PPS                 Precise positioning service (GPS) 
PRC                Peoples Republic of China (China) 
Primum Non Nocere – First Do No Harm (Latin) 
PSD                 Power Spectral Density 
PREACT         Partnership for Regional East Africa 
Counterterrorism (PREACT) 
PRF                 Pulse repetition frequency codes 
PRM                Precision Runway Monitor 
PS                    Pressure sensor 
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PSH                 Plan-symmetric helicopter 
PSR                 Primary Surveillance Radar 
P t                    Power output of the enemy drone, in watts, FM 
34-40-7 
PW/PSYWAR Psychological Warfare 
PWO               Principal Warfare officer 
P(Y)                Precise Signal (GPS)for military positioning 
QOS                Quality of Service in HAPs 
QR                  QR code is a type of matrix barcode which is 
machine or phone readable. 
QUAS             QUT UAS 
QUT                Queensland University of Technology 
R                     1 /Tb is the bit rate (b/s) in link equation 
R&D               Research & Development 
R4                           Energy density received at detected target 
range, R, nm. 
RA                  Resolution Advisory 
RAC                Range air controller 
RACC             Social media RACC Threat Matrix: Removal, 
Authenticity; Censorship,   Collusion 
RADAR          Radio Detection and Ranging 
RADINT         Radar intelligence 
RAM               Radar absorbing materials. 
RAS                Radar absorbing structure. 
RAST              Recovery, assist, and traverse. 
RB                   Rule-based methods (Conflict Resolution) 
RBW               Red- breasted Woodpecker 
RCE                Remote Code Execution 
RCO                Remote-control operator 
RCS                Radar cross-section 
RCTA             Surf Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics 
RDT& E          Research, Development, Test & Evaluation 
RED                Risk Estimate Distance 
Remote ID      Remote ID has two meanings in this textbook. It is 
used as an information / 
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technology device to identify people from a UAV. This term is used 
in the UAS. 
industry and the FAA as a mechanism for identifying an aircraft 
type and the 
registrant from the ground, essentially a digital license plate and 
registration. 
RES                 Radio electronic systems 
RF                   Radio Frequency 
RGB                Red Green Blue for VIS camera 
RGT                Remote ground terminal 
RIAS               Research Institute for Autonomous Systems 
-University of North Dakota 
Rician PDF     Rician probability density function 
RIMPAC        Rim of the Pacific Exercise – Maritime 
RL                   Ramp launched 
RMS                Reconnaissance management system /Root-mean-
square 
RN                  Ryan-Nichols Qualitative Risk Assessment Equations 
17-2, 17-3 
RNRA             Ryan – Nichols Attack / Defense Scenario Risk 
Assessment for Cyber cases 
ROA               Remotely operated aircraft 
ROC                Republic of China (Taiwan) / Regional Operations 
Center (USA) 
ROV/ROUV   Remote operating vehicle / Remotely operated 
underwater vehicle 
RPA                Remotely piloted aircraft 
RPH                Remotely piloted helicopter 
RPV                Remotely piloted vehicle 
RR                   Radio regulations 
RRE                Radar Range Equation 
RSA                RSA (Rivest–Shamir–Adelman) -authors of early 
public –key cryptographic system 
RSTA              Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition 
RTA                Dubai Roads and Transport Authority 
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RTF                 Off- the- shelf, Ready -to -Fly 
RTG                Real time Gradiometer 
RTK                Real Time Kinematic 
RTS                 Remote tracking station/Request to send/Release 
to service. 
RTU                Remote Terminal Unit 
RUAV            Relay UAV 
RWR               Radar warning receiver 
S                      Intensity at surface of sphere 
S&T                 Science & Technology 
SA                   Situational Awareness 
SAA                Sense and Avoid & 
SAA                Sense and Act Systems; replaces See and Avoid 
function of a human pilot. 
SAASM          Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module 
SAE                Society of Automotive Engineers 
SAHRV          Semi-autonomous Hydrographic Reconnaissance 
vehicle 
SAM               Surface to Air Missile 
SAMPLE        Survivable autonomous mobile platform, long-
endurance 
SAP                 Systems Applications and Products also the name of 
a company 
SAR                Synthetic aperture radar / Search and rescue- 
especially using helicopters. 
SAS                 Safety Assurance System 
SATCOM       Satellite communications 
SBP                 Sub Bottom Profiler 
SCADA          Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems 
SCHEMA       Security Incident Identification 
SCIF               Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility 
SCS                 Shipboard control system (or station) / Stereo 
Camera System / South China Sea 
SE                   Synthetic environment 
SEA                Airport code for Seattle 
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SEAD             Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses 
SECDEF         Secretary of Defense 
Shadowing      Airframe shadowing – UAV- Ground signal 
degradation during maneuver 
SEZ                 Special economic zones 
SHM               Simple harmonic motion – represented by sign 
wave. 
SHORAD       Short Range Air Defense systems 
SIGINT           Signals Intelligence 
Signature         UAS detection by acoustic, optical, thermal and 
radio /radar 
SINS               Ships inertial navigation systems. 
SJM                 Salafi-Jihad Movement 
SKASaC         Seeking airborne surveillance and control. 
SKYNET        Fictional artificial intelligence system that becomes 
self-aware 
SLAM             Simultaneous localization and mapping 
SLAMRAAM Surface launched AMRAAM 
SM                  Separation Management 
SMC                Single moving camera 
SME                Subject matter expert 
SMR                Single main rotor 
S/N                  S / N = is one pulse received signal to noise ratio, 
dB: Signal to Noise ratio at HAPS receiver 
SOA                Static Obstacle – Avoidance system 
Soft damage    DEW disruption to a UAS computer 
SOLAS           Safety of Life at Sea (International Maritime 
Convention) [safety conventions] 
SONAR          Sound Navigation and Ranging 
Sox                  Sulfur emissions 
SPL                 Sound pressure level, dB = 20 Log p / po [ measured 
pressures to reference pressure]          see Eq. 20-3,4; 6-7 
SPS                 Standard position service (GPS) 
Spoofing         A Cyber-weapon attack that generates false signals 
to replace valid ones. 
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Spot sensors    ARS sensors that measure single locations without 
image library 
SPURV           Special purpose underwater research vehicle 
SQL                SQL Injection – common malevolent code injection 
technique 
SR                   Short range 
SRBM             Short range ballistic missile, ex SCUD missile 
SRL                 Systems readiness level 
SSA                 Static Sense-and -Act 
SSBN              Ballistic missile submarine force 
SSP                 Smart Skies Project 
SSR                 Secondary Surveillance Radar 
SST                 Self – Separation Threshold 
ST&T              Submarine Track and Trail 
STANAG 4856 Standard interfaces of UAV Control System for 
NATO UAV 
STCW             Standards of training and certification 
STK                 Satellite toolkit 
STOL              Short take-off and landing 
sUAS              Small Unmanned Aircraft System 
SubT                Subterranean Challenge Urban Circuit 
SUAVE          Small UAV engine 
SWARM         High level, dangerous collaboration of UAS, UUV, or 
unmanned boats 
SWAT             Special Weapons and Tactics (police / paramilitary) 
SWAP             Size, weight, and power 
SWIR              Shortwave infrared, 1400-3000 nm, 1.4 -3.0 um 
wavelength range 
SZ                   Safety Zone is defined as the horizontal and vertical 
separation criteria which form a cylindrical airspace volume around 
the UAS. In figure 3-2 that volume is defined by 1000 ft. radius and 
200 ft. height. It is assumed that initially the UAS is in the center 
with 100 ft above and below the A/C. 
T                      In Range equation & environment, strength of a 
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received signal, function of square or fourth power of distance, d, 
from transmitter (Adamy D. -0., 2015) 
T                      Time, sec (RRE) 
T                      Tension in Eq.20-5 
TA                   Traffic Advisory 
TAC                Target air controller 
TACAN          Tactical air navigation 
TAR                Antenna noise temperature, Kelvin 
TAS                 True airspeed 
TBO                Time between overhauls 
TC                   Type certificate 
TCAS              Traffic alert and collision avoidance system 
TCPA              Time to reach Closest Point of Approach 
Te                    Effective input noise temperature, Kelvin, 
TEAM (UAS) High level, dangerous collaboration of UAS, UUV, or 
unmanned boats; differs from SWARM in that it has a UAS Team 
Leader, (TL) where SWARM does not. TL directs the UAS team and 
is the primary counter UAS target to disrupt. 
TETRA           Terrestrial Trunked Radio for terrestrial terminals / 
services 
Thermobaric   Metal augmented charge 
THOR             Tactical high-power operational responder 
TIR                  Thermal infrared = 8000 – 15000 nm, 8 -15 um 
TL                   Team Leader 
TLS                 Transport Layer Security 
TO                   take-off 
Tort                 A tort is an act or omission that gives rise to injury 
or harm to another and amounts to a civil wrong for which courts 
impose liability. 
TP                    Trajectory Prediction 
TRANSCOM  U.S. Transportation Command networks 
TRL                 Technology readiness level: Technology readiness 
levels are a rating method. 
developed by NASA to describe where a technology is in terms of 
its 
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development.  The lowest levels (1 – 3) are technologies that are 
being. 
researched, the middle levels (4 – 6) are technologies that are 
being prototyped. 
and tested, and the highest levels (7 – 9) are technologies that are 
being. 
demonstrated and used.  (NASA, 2017) 
TS                    Measured noise temperature, Kelvin units above 
absolute zero. 
TSTCP            Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. TSCTP 
partners include Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia. 
TT & C           Telemetry, tracking and command. 
TUAV             Tactical UAV 
UA                  Unmanned Aircraft (non-cooperative and potential 
intruder) 
U-Actors         Unintentional Cyber Actors 
UAE                United Arab Emirates 
UAM               Urban Air Mobility (vehicle) 
UAPO             Unmanned Aircraft Program Office 
UAS                Unmanned aircraft system 
UASCdr          Unmanned aircraft system commander 
UASIPP          UAS Integration Pilot Program 
UAS-p             UAS pilot 
UAV               Unmanned aerial vehicle / Unmanned autonomous 
vehicle. 
UAV-p            UAV pilot 
UBR                Uplink bit rate, Mb/s 
UCAR             Unmanned combat armed rotorcraft 
UCARS          UAV common automated recovery system 
UCAV            Unmanned combat air vehicle 
UCWA / UA   Unintentional cyber warfare attack 
UG                  Underwater glider (USN) 
UGCS             Unmanned Ground Control Station 
UGS                Unmanned ground-based station 
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UGT                Unmanned ground transportation 
UGV               Unmanned ground vehicle 
UHF                Ultra High Frequency, 300 MHz – 3 GHz 
UIT                 Unintentional Insider Threats 
UK                  United Kingdom 
UL                   Upload link 
ULC                Uniform Law Commission 
ULPCG           University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria 
UMTS             Universal Mobile Telecommunications System 
U.N.                United Nations 
UND               University of North Dakota 
UNESCO        United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization 
UNICEF         United Nations Children’s Fund 
US                   United States 
USAMRIID    U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious 
Diseases 
USBL              Responder for Surface Ultra Short Baseline 
USCG             United States Coast Guard 
USCGA          United States Coast Guard Auxiliary 
USD                Unmanned surveillance drone / United States 
Dollar 
USMC             United States Marine Corp 
USS                 Undersea Search and Survey 
USV                Unmanned surface vehicle [Boat] 
UTM               Unmanned Traffic Management / Safe Uniform 
Traffic Management 
UTV                Unmanned target vehicle 
UUV               Unmanned underwater / undersea vehicle. 
UV                  Unmanned Vehicle 
UUNs/DUNSs Urgent / deliberate universal needs statements 
UXO               Unexploded Ordinance 
V                     Visible 
VCR                Video Camera Recorder 
VFR                Visual flight rules 
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VHS                Very High Frequency Radio 
VIKI               Virtual Interactive Kinetic Intelligence 
VLA                Very light aircraft 
VLJ                 Very Light Jet 
VLAR             Vertical launch and recovery 
VLOS             Visual Line of Sight 
VMC               Visual Meteorological Conditions 
VNIR              Visible light and near infrared 400 – 1400 nm, 0.4 – 
1.4 um wavelength range 
VOA               Voice of America 
Voloport          Landing site for Volcopter. 
VTC                Vessel traffic control 
VTM               Vessel traffic management 
VTOL             Vertical take-off and landing 
VTUAV          Vertical take-off UAV 
WABN            wide available broadband networks 
WARM           identify war reserve mode emissions. 
WEF                World Economic Forum 
WEZ               Weapon Engagement Zone 
WMD              Weapons of Mass Destruction /Weapons of Mass 
Disruption 
WMDD           Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate 
WRC               World Radio Conference Standards Organization 
XLUUV          Extra-large unmanned undersea vehicle 
XO                  Executive Officer of Naval vessel 
ZIGBEE or KILLERBEE      Sniffing / penetration tools specific to 
UAS. 
 
Greek / Mathematical Symbols 
λ                      Wavelength in Hz, c / f where c= speed of light 344 
m/s and f = frequency, Hz. 
Σ                      Radar Cross Sectional Area, m2 
υ                      UAV velocity vector and UAV speed (ms -1) 
θ                      Horizontal angle in inertial axes (rad) 
Ψ                     Vertical angle in inertial axes (rad) 
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x,y,z                 Inertial position coordinates (m) 
κ                      Curvature (m-1) 
τ                       Torsion, (m-1) 
r(q)                  Path, with path variable (q) 
h                      Path length (m) 
e                       Basis axes vector set. 
P(x, y, z, θ, Ψ) UAV pose where: where x, y, z, is the UAV location or 
waypoint and (θ, Ψ) are. 
the horizontal and vertical angles , respectively 
Ps                    Starting pose for UAV moving to 
Pf                    Finish pose 
Џ                     Path constraint in (9.4) 
a                      lateral acceleration proportional to curvature k 
∞                     vector operator in (9.6) 
f(n)                  Path cost function in (9.9) 
g(n)                  cost of path from start node n to the goal. 
h(n)                 Heuristic function which estimates the distance 
from the next node n on the path. 
to goal in (9.9) 
h(X)                 represents actual journey cost from goal X. 
g(X,E)             represents the estimate journey cost from state X to 
the current position of the 
stealth UAV in (9.10) 
N                     Length of the prediction domain in (9.11) & N steps 
in (9.12) 
W                    length of the control domain in (9.11) 
qi                     Output prediction error 
qj                     Is the weighting coefficient of the control variable 
in (9.11) 
k                      Kth node for prediction of cost of predicted flight 
path in MPC (9.12) 
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Asymmetric warfare can describe a conflict in which the 
resources of two belligerents differ in essence and, in the struggle, 
interact and attempt to exploit each other’s characteristic 
weaknesses. Such struggles often involve strategies and tactics 
of unconventional warfare, the weaker combatants attempting to 
use strategy to offset deficiencies in quantity or quality of their 
forces and equipment. (Thomas, 2010) Such strategies may not 
necessarily be militarized. (Steponova, 2016) 
 
This is in contrast to symmetric warfare, where two powers have 
comparable military power and resources and rely on tactics that 
are similar overall, differing only in details and execution. (Thomas, 
2010) 
Sources plus Bibliography below: (Nichols R. K., Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems In the Cyber Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced 
Air Assets. 2nd Ed. Manhattan, KS: New Prairie Press., 2019) and 
(Nichols, et al., Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems Technologies 
and Operations, 2020) (Nichols & et.al, 2020) 
Austin, R, (2010) Unmanned Aircraft Systems: UAVS Design, 
Development and Deployment, West Sussex, UK: Wiley, [Condensed 
with additions from eleven-page “Units and Abbreviations Table.” 
Pp. ix-xxix] Additional sources generated from / specific to Chapter 
development / discussion. A few definitions taken from Wikipedia. 
Cyber terminology from: Nichols, R. K. (Sept. 5, 2008) Cyber 
Counterintelligence & Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility 
(SCIF) Needs – Talking Points & (Randall K. Nichols J. J., 2018) 
& (Nichols R. K., Hardening US Unmanned Systems Against Enemy 
Counter Measures, 2019) & (Randall K. Nichols D. , Chapter 20 
Acoustic CM & IFF Libraries V SWARMS Rev 1 05142019, 2018) 
& (Randall K. Nichols and Lekkas, 2002)& (NIST, September 2012) 
Alford, L. D., Jr., USAF, Lt. Col. (2000) Cyber Warfare: Protecting 
Military Systems Acquisition Review Quarterly, spring 2000, V.7, No. 
2, P, 105, (Nielsen, 2012) 
Nichols, Randall K.; Mumm, Hans C.; Lonstein, Wayne D.; Ryan, 
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Julie J.C.H.; Carter, Candice; and Hood, John-Paul, “Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain” (2019). NPP eBooks. 27. 
https://newprairiepress.org/ebooks/27 
Http://Www.Dtic.Mil/Dtic/Tr/Fulltext/U2/A487951.Pdf 
Appendix 1: Standard Acoustic Principal Physical Properties 
(Entokey, 2019) 
and (Gelfand S. A., 2009) 
 
A majority of the technical abbreviations come from (Nichols R. K., 
et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain, 2019) and 
(Nichols, et al., Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems Technologies 
and Operations, 2020) (Nichols & et.al, 2020) (Nichols, et al., 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in Cyber Domain: Protecting 
USA’s Advanced Air Assets, 2nd Edition, 2019) Nichols, R. K., Ryan, 
J., Mumm, H., Lonstein, W., Carter, C., Hood, J., . . . & Jackson, M. 
(2020). Unmanned Vehicle Systems & Operations on Air, Sea, Land. 
Manhattan, KS: New Prairie Press #35. Nichols, R. K., Sincavage, S., 
Mumm, H., Lonstein, W., Carter, C., Hood, J., . . . & Shields, B. (2021). 
Disruptive Technologies With Applications In Airline, Marine, Defense 
Industries. Manhattan, KS: New Prairie Press, #TBA. 
Other definitions from the following references: 
References 
49 U.S. Code § 40103, 49 U.S. Code § 40103 Sovereignty and use of 
airspace (U.S. Code July 5, 1994). 
Abramson, E. (2016). Ethical Dilemmas in the Age of AI. Retrieved 
from Abramson, E. – knowmail.me/blog: 
https://www.knowmail.me/blog/ethical-dilemmas-age-ai/ 
Adamy, D. -0. (2015). EW 104 EW against a New Generation of 
Threats. Boston: Artech House. 
Adamy, D. (2001). EW 101 A First Course in Electronic Warfare. 
Boston, MA: Artech House. 
Adamy, D. (2001). EW 101 A First Course in Electronic Warfare. 
Boston: Artech House. 
Adamy, D. (2004). EW 102 A Second Course in Electronic Warfare. 
Boston: Artech House. 
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The length of the aft hull-section (Laft) is (Eq. 1.1): 
(1.1) 
Laft  =  100 – ( Lfwd  +  Lmid ) 
 
The radius of the forward hull-section, Rfwd, for a given axial 
coordinate, x, is defined as a modified semi-ellipsoid (Eq. 1.2): 
(1.2) 
 
Rfwd     =   (D /2)    { [ 1 – ( x- Lfwd / x ) 
2 ] n } 
 
The radius of the aft hull-section, Raft, is defined as (Eq. 1.3): 
(1.3) 
Raft  =  (D /2)  – { [ (3D/2Laft 
2    –  tan α  / Laft)  ( x – Lfwd  – Laft ) 
2  ] 
} 
 
6  Future Proof Security [Shields] 
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1. Propulsion and Fuels: 
Disruptive Technologies for 
Submersible Craft Including 
UUVs [Jackson] 
 
Student Learning Objectives – The student will understand 
disruptive technologies associated with submersible craft including 
unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). 
The student will be able to: 
• Understand the drivers for change that leads to the adoption 
of disruptive technologies. 
• Appreciate the need for international regulations to manage 
the disruption. 
• Explain the current and future disruptive technologies that 
drive the need to change fuels for use in new propulsion 
systems. 
• Understand the role of naval architects in developing 




Drivers for Change 
The major disruptors in terms of propulsor’s and associated fuels 
for UUVs (Button, 2009) are driven by three areas: introduction of 
carbon taxes, rising cost of fuel and environmental regulations. In 
terms of carbon emissions, Article 2.2 of the Kyoto Protocol limits 
carbon emissions and is governed by the International Maritime 
Propulsion and Fuels: Disruptive
Technologies for Submersible Craft
Organization (IMO) for all seafaring craft (American Bureau of 
Shipping, 2019). Failure to reach such an agreement globally means 
that individual nations is responsible for its own reductions and 
the IMO developed the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) to 
support nations who are proactive at reducing carbon emissions.  At 
best, nations monitor reductions, and the naval architect develops 
procedures aimed at reducing the carbon footprint of the craft. 
 
The rising price of oil is a way of reducing carbon emissions from 
an economic viewpoint. As it is a finite resource, there will be a 
point when the price of oil will force operators of submersibles 
including UUVs to use an alternate fuel and its finite volume is seen 
as a significant disruptor that will force naval architects to design 
craft that will use renewable sources of energy (Department of the 
Navy, 2004), (Department of Defense, 2011), (Department of Defense, 
2012). Extra-large UUVs (XLUUVs) is set to become the dominant 
UUV for the US Navy starting 2023 (US_Congress, 2020). The US 
navy defines XLUUVs as greater than 48 inches in diameter and can 
only be launched from a pier rather than a manned submarine. 
 
A typical XLUUV is shown in Figure 1.1 and is known at the Boeing 
Echo Voyager XLUUV. The Echo Voyager is 51 feet in length and has 
a rectangular cross section of 8.5 feet x 8.5 feet, a weight in air of 
50 tons, and a range of 6,500 nautical miles. It can accommodate a 
modular payload section up to 34 feet in length and provides 2,000 
cubic feet of internal payload volume. 
 
Figure 1.1 Boeing Echo Voyager XLUUV. Courtesy of Boeing 
(https://www.boeing.com/defense/autonomous-systems/echo-
voyager/index.page) 




The regulatory authority that serves the international maritime 
community is known as the ‘International Maritime Organization’ 
and is an arm of the United Nations (UN). The UN has a secretariat 
of flag states where regulations and conventions are debated and 
agreed. The IMO provides rules that follow the regulations and are 
adopted across all territorial and international waters. There are 
a number of regulations that cover UUVs and are associated with 
the prevention of marine pollution (MARPOL), standards of training 
and certification (STCW) and safety conventions (SOLAS).  MARPOL 
applies to the protection of the marine environment from the craft 
itself, STCW provides a competency framework for operators of 
UUVs and SOLAS applies to structural integrity of UUVs and other 
seafaring craft, manned or unmanned (American Bureau of 
Shipping, 2019).  Emissions control under MARPOL Annex VI 
restricts the emissions of nitrogen (NOX) and sulfur (SOX) pollutants 
during the combustion of diesel in prime movers.  However, 
restrictions in ozone, particulates and greenhouse gases are 
included in subsequent amendments of Annex VI. 
 
The standards are arranged in three tiers I, II, and III. Tier I was 
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established in 1997 and ratified in 2004, whereas Tiers II and III were 
established in 2008 and ratified in 2010.  NOX limits apply globally, 
whereas SOX limits apply regionally.  Large seafaring vessels 
typically produce relative CO2 emissions between 1 – 3, whereas 
airplanes emit 398 relative units of CO2, small goods vehicles emit 
226 relative units of CO2, large articulated trucks emit 49 relative 
units of CO2, while railway wagons emit 6 relative units of CO2. 
Therefore, ships and submersibles have a low carbon footprint than 
other forms of global transport. 
 
Fuels and Propulsion: Current Disruptive Technologies 
Diesel Fuels 
Diesel engines have improved significantly since the 1980s with 
advances associated with increased bore/stroke ratio, slow- and 
medium-speed engines, improved peak pressures and significant 
fuel reductions in two-stroke engines. Turbocharging efficiency 
and fuel injection technology have contributed to further 
reductions in consumption in four-stroke engines. However, since 
the mid-1990s, the design of diesel engines changed due to the 
reduction of NOX and SOX emissions without changing fuel 
efficiency requirements. Marine engine design has changed since 
the mid-1990s and include changes such as: low NOX combustions 
with adjustable camshafts, variable inlet valve controls, high boost 
pressures and better combustion chamber design, greater 
mechanical strength of engines, two-stage turbocharging, exhaust 
gas recirculation, waste gate technology, sequential turbocharging, 
variable turbine geometry, humidification of inlet air, use of 
selective catalytic reduction systems, exhaust gas scrubbing, and 
the emulsification of fuels (MAN Energy Solutions, 2018). 
 
The disruptive technologies used for improving NOX emissions 
in diesel engines are focused on reducing peak temperatures and 
duration of the combustion cycle and the use of Miller cycle inlet 
valve timings and higher-pressure turbochargers. It has been 
discovered that using the Miller cycle instead of the Diesel cycle 
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during combustion reduces NOX emissions by reducing the cycle 
temperature at constant high pressure, hence the use and further 




Collections of cells and proteins and the conditions under which 
these natural living systems grow and replicate created the first 
biofuels. The first generation of biofuels consisted of biodiesel and 
bioethanol.  Biodiesel is manufactured from vegetable oils (coconut, 
palm, rape seed, soybean, and tallow) and animal fats. They are 
classed as fatty acid methyl esters (FAME) and are manufactured 
when vegetable oils and animal fats react with alcohol such as 
methanol. Bioethanol is manufactured by fermenting renewables 
based on sugar or starch.  These ingredients are typically cassava, 
corn, sorghum, sugar beets, sugar cane and wheat.  The variability in 
FAME stability in various conditions is due to the type of ingredients 
used in their formulation and their ability to absorb water and hold 
in suspension, which causes hydrolytic reactions that causes FAME 
to revert to fatty acids.  If water is dissociated microbiological 
growth can clog filters and corrosion of engine parts can occur. 
Disruptors that may enhance and increase the use of biofuels 
focus on producing synthetic fuels based on branch-chain higher 
alcohols, E-coli, microorganisms such as yeast and algae-based 
fuels. Other types of fuels that may be used in the future could 
be based on di-methyl ether (DME) that can be produced from 
biomass, natural coal and gas and oil residues. It is condensed when 
pressured above 0.5 MPa, is non-toxic and environmentally benign 
and is not dissimilar to liquid natural gas (LNG). It has a high cetane 
number and is high in oxygen content when mixed in air achieving 
smokeless combustion and very low formation of particulates. 
However, it has a lower density than other fuels and lower 
combustion enthalpy. It requires lubricity and corrosive inhibiting 
additives, but despite the issues of lubricity and corrosion, it has 
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high thermal efficiency, low noise, low NOX emissions and is low in 
particulates (low soot formation) (MAN Energy Solutions, 2018). 
 
Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) Fuels 
The principal constituent of LNG is CH4, which reduces CO2 
emissions by 25%. Also, NOX production is 85% less due to 
compression ratio and combustion temperature differences. Since 
sulfur is absent from the fuel, SOX emissions are non-existent.  The 
advantages of using LNG are described as low emissions, existing 
marine engines burn LNG, LNG is cheaper than most fuels, and 
fueling technology is well established.  The disadvantages 
associated with LNG are associated with methane slip and that 
LNG requires a heat source to evaporate it to form a gas used for 
combustion. 
 
Gas Turbine Propulsion 
Gas turbines are used for direct propulsion or can be used to 
generate electricity to electric motors when not used for 
propulsion.  Figure 1.2 shows a typical cross-section of a gas turbine. 
This allows them to be used for hybrid operations coupled to diesel 
engines or diesel generators. Gas turbines have the advantage of 
low weight compared to standard prime movers and aero-derivative 
turbines burn distillate fuels that satisfy current regulations on 
emissions and smoke generation.  However, distillate fuels are more 
expensive than standard marine fuels, and are very powerful when 
turbines are heat recovery turbines are coupled to use the exhaust 
gases to increase thermal efficiency for electricity generation. 
Indeed, gas turbines can be used for propulsion and for providing 
electricity to secondary propulsion units. The advantages of using 
gas turbines lies in the fact that they are high power density prime 
movers and are low weight and small size. NOX emissions are low 
and SOX emissions are negligible due to use of high-grade fuels. 
However, distillate fuels are expensive, turbines are less efficient as 
ambient temperature increases and thermal efficiencies are lower 
compared to diesel engines (MAN Energy Solutions, 2018). 
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Figure 1.2 Cross section of a typical gas turbine 
engine. Courtesy of Tilyudai and reused under license CC BY-NC-






Energy generation and storage usually relies on breaking 
chemical bonds between atoms. Nuclear power relies on converting 
large and heavy nuclei into smaller fission products by controlled 
chain reactions. A large amount of heat is generated that is 
converted to usable power via an appropriate thermodynamic cycle. 
Nuclear propulsion is CO2 free and is quite disruptive in terms of 
using it as a propulsion source. Molten salt thorium reactors are 
considered to be disruptors to using diesel and turbine power units 
owing to the abundance of thorium compared to uranium and using 
molten salts of fluorides and chlorides to act as coolants operating 
at temperatures in the range of 650OC to 700 OC. Such reactors are 
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in development and the use on seafaring craft is governed by the 
IMO’s Code of Safety for Nuclear Ships, Resolution A.491 (XII), 1981. 
However, they have not been used on UUVs and small submersibles 
so experience and knowledge of operation from larger submarines 
may have to be transferred to the naval architect responsible for 
using them in UUVs.  The advantages of using them include no 
emissions generated, the design of reactors is well established so 
could easily be adapted for UUVs, they can be small and modular 
in design, the cost of fuel is paid at the beginning of use and is 
not subjected to price fluctuations.  The disadvantages of this 
technology are associated with knowledge of safety and the lack 
of systems engineering knowledge in personnel that would prevent 
wider adoption, design of UUVs may be constrained because of the 
technology, regulatory standards would need to be created for use 
in UUVs, support systems and planned response to misuse would 
need to be developed and for use a new and controversial 
technology, proof of concept and the management of public 
perception will need to be managed (MAN Energy Solutions, 2018). 
 
Battery Technology 
Battery technology is very well advanced and documented. New 
battery chemistries are fundamental and constitute the most 
disruptive technology associated with their wider use on UUVs. 
Metal-sulfur is typical, but metal-air is becoming more widespread 
such as lithium-air being the leading couple due to its ability to 
provide the highest amount of energy per density of metal. 
However, post lithium-air battery technology is being developed 
due to the limited supply of lithium.  The use of magnesium-air 
batteries is being considered and the technology developed because 
magnesium can be harvested from salt water. However, energy 
storage is thought to be the key to the future for UUVs, so the 
development of supercapacitors to store charge is a key disruptor 
for many areas of transport, not least UUVs. The advantages of 
batteries on UUVs are focused on non-generation of emissions, 
continuous development means that they will get smaller and more 
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powerful and that batteries can be used as hybrid power generators 
with combinations of other modes of propulsion (MAN Energy 
Solutions, 2018). Disadvantages include size and the fact that they 
need to be recharged/replaced when the UUV is being used in 
service. A submarine battery cell is shown in Figure 1.3. 
 
Figure 1.3 Submarine battery cell. Courtesy of Jamie 
Sanford and used with permission under license CC BY-NC 2.0. 





Fuel cells were invented in 1838 but not widely adopted until 
recently due to their low mass, the emission of the fuel cell is 
water, and because materials technology has advanced so much in 
recent years that fuel cells may be widely used. They are electro-
chemical and require support plant such as pumps and fans and 
rely on hydrogen and oxygen combining to release energy.   The 
reactants consumed by the fuel cell is stored externally rather than 
internally (batteries) and can be renewed continuously rather than 
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depleted (battery). Therefore, it produces power all the time as long 
at the reactants are supplied to it.  There are certain drawbacks to 
their use such as hydrogen supply issues at sea and they have lower 
specific power and density compared to diesel engines. They also 
provide direct current output that is not compatible with coupling 
to mechanical transmission systems (MAN Energy Solutions, 2018). 
However, they can be used for auxiliary power sources, methanol 
can be used as a substitute fuel, they are quiet (no moving parts), 
and they require clean fuels that do not emit SOX or NOX due to low 
temperature operation. Figure 1.4 shows a fuel cell developed by the 
Argonne National Laboratory, USA. 
 
Figure 1.4 Fuel cell. Courtesy of Argonne National 
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Hydrogen is a potential disruptive fuel for use on UUVs and can 
come from sources such as wind, hydro-electric, nuclear or as a 
conventional fuel used in fuel cells. The advantages of using liquid 
hydrogen are that it does not produce CO2 or SOX emissions, it uses 
land-based sources of power for creation, it can be used in fuel cells 
and in internal combustion engines and burning it produces a large 
amount of fresh water (MAN Energy Solutions, 2018).  However, it is 
unknown in the marine sector, has some safety issues and a supply 
infrastructure would be needed for use in UUVs. 
 
Future Disruptive Technologies for Propulsion and Fuels 
Hybrid Propulsion 
Hybrid propulsion is an option where different modes of power 
can be used to optimize the operation of the UUV. The reasons 
for selecting hybrid propulsion systems are focused on reduced 
fuel consumption, reduced impact of CO2 and other pollutants, 
variable future fuel costs and supply, insurance against increasing 
environmental legislation, noise reduction, operating in zero 
emission mode, and lower amount of maintenance. 
Further disruptive technologies associated with propulsion 
include the use of propellers such as fixed pitch, controllable pitch 
propellers and ducted propellers.  The type of propeller used for 
UUVs is determined by operational conditions.  Typically, for small 
high-speed UUVs both rotational speed and propeller advance can 
be high and it can be difficult to control the effects of cavitation. 
Therefore, developments in the use of ducted and podded 
propellers will need to be made to apply this disruptive technology 
to UUVs. Other types of propeller to be considered for use on UUVs 
include contra-rotating propellers, and cycloidal propellers.  The 
naval architect should maximize the diameter of the propeller so 
that torque, thrust, and propeller efficiency are maximized.  The 
propeller can be approximated to a Wageningen B-screw series 
using open water design data.  This is well characterized in most 
texts concerned with naval architecture (Lewis, 1988). Other 
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disruptive technologies to consider for propulsion is waterjet 
propulsion and magneto hydrodynamic propulsion for small UUVs. 
 
Energy Saving Devices 
Energy saving devices associated with hydrodynamic flow are 
considered in three sections of the hull: before the propeller, at 
the propeller and after the propeller.  There are some overlapping 
areas but mostly operate at the boundary layer and in the wake of 
the UUV. Devices placed on the flow of the propeller include wake 
equalizing ducts, asymmetric stern, Grothuis spoilers, partial stern 
tunnels, Mewis ducts, reaction fins, Zozen nozzles, and integrated 
ducted propellers. 
Disruptive technologies applied to the propeller area include low 
speed propellers, propellers with end plates, Kappel propellers and 
propeller boss cap fins. For energy saving behind the propeller, grim 
vane wheels, rudder thrusting fins and rubber bulb fins are adopted 
depending on the mode of operation (Hughes, 2010). 
 
 
Hull Design (Appendages and Coatings) 
The efficiency of the hull is governed by the form of the hull and 
its dimensions (Nicholls, 2020).   The hull envelope for submersibles 
is described by the Jackson hull-form (Figure 1.5) (Hughes, 2010). 
However, the stern of the UUV can be improved by using the Myring 
hull-form with its axisymmetric geometry.  The Myring hull-form is 
a function of five variables: forward length of hull-section (Lfwd), 
parallel mid-body length (Lmid), forward curvature index (n), tail 
semi-angle (α), and maximum hull-form diameter (D). 
The length of the aft hull-section (Laft) is (Eq. 1.1): 
(1.1) 
Laft  =  100 – ( Lfwd  +  Lmid ) 
 
The radius of the forward hull-section, Rfwd, for a given axial 
coordinate, x, is defined as a modified semi-ellipsoid (Eq. 1.2): 
(1.2) 
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Rfwd     =   (D /2)    { [ 1 – ( x- Lfwd / x ) 
2 ] n } 
 
The radius of the aft hull-section, Raft, is defined as (Eq. 1.3): 
(1.3) 
Raft  =  (D /2)  – { [ (3D/2Laft 
2    –  tan α  / Laft)  ( x – Lfwd  – Laft ) 







FORWARD-BODY                          MID-
BODY                                       AFT-BODY 
Figure 1.5 Jackson hull-form geometry. [Adapted from Open 
Clipart Vectors by pixabay (Public Domain Image)] 
The Myring hull-form is similar to the Jackson hull-form. 
However, the semi-angle of the aft section provides the naval 
architect with the ability to account for stern flows effects due 
to the geometry of the hull-section.  The use of coatings on the 
Myring hull-form has yet to be investigated as a potential disruptive 
technology that could changes the characteristics of skin friction 
resistance and reduced biofouling. 
 
Hull coatings and roughness is significant when considering the 
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motion of UUVs. Hull coatings minimize the skin friction component 
of resistance and prevent fouling of the surface.  Tin-based coatings 
have been used regularly in marine applications to prevent fouling 
but are detrimental to the environment. Therefore, disruptive 
technologies are focused on providing environmentally-friendly 
coatings such as electrochemically active coatings that allow the 
injection of boundary interfaces with bubbles so that an air cushion 
can be activated under certain conditions to reduce friction and 
disrupt the fouling process.  Investigations into the texture of 
coating/hull surfaces will need to be conducted to emulate the skin 
of marine mammals so that friction and fouling is minimized or 
eliminated completely. 
 
Superconducting Electric Motors 
Electric motors are very efficient, but superconducting electric 
motors are highly efficient (~ 99%).  This allows them to reduce 
operating costs of UUVs and reduce emissions.  Superconducting 
motors are smaller in size, typically developing power per weight 
in the region of 30 kW/kg compared to standard electric motors 
~ 5 kW/kg.  High temperature superconductors discovered in 1986 
are useful for developing this technology, but the discovery of 
magnesium diboride as a superconducting material in 2001 means 
that its lower critical temperature and sensitivity to magnetic fields 
will need to be adapted for use in rotating electrical machinery.  The 
potential advantages of this disruptive technology include very low 
losses in electrical machines such as motors and the size and weight 
of the motor compared to traditional electric motors is much lower. 
However, the technology is yet to be proven at sea. 
 
Conclusions: Naval Architect’s Role 
The role of the naval architect is becoming increasingly complex 
and broad especially when one considers the effects of extreme 
weather and the minimization of using the earth’s scarce resources 
(Lewis, 1988).  The future naval architect will need to work with 
natural scientists, such as marine biologists, in order to design 
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vessels that work with nature to minimize the impact on the natural 
world (Hughes, 2010). The role will continue to work with engineers 
from other disciplines, project managers and business 
administrators and we may see the development of new academic 
courses that blend the principles of naval architecture with business 
studies that includes the commercial aspects of UUVs such as ‘naval 
systems architecture’ or ‘marine systems engineering’ (MAN Energy 
Solutions, 2018).   The UUV must be considered as a system in order 
to design an environmentally beneficial craft.  This means that the 
design, operation, and maintenance of the UUV is an integrated 
system, and that the naval architect needs to fully understand the 
operational and engineering principles that form the systems 
architecture of UUVs.  The potential integration of disruptive 
technologies into the design of UUVs provides opportunities to 
further advance the field of underwater systems especially in the 
current political and economic climate. 
 
Questions 
• What are the drivers for change in terms of using new fuels for 
propulsion units in UUVs? 
• Name and explain the key international regulations that 
support the design and operation of submersibles and other 
forms of UUVs. 
• Describe the disruptive technology driving the development of 
diesel engines and explain why the Miller thermodynamic 
cycle better than the Diesel cycle in the context of disruptive 
technologies applied to diesel engines? 
• Discuss and describe the current disruptive technologies that 
affect the design, maintenance, and operations of UUVs. 
• The choice of fuel is dependent on the type of prime mover 
used in a UUV. What are the environmental benefits of using 
biofuels, LNG, and hydrogen? 
• What is hybrid propulsion? Name its advantages and 
disadvantages. 
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• Comment on the design a the UUV’s hull section and the naval 
architect’s role in designing UUVs subjected to future 
disruptive technologies. 
• What are the advantages and disadvantages of using 
superconducting electric motors in UUVs? 
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2. Automation & 
Human-Machine Symbiosis 
[Mumm] 
Student Learning Objectives – The student will gain knowledge of 
the concepts and framework as it relates to the symbiosis of humans 
and machines and how this once futuristic idea is now a reality. 
A Look Back at the Machine and Human Symbiosis Evolution 
The idea that humans and machines would someday become 
interdependent upon one another was once considered science 
fiction and useful material for Hollywood films; however, it was 
not a scenario based on reality. This has all changed, and the 
interdependence of the human race on machines is becoming an 
integration that we can no longer ignore. 
The Biology Dictionary lists the definition of symbiosis as “an 
evolved interaction or close living relationship between organisms 
from different species, usually with benefits to one or both of the 
individuals involved”. (Symbiosis Definition, 2020). See Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1 Robot and Human Connecting (Middleton, 2018) 
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For this discussion, the humans are creating the autonomous 
systems (robots) for the benefit of the human race, which is deemed 
as an obligation in symbiosis in “which case the relationship 
between the two species is so interdependent, that each of the 
organisms is unable to survive without the other” (Symbiosis 
Definition, 2020).  The case for an obligated symbiotic relationship 
can be made here as a ‘facultative’ relationship is based in the ability 
of the connection to be created by choice, because one entity can 
live without the other. In the year 2020 and beyond, it is clear 
humans have created a world where machines are essential to 
human survival. This survival is seen in many forms from daily 
activities, healthcare to national security and warfare as discussed 
in November of 2020 by the head of the British Army, General Sir 
Nick Carter, as he is forecasting “Thirty thousand “robot soldiers” 
could be fighting alongside humans in the near future as the British 
Army is forced to modernize” (Duncan, 2020). This would include 
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small drones, unmanned ground vehicles, and unmanned 
underwater vehicles. 
A look at how the human race is becoming more of a cyborg 
or a cyber organism is discussed from the lens of this being an 
endosymbiosis relationship “occurring when one of the symbiotic 
partners lives within the body of the other” (Symbiosis Definition, 
2020). 
The study of organic life and how it evolves is steeped in history, 
scientific theories, and documentation. This is in stark contrast to 
the very recent evolution of artificial intelligence and artificial life. 
 In order to achieve full symbiosis between humans and machines 
“may require that truly human-like characteristics be developed 
in intelligent machines. Such machines not only should be capable 
of human-like thinking, reasoning, and problem solving, but also 
should be capable of displaying human-like motivation, emotion, 
and personality, among other things. 
Little is known about how a system will evolve over time and 
how this evolution will act and react in human settings such as the 
workplace and our overall society” (Sun, 2020). 
The Fifth Industrial Revolution 
Changes take time, resources, and evolutionary reasoning 
towards the betterment of humanity or a radical shift in our daily 
lives introduced in small measures. This pace of change is speeding 
up, and the time between shifts is shrinking, yet the effects of 
the change are magnified without a clear understanding of the 
consequences of actions and the reactions they cause.  The fifth 
revolution will “take away mundane and repetitive tasks; it opens 
the way to curiosity, creativity, empathy, and judgment, ensuring a 
balance between people and technology” (Joseph, 2020).  The rate 
of change will dwarf that of the past as the definition of the new 
revolution will herald that in “the Fifth Industrial Revolution, 
humans and machines will dance together, metaphorically” (Gauri, 
2019). In a September 2020 article of The National, Patrick Noack 
states: 
The speed of this revolution is unprecedented, and the impact is 
Automation & Human-Machine Symbiosis [Mumm]  |  145
relevant to more and more people in increasingly diverse ways…the 
first of the revolutions lasted about 200 years. The second lasted 
100, while the third about 50. It is easy to see the pattern 
here…during the fourth (revolution) we are hyperconnected 
through our smart devices to most of the planet. The fifth 
revolution will make that connection closer and seamless and will 
feel unmediated. The smart device on which we tap and into which 
we speak will disappear. Brain-computer interfaces will replace 
them. (Noack, 2020). 
The aviation and maritime industries are steep in the history 
of humans and machine as the industrialization of our societies 
spread across the world. It was first the naval industry and later the 
aviation industry that allowed commerce to blossom and affordable 
travel to take hold.  The change seen in these industries drove 
innovation, yet profit was the goal; this hallmark is what defines the 
shift as humanity “needs a Fifth Industrial Revolution to flower like 
a new Renaissance Age. It will be marked by creativity and common 
purpose, as we together work to bend progress and profits toward 
purpose and inclusivity” (Gauri, 2019). 
Consider the motivations of innovations such as “Mr. Trash 
Wheel” as seen in Figure 2-2, as it depicts human-like qualities even 
though it is a sustainably powered trash interceptor invented in 
Baltimore, Maryland. 
“Mr. Trash Wheel helps to connect the dots and helps residents 
understand the impact of their actions,” said Rebecca Woods, 
executive director of Baltimore’s Environmental Control Board. “Mr. 
Trash Wheel provides a point of education for upstream efforts in 
helping residents understand what happens to trash that enters 
streets and then storm drains. Woods said. “Mr. Trash Wheel (Figure 
2.2) is that friendly face that provides my son comfort that trash will 
be blocked from entering the harbor. To my son, Mr. Trash Wheel is 
a hero” (Kossakovski, 2018). 
 
Figure 2.2 Mr. Trash Wheel (Kossakovski, 2018) 
 




The project offered a purpose greater than profit, as the amount 
of trash that is in harbors, docks, and even the open ocean is 
staggering. “Plastic, tires and other trash routinely flow into the 
harbor through the city’s storm sewers”. This innovation allows for 
more than just environmental cleanup; and it provides for profits 
towards a purpose of inclusivity as Mr. Trash Wheel “has collected 
more than 1.5 million pounds of trash since May 2014. It is powered 
by the harbor’s current and solar panels” (Kossakovski, 2018). 
The fifth industrial revolution is poised to push the fourth 
revolution into the history books and take over sooner than one 
might think. Our preferred mode of communications moves from 
cell phones to brain waves, our data collection from the internet 
of things to 3-D sensor collection, allowing artificial intelligence 
freedom to roam far past our understanding. We might “check-
in at the airport using a mind-reading bracelet or do our mind-
supported shopping to guarantee our safety from infectious 
viruses… our use of these technologies will lay the foundations for 
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yet a new revolution. What might the Sixth Industrial Revolution 
hold?” (Noack, 2020) 
 
. 
Human and Machine Joined – Cyborg or Evolutionary 
Inevitability? 
Who would have ever thought that the television program “The 
Six Million Dollar Man” would not only become reality, but it would 
also be looked at as rudimentary in our evolution of integrating 
machines into humankind to improve our quality of life and 
ultimately extend our lives? The definition of a cyborg is “a person 
whose physiological functioning is aided by or dependent upon a 
mechanical or electronic device” ( Cyborg, 2020) or basically a bionic 
human or animal.  Now the real question becomes, do machines 
evolve past humankind, becoming not only more intelligent but also 
self-aware and more like humankind? 
Will robots continue to learn and study humans and their 
evolution for the purpose of evolving past humanity? What is not 
apparent is the pace at which authorities, responsibilities, strategic 
plans, and policies must change and evolve in order to help 
organizations understand their role in shaping a positive, proactive 
future. 
The threat of unchecked technology, unmanned architecture 
development, and the ability to weaponize unmanned systems 
continues to evolve. Unmanned architecture technology 
advancements have offered more sophisticated abilities with cost-
effective designs that have reduced the entry barrier for consumers, 
businesses, enemy states, and terrorist organizations. (Nichols, et 
al., 2019). 
Elon Musk’s company, Neuralink, is working on creating a brain to 
machine interface which will allow for an integrated brain-machine 
symbiosis with thousands of channels to take advantage of the 
power of artificial intelligence. Musk has described it as a “Fitbit 
for your brain” and is envisioning that a robot will do the entire 
surgery to fit this coin-sized device into your brain. Musk admits 
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that the ethical and safety issues will drive some of the early public’s 
adoption. 
 
Figure 2.3 Neuralink Interface Process (Gilbert, 2019) 
 
The device would read your brain through the interface as it is 
“connecting electrodes throughout the brain and reading its neuron 
signals en masse. (Figure 2.3) Gathering huge amounts of data from 
the signals would eventually teach Neuralink’s software how the 
brain uses them to communicate with the rest of the body” 
(Ioannou, 2020). Musk is quoted as stating, “It’s not just a measure 
of computerizing your brain, but a measure of potentially fixing 
complex neurological problems. “I think there’s an incredible 
amount we can do to solve brain disorders and damage” (Gilbert, 
2019). 
Reports published in the Journal of NeuroInterventional Surgery 
are hailing the first time a Stentrode device has allowed a human to 
control a computer by using their mind, without wires or machine 
intervention. The device is inserted into the brain via a small keyhole 
incision (Lavars, 2020). Figure 2.4 shows the device next to a 
matchstick. The patient, Phillip O’Keefe, has had a Stentrode device 
implanted and 
 
Figure 2.4 Stentrode device compared to a matchstick (Lavars, 
2020) 
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the implant records his brain activity and transmits it wirelessly 
to a small receiver worn on his chest, and onward to a computer 
that translates the signals into onscreen commands… to surf the 
internet, write emails, do part-time work in data entry, and check 
his online banking. By thinking about moving his left ankle, he is able 
to perform a mouse click (Lavars, 2020). 
This incredible symbiosis offers us a glimpse into the idea that 
“technology will bend back towards the service of humanity, marked 
by creativity and a common purpose…empower(ing) us to close the 
historic gap and create a new socio-economic era” (Joseph, 2020). 
Cyborgs and cyborg soldiers of all forms and fashion are featured 
in Hollywood movies and Sci-Fi novels. These cyborg soldiers are 
no longer characters in sci-fi thrillers. As depicted in Figure 2.5, 
the troops of the future will have computers embedded in their 
craniums.  The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) 
 
Figure 2.5 Mind-Controlled Troops Connected to Weapons 
Systems (West, 2018) 




is selecting teams to develop a “neural interface” that would both 
allow troops to connect to military systems using their brainwaves 
and let those systems transmit back information directly to users’ 
brains. The Next-Generation Non-Surgical Neurotechnology, or N3, 
program aims to combine the speed and processing power of 
computers with humans’ ability to adapt to complex situations, 
DARPA said. In other words, the technology would let people 
control, feel, and interact with a remote machine as though it were 
a part of their own body (West, 2018). (See Figure 2.6) 
 
Figure 2.6 Mockup of U.S. SOCOM’s TALOS suit (Rempfer, 2019) 
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Figure 2-6 illustrates the future soldier with additional sensors 
to allow the soldier to autonomously send and receive information. 
The implications of a machine talking directly into a human mind 
in the middle of a high stress, highly emotional situation such as 
combat is not understood or even discussed within most available 
literature. The consequences to the human or to the battlefield are 
not known as “these interactions would allow warfighters direct 
communication with unmanned and autonomous systems, as well 
as with other humans, to optimize command and control systems 
and operations” (Rempfer, 2019). All of this is with a questionable 
ability to interject ethics and with minor regard as to what long term 
effects it will have on the human soldiers. 
 
Traversing the Seas with New Autonomous Technologies 
The seas are generally regarded as a very unforgiving place where 
a mix of factors from weather to technology combined with the 
operator’s experience will determine success or failure in successful 
navigation or just surviving this environment. Future Defense USA 
in Alexandria, Virginia, is developing an optionally piloted advanced 
technology vessel known as the Thunderchild to the defense market 
and later to the civilian arena. The boat will be outfitted with 
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complimentary autonomous systems based on the customers’ 
requirements (DiDonato, 2020). (Figure 2.7) 
 
Figure 2.7 The Thunderchild (Kowalski, 2020) 
 
The Thunderchild already holds world records for speed in 
navigation, and with the ability to operate in sea state six, which 
encompasses wind speeds over 25 knots, and wave heights of over 
3 meters, this capability allows the Thunderchild to operate where 
most of the worlds Coast Guards and Navies are not able to. This 
technology will have the ability to be optionally piloted, allowing 
for maximum flexibility for manned operations when required or 
unmanned operations to take advantage of the advances in 
communications, navigation, and a lower operating cost than 
currently available (DiDonato, 2020). 
Surface vessels are quickly moving to full autonomy with the help 
of some large IT companies. IBM has invested in moving autonomy 
forward with its Mayflower Autonomous Ship (MAS). It is currently 
sailing and is slated to re-trace the original 1620 Mayflower sea 
route to commemorate the 400th anniversary of the Mayflower 
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ocean voyage. MAS will use IBM’s advances in AI and edge 
computing (Figure 2.8): 
to sense, think and make decisions at sea, even with no human 
intervention… with no human captain or onboard crew, it will 
become one of the first full-sized, fully autonomous vessels to cross 
the Atlantic. The mission will further the development of 
commercial autonomous ships and help transform the future of 
marine research.” (IBM News Room, 2020) 
 
Figure 2.8 MAS (IBM News Room, 2020) 
 
 
Unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) will be used for logistics, 
research, and offensive and defensive weapons. The US Navy is 
working quickly to increase its offensive undersea drone capabilities 
as 
“The maritime domain has yet to see the kind of explosive 
innovation that UAVs have brought to land warfare… autonomous 
systems promise to bring to the undersea domain the kind of new 
capabilities and offensive punch, the Navy has yet to fully tap their 
potential” (Frandrup, 2019). 
 
The new era of unmanned submarines and the implications of 
where the technology will lead humankind is under “The influence 
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of massive spending on developing AI for undersea systems 
portends the greatest change in military sea power since the 
introduction of nuclear-powered vessels”. (Wilson, 2019) See Figure 
2.9. 
 
Figure 2.9 Boeing Echo Voyager Extra-Large Unmanned 
Underwater Vehicle (XLUUV) (Wilson, 2019) 
 
 
The research missions of UUVs are countless, yet they have their 
limitations. Terradepth, a Texas company, is working on solving the 
power and longevity issues that plague many research missions. 
Terradepth is working on a tag-team design of an unmanned 
submersible they named AxV. (Figure 2.10) 
 
Figure 2.10 Diagram illustrating the Terradepth system 
(Coxworth, 2020) 
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The submerged AxV likewise gathers undersea data, running 
purely on battery power. When that battery starts getting low, the 
vehicle automatically surfaces near its counterpart. It then fires 
up its generator and starts recharging its battery, while the AxV 
that had been traveling at the surface submerges to take its place 
underwater (Coxworth, 2020). 
Terradepth has had such successful sea trials of the technology in 
November 2020 that they are continuing to expand the capabilities 
beyond the current depth of 6,000 meters. The next power solution 
set they are working to incorporate is an air-breathing hydrogen 
fuel cell system. 
Technology can be used for good or evil; it just depends on how 
the technology is employed. In November 2020, the US Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) captured a hard to detect narcotics 
carrying submarine near Choco, Colombia. (Figure 2.11) 
 
Figure 2.11 Electric Narco-Submarine (Sutton, 2020) 
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This “fully submersible electric-powered submarine makes it very 
hard to trace. The vehicle was capable of carrying 6 tons of cocaine. 
The street value of such a huge amount stands at an estimated $120 
million USD” (Kundu, 2020). Although not unmanned yet, it is clear 
to see that the narco-traffickers are working on undersea logistics 
to move their products. It will only be a matter of time before they 
add unmanned underwater vehicles to their fleet. 
Advancement in unmanned submersibles is tied directly to the 
improvements in the AI field. AI vessels are not just being limited 
to nefarious uses; many governments are working on broadening 
mission sets for national defense. China has made “achievements 
in AI-enabled unmanned surface vessels, which it plans to use to 
patrol and bolster its territorial claims in the South China Sea. It has 
also tested unmanned tanks as part of research efforts to integrate 
AI into ground forces” (Tadjdeh, 2020). 
 
It is clear that the symbiosis of human and machine to harness the 
power of the seas is quickly approaching; technology laws, policies, 
and governance still have a long way to go before man and machine 
can claim victory. 
Human Symbiosis Disrupts the Aviation Industry 
In examining the idea of human symbiosis and the aviation 
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industry, most thoughts immediately go to UAVs or drone type 
aircraft. However, the optionally piloted aircraft/vehicle (OPV) 
allows for the symbiosis in a more trusting and understood manner. 
If an aircraft is only able to be flown by the computer itself, and 
no human intervention is possible when a fault occurs, humans 
quickly start to distrust the sensors, computers, and AI systems. 
Nowhere is this example clearer than that of the Lion Air and the 
Ethiopian Airline Boeing 737-Max 800 aircraft crashes that occurred 
respectively in 2018 and 2019. 
A preliminary report from Indonesian investigators indicates that 
Lion Air 610 crashed because a faulty sensor erroneously reported 
that the airplane was stalling. The false report triggered an 
automated system known as the Maneuvering Characteristics 
Augmentation System, or MCAS. This system tried to point the 
aircraft’s nose down so that it could gain enough speed to fly safely 
(Hawkins, 2019). 
The sensors that were supposed to create a human symbiosis with 
the aircraft ended up creating confusion and causing the crash of 
two airliners, killing 346 persons, and grounding the entire fleet of 
aircraft.  The cost to Boeing and the airline industry is in the billions, 
the FAA lifted the grounding order for the 737 Max as of December 
3, 2020. 
The ability to have an optionally piloted helicopter has been 
demonstrated by Airbus in 2017. Airbus has stated that the “The OPV 
(Figure 2.12)  is able to autonomously take-off, hover and perform 
stabilized flight and maneuvers…VSR 700 flight control system is 
a fully-digital, multi-channel system with a very high level of 
redundancy. It takes advantage of Airbus Helicopters unique 
expertise in digital autopilots” (VSR700 demonstrator performs first 
autonomous flights, 2017). 
 
Figure 2.12 VSR 700 OPV (VSR700 demonstrator performs first 
autonomous flights, 2017) 
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Boeing is working diligently in the arena of OPVs that handle 
passenger traffic (Figure 2.13). In January of 2019, Boeing’s 
unmanned passenger aircraft completed its first flight as it “tested 
the prototype’s autonomous functions and ground control systems, 
according to Boeing. Subsequent test flights will check forward and 
wing-borne flight and the transition between vertical and forward 
flight modes” (Abel, 2019). 
 
Figure 2.13 Boeing Unmanned Passenger Aircraft (Abel, 2019) 
 
 
This OPV “was designed and developed in partnership with 
Boeing NeXt and Boeing subsidiary Aurora Flight Sciences. John 
Langford, president, and CEO of Aurora Flight Sciences, stated, 
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“Certifiable autonomy is going to make quiet, clean and safe urban 
air mobility possible” (Abel, 2019). The next project for Boeing is 
reportedly an unmanned electric cargo aircraft that will carry up to 
500 pounds. 
Airbus is also working on a pilotless commercial jet. Airbus has 
been testing the aircraft and confirmed that “while completing 
alignment on the runway, waiting for clearance from air traffic 
control, we engaged the autopilot and the A350-1000 achieved eight 
automatic takeoffs over a period of four and a half hours” 
(Hardingham, 2020). See Figure 2.14. 
 




Even without a fully pilotless aircraft, passenger jets are currently 
landing with the “assistance of on-board computers with pilots 
manually fly the aircraft for just a few minutes on average… 
Autonomous technologies are paramount to supporting pilots, 
enabling them to focus less on aircraft operation and more on 
strategic decision-making and mission management” (Hardingham, 
2020). 
Further into the future of aviation and human symbiosis is the 
promise of what is being called Ion Thrusters that allows flight 
without a liquid type fuel. See Figure 2.15. 
 
Figure 2.15 Ion Thruster Rendering ( IFL Science, 2020) 
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This technology is being created by a team led by Steven Barrett 
from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), the “so-
called electro aerodynamic-powered plane, one that uses solid-
state propulsion, meaning no propellers or jet engines with 
expendable fuel” ( IFL Science, 2020) 
The idea of humankind and flying machines working together 
in a symbiotic relationship is moving further toward reality. The 
technologies and public policies that regulate this technology must 
align better in the future in order for humans to trust the machines 
and the machines, understanding their role in serving humanity. 
Integrating Artificial Employees-The Changing Horizon of 
Human Resources 
There is an old saying that all problems are people problems, 
which gives rise to the issue of employees in the fifth revolution as 
“we are unprepared to meet the challenges ahead. According to a 
recent World Economic Forum Report, for example, 65% of children 
entering the school system today will end up in careers that don’t 
exist yet” (Gauri, 2019). 
The study of organic life and how it evolves is steeped in history, 
scientific theories, and documentation. This is in stark contrast to 
the very recent evolution of artificial intelligence and artificial life. 
Little is known about how a system will evolve over time and how 
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this evolution will act and react in human settings such as the 
workplace and our overall society. Can a virtual or physical robot 
(autonomous system) truly understand the needs, emotions, and 
motivations of a human? If this is possible using AI, the autonomous 
systems “can anticipate what a human will need and will do, it 
can provide better assistance. Furthermore, if it can appreciate, for 
example, the frustration that a human feels, then it can help to find 
solutions” (Sun, 2020). 
 
The potential risk for “ loss to an organization from an Artificial 
Employee (AE) making autonomous decisions is enormous” (Brand, 
2019). The Canadian Chief Scientific Officer of Kindred Biomedical 
states, “A subset of the artificial intelligence development in the 
next few decades will be very human-like. I believe these entities 
should have the same rights as humans…robots fundamentally have 
to make mistakes in order to learn” (Wong, 2017). The risk could 
potentially be every bit as great as that of human error. Research 
in this area tends to use the Grounded Theory as it lends itself 
well to organizations and human resource issues. The grounded 
theory research approach “presents promising possibilities for the 
development of theoretical frameworks that emerge from research 
situated in practice and enhance the Human Resource Development 
(HRD) theorist”  (Egan, 2002). There appears to be very few 
organizations with a plan for increasingly autonomous machines 
capable of deep learning, as 
“these machines are considered physical assets as opposed to 
intelligence assets” (Brand, 2019). Machines do not have the same 
issues as humans who have self-determined and intrinsic 
motivations and thus are capable of autonomous choice of action 
in accordance with these motivations…include not only power, 
achievement, and other individualistic tendencies, but also 
adherence to social norms, affiliation with other individuals, and 
other tendencies related to social cooperation and 
interdependence” (Sun, 2020). 
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Most corporations adopt risk management, ethics, or training and 
development plans for human employees. By contrast, machines 
with any level of intelligence are considered physical assets and 
are managed as such. However, a thinking machine is capable of 
choices, actions, and decision making, much like that of its human 
counterpart. If a machine can make an autonomous decision or 
action, “the behavior of the machine must be managed and 
responsible for outcomes assigned” (Brand, 2019).  If so, training, 
monitoring, and development programs must be considered for 
managing the AEs in many of the same ways human employees are 
managed. On a deeper level, human and machine resources must be 
observed and managed in their interactions. The machines that will 
make thinking decisions could have much broader implications and 
the humans that interact with them will respond based on human 
needs and human concerns. 
Any organization relying on a human to make an intelligent 
decision has some employee oversight system in place. An entire 
field of employment and research is dedicated to the complex task 
of managing humans and their decisions. The hypothesis is an 
equally in-depth system of management is called for when 
managing intelligent machines, with a focus on differences in the 
decision making and task completion methodology. In Ethical 
Dilemmas in the Age of AI, Abramson states, “In the distant future, 
some machines may have to make decisions for humans. In the 
case of empathy, imagine a robot having to decide if resuscitation 
attempts on a deceased human should be undertaken, and if so, for 
how long?” (Abramson, 2016). 
In January 2017, and again in 2018, the European Union passed 
a motion adopting a report that calls for the development of 
“electronic personhood” – regulations for robots and AI systems 
“granting special legal status, or “electronic personalities,” to smart 
robots, specifically those which can learn, adapt, and act for 
themselves (Withers, 2018). Although this legislation has not passed 
yet, it appears that it will be approved in the next few years as 
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countries and companies start to tackle the issue of leveraging 
Artificial Employees. 
There are far too many issues and questions to address in this 
chapter, however, as a parting thought on this topic, consider what 
happens if a human goes on vacation – who monitors the AE?  What 
is liability for a mistake by the AE? What about AE maintenance? 
How do you terminate an AE? Is it a loss to the company/
government, or is it employee replacement? What could a company 
potentially lose or be liable for? 
Conclusions 
Additional theoretical models and frameworks should be explored 
in this challenging environment with many complex issues that have 
yet to be discovered. Future research implementing these 
theoretical models and frameworks should be used to fill the 
knowledge gaps related to evolving approaches and innovative 
solutions that could complement the speed of human/machine 
progress. If a machine can make an autonomous decision or action, 
the behavior of the machine must be managed and responsible for 
the result. 
The cyborg soldier of the future will “mentally link up with the 
various weapons systems at their disposal…this would also be a 
two-way system that could enable the systems to transmit 
information back to the soldier as well” (West, 2018). If so, training, 
monitoring, and development programs must be considered for 
managing the symbiosis of human and machines in many of the 
same ways we manage human employees. A broad range of 
cognitive architectures needs to be investigated as the human mind 
“needs to deal with all of its functionalities: perception, 
categorization, memory, decision-making, reasoning, problem-
solving, communication, action, learning, metacognition, 
motivation, and so on” (Sun, 2020). The demand for AI and human 
symbiosis models capable of working with these broad 
functionalities needs to be better scoped for future research and 
integration if we are to hope for true human-machine symbiosis. 
Time will tell if the human resources, maritime, and aviation 
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industries can all successfully adjust into this new world. Human-
machine symbiosis appears to be just over the horizon; it will also 
require guidance to incorporate the correct mix of policies and laws 
to support a complimentary partnership to this new reality instead 
of a hindrance. 
 
Questions 
1. What is the difference between symbiosis and the industrial 
revolution? 
2. Do you think human evolution will migrate to us all being 
cyborgs? Why or Why not? 
3. List three disruptive technologies in the aviation industry. 
4. How would you to take advantage of the disruptive nature of 
the fifth industrial revolution and human symbiosis? 
5. Name three ways that the maritime industry is benefiting from 
the fifth industrial revolution and the inclusion of human 
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3. UAS Regulation / 
Innovation / Safety 2020 / 
Privacy and Beyond [Hood] 
Student Learning Objectives 
UAS Regulations keep changing. This chapter is designed to bring 
drone operators and enthusiasts up to date. This chapter is study 
only. 
 
Two New FAA Rules That make a Difference 
Two long awaited rules from the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) regarding mandating remote identification (Remote ID) of 
drones and allow drone operators of “small” drones to fly over 
people and at night under certain conditions. The majority of 
following information was taken from the FAA Executive Summary 
and associated press release issued in December 2020. 
 
As a parting gift to show that 2020 wasn’t all bad, the FAA released 
two long-awaited rules that will help push the drone industry into 
the future. The FAA’s ultimate goal is to enable routine drone 
operations in the same airspace as manned aircraft, but a lot of 
hurdles have to be cleared before that is possible. Like a game of 
Chutes and Ladders, many small moves and a couple of big ones 
are required to reach that goal, and along the way, there is an ever-
present danger of sliding backwards. (Kiemen, 2021) 
 
 
Figure 3.1.  Embry-Riddle drone ready to fly by Scott Burgess, 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. Source: Scott Burgess 
ERAU 
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These rules come at a time when drones represent the fastest-
growing segment in the entire transportation sector – currently 
over 1.7 million drone registrations and 203,000 FAA-certified 
remote pilots.  (Administration, 2020) See Figure 3.1 
 
According to the FAA, Remote ID is a major step toward the full 
integration of drones into the national airspace system. Remote 
ID provides identification of drones in flight as well as location of 
their control stations, providing crucial information to our national 
security agencies and law enforcement partners, and other officials 
charged with ensuring public safety. Airspace awareness reduces 
risk of drone interference with other aircraft and people and 
property on the ground.  (Administration, 2020) 
 
Equipping drones with remote ID technology builds on previous 
steps taken by the FAA and the drone industry to integrate 
operations safety into the national airspace system. Part 107 of the 
federal aviation regulations currently prohibits covered drone 
operations over people and at night unless an operator obtains a 
waiver from the FAA. The new regulations jointly provide increased 
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flexibility to conduct certain small UAS without obtaining a waiver. 
(Administration, 2020) 
 
“The new rules make way for the further integration of drones 
into our airspace by addressing safety and security concerns,” said 
FAA Administrator Steve Dickson. “They get closer to the day when 
we will more routinely see drone operations such as delivery of 
packages.” (Administration, 2020) 
 
As the rules are read and understood, it can be inferred which 
potential industries these new rules are aimed at effecting (or 
allowing) to move forward. Examples of such industries include 
delivery and transit services. 
 
Remote ID 
The remote ID Rule applies to all operators of drones that require 
FAA registrations. There are three ways to comply with the 
operational requirements: 
 
1: Operate a standard Remote ID drone that broadcasts 
identification and location information of the drone and control 
station; 
 
2: Operate a drone with a Remote ID broadcast module (may 
be separate device attached to the drone), which broadcasts 
identification, location, and take-off information; or 
 
3: Operate a drone without Remote ID but at specific FAA-
recognized identification areas. 
(Administration, 2020) 
 
Operations over People and at Night 
This rule applies to Part 107 operators. The ability to fly over 
people and moving vehicles varies depending on the level of risk a 
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small drone operation presents to people on the ground. Operations 
are permitted base on four categories 
 
 
These Operations Categories consist of the following: 
Category 1 eligible: small, unmanned aircraft must weigh less 
than 0.55, including everything on board or otherwise attached, and 
contain no exposed rotating parts that would lacerate human skin. 
No FAA-accepted Means of Compliance (MOC) or Declaration of 
Compliance (DOC) required. 
 
Category 2 eligible: small, unmanned aircraft must not cause 
injury to a human being that is equivalent to or greater than the 
severity of injury caused by a transfer of 11 foot-pounds of kinetic 
energy upon impact from a rigid object, does not contain any 
exposed rotating parts that could lacerate human skin upon impact 
with a human being, and does not contain any safety defects. 
Requires FAA-accepted means of compliance and FAA-accepted 
declaration of compliance. 
 
Category 3 eligible: small, unmanned aircraft must not cause 
injury to a human being that is equivalent to or greater than the 
severity of injury caused by a transfer of 25 foot-pounds of kinetic 
energy upon impact of a rigid object, does not contain any exposed 
rotating parts that could lacerate human skin upon impact with a 
human being, and does not contain any safety defects. Requires 
FAA-accepted means of compliance and FAA-accepted declaration 
of compliance. 
 
Category 4 eligible: small, unmanned aircraft must have an 
airworthiness certificate issued under Part 21 of FAA regulations. 
Must be operated in accordance with the operating limitations 
specified in the approved Flight Manual or so otherwise specified 
by the Administrator. The operating limitations must not prohibit 
operations over human beings. Must have maintenance, preventive 
UAS Regulation / Innovation / Safety 2020 / Privacy and Beyond
[Hood]  |  173
maintenance, alterations, or inspections performed in accordance 
with specific requirements in the final rule. (Administration, 2020) 
 
Figure 3.2  EL PASO, TEXAS – NOVEMBER 20: DroneUp pilot 
Andrew Holbert prepares to launch a drone to deliver a COVID-19 
self-collection test kit to a home, after being ordered from 
Walmart by a resident, amid a Covid-19 surge on November 20, 
2020 in El Paso, Texas. Source: Photo by Mario Tama/Getty Images 
 
Operating Rules 
Operations at Night (See Figure 3.2) 
• – Remote pilots in command who wish to conduct small, 
unmanned aircraft operations at night must complete either 
the updated initial test or the updated recurrent online 
training prior to conducting such operations. 
• – Additionally, prior to conducting small, unmanned aircraft 
operations at night, the small, unmanned aircraft must be 
equipped with anti-collision lights that can be seen for 3 
statute miles and have a flash rate sufficient to avoid a 
collision. These anti-collision lights must be operational. 
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Operations Over People 
• – Category 1 eligible aircraft: 
◦ o Small, unmanned aircraft must weigh less than 0.55, 
including everything on board or otherwise attached, and 
contain no exposed rotating parts that would lacerate 
human skin. Remote pilots are prohibited from operating a 
small, unmanned aircraft as a Category 1 operation in 
sustained flight over open-air assemblies unless the 
operation meets the requirements for standard remote 
identification or remote identification broadcast modules 
established in the Remote ID Rule. 
(Administration, 2020) 
• – Category 2 eligible aircraft: 
◦ o Remote pilots are prohibited from operating a small, 
unmanned aircraft as a Category 2 operation in sustained 
flight over open-air assemblies unless the operation meets 
the requirements for standard remote identification or 
remote identification broadcast modules established in the 
Remote ID Final Rule. 
◦ o Requires means of compliance and declaration of 
compliance by applicant. 
• – Category 3 eligible aircraft: 
◦ o Must not operate the small, unmanned aircraft over 
open-air assemblies of human beings. 
◦ o May only operate the small, unmanned aircraft above 
any human being if operation meets one of the following 
conditions: 
▪ The operation is within or over a closed- or 
restricted-access site and all human beings located 
within the closed- or restricted-access site must be 
on notice that a small, unmanned aircraft may fly over 
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them 
▪ The small, unmanned aircraft does not maintain 
sustained flight over any human being unless that 
human being is directly participating in the operation 
of the small, unmanned aircraft; or located under a 
covered structure or inside a stationary vehicle that 
can provide reasonable protection from a falling small, 
unmanned aircraft. 
◦ – Category 4 eligible aircraft: 
▪ o Must have an airworthiness certification issued 
under Part 21. 
▪ o Must be operated in accordance with the operating 
limitations specified in the approved Flight Manual or 
as otherwise specified by the Administrator. The 
operating limitations must not prohibit operations 
over human beings. 
▪ o Must have maintenance, preventative maintenance, 
alterations, or inspections performed in accordance 
with specific maintenance requirements detailed in 
the final rule. 
▪ o Remote pilots are prohibited from operating a small, 
unmanned aircraft as a Category 4 operation in 
sustained flight over open-air assemblies unless the 
operation meets the requirements of standard remote 
identification or remote identification broadcast 




Figure 3.3 UAV and Drone Solutions monitoring aircraft 
(Source: AOPA.org) 
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Operations over moving vehicles (See Figure 3.3) 
• – Must be Category 1, Category 2, and Category 3, eligible to 
operate over people, may not maintain sustained flight over 
moving vehicles; transit operations only. 
• – For an operation under Category 1, Category 2, or Category 
3, the small, unmanned aircraft, throughout the operation – 
◦ o Must remain within or over closed- or restricted-access 
sites, and all human beings located inside a moving vehicle 
within the closed- or restricted-access site must be on 
notice that a small, unmanned aircraft may fly over them; 
or 
◦ o Must not maintain sustained flight over moving vehicles. 
• – For a Category 4 operation, the small, unmanned aircraft 
must – 
◦ o Have an airworthiness certificate issued under part 21 of 
this chapter. 
◦ o Be operated in accordance with the operating limitations 
specified in the approved Flight Manual or as otherwise 
specified by the Administrator. The operating limitations 
must not prohibit operations over human beings located 
inside moving vehicles. 
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Figure 3.4. Las Vegas, NV, September 23, 2020. A DroneUp 
employee prepares a Covid-19 test kit for delivery. (Source: Joe 
Cerreta, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University) 
 
 
Remote Pilot Knowledge Test Changes (See Figure 3.4) 
 
A remote pilot in command, owner, or person manipulating the 
flight controls of a small, unmanned aircraft system must: 
• – Have in that person’s physical possession and readily 
accessible the remote pilot certificate with a small UAS rating 
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and identification when exercising the privileges of that 
remote pilot certificate. 
• – Present his or her remote pilot certificate and identification 
upon request from the FAA, NTSB, TSA, or and Federal, state, 
or local law enforcement officer. 
• – Make available, upon request, to the FAA and document, 
record, or report required to be kept under FAA regulations. 
• – Upon request, must allow the FAA to test or inspect the 
small, unmanned aircraft system, the remote pilot in 
command, the person manipulating the flight controls of a 
small, unmanned aircraft system, and, if applicable, the visual 
observer to determine compliance with the rule. 
(Administration, 2020) 
 
Design and production Rules for Manufacturers 
• – Some existing Category 1 small, unmanned aircraft may meet 
the performance-based requirements to be eligible for 
Category 1 operations over people of this rule beginning the 
effective date of the rule (Those that have already been 
produced with propeller guards/shrouds that prevent the 
blades from causing laceration to human skin upon impact). 
• – Manufacturers may bring to market retrofit propeller guards 
to install on existing small, unmanned aircraft to make them 
eligible for Category 1 operations over people beginning after 
effective date of this rule. 
• – Some existing small, unmanned aircraft may meet the 
performance-based requirements to be eligible for Category 2 
operations over people of this rule once FAA-accepted MOC 
and DOC are received. 
• – Small, unmanned aircraft may meet the performance-based 
requirements for Category 2 of this rule upon FAA-Accepted 
MOC/DOC 9-12 months after the effective date of this rule. 
• – Small, unmanned aircraft may meet the performance-based 
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requirements for Category 3 of this rule upon FAA-Accepted 
MOC/DOC 9-12 months after the effective date of this rule. 
• – Category 4 small, unmanned aircraft for operations over 
people may receive an airworthiness certificate beginning 6-12 
months after the effective date of this rule. 
 
Major Changes from Proposed Rule to the Final Rule 
• – Category 1 small, unmanned aircraft cannot have any 
exposed rotating parts that would lacerate human skin. 
• – Category 1, 2, and 4 remote pilots are prohibited from 
operating small, unmanned aircraft in sustained flight over 
open-air assemblies unless the operation meets the 
requirements of standard remote identification or remote 
identification broadcast modules established in the Remote ID 
Final Rule. 
• – Added a Category 4 of small, unmanned aircraft that. Ay be 
eligible for operations over people and moving vehicles. 
• – Allow operations over moving vehicles 
• – Remote pilot, owner, or person manipulating the controls 
must have in their physical possession and readily available 
their remote pilot certificate. 
(Administration, 2020) 
 
What Do These Two Rules Really Mean and Why is it Important? 
Some major players in the drone industry are not all that happy 
with the new rules as they currently stand. The following article 
excerpt from Sean Hollister has a much different take and makes 
some interesting points. 
 
Alphabet’s drone delivery company “Wing” still wants drones 
tracked — but differently 
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Internet-based tracking is exactly what the FAA had originally 
intended to do when it first 
 
proposed the Remote ID rules back in December 2019, by the way 
— before it received a 
 
laundry list of reasons from commenters why internet-based 
tracking might be problematic and 
 
decided to abandon it. Here are just a few of the ones mentioned: 
• The cost of adding a cellular modem to a drone to begin with 
• The cost of paying for a monthly cellular data plan just to fly a 
drone 
• The lack of reliable cellular coverage across the entirety of the 
US 
• The cost of paying a third-party data broker to track and store 
that data 
• The possibility of that third-party data broker getting 
breached 
• The possibility of that data broker or network getting DDoS’d, 
grounding drones in the US 
“Personally,[1] I think it’s pretty ridiculous that the FAA felt it had 
to choose between “everyone has to broadcast their location to 
everyone within earshot” and “everyone has to pay gobs of money to 
private industry and trust some data broker with their location,” but 
the reasons why we aren’t going with internet-based tracking make 
some sense to me. (Hollister, 2021) 
Most proponents of Remote ID technology, including Wing, like 
to explain that it’s merely a “license plate” for the skies, perhaps 
nothing more intrusive than you’d already have on your car. Here’s 
Wing (See Figure 3.5) on that: 
This allows a drone to be identified as it flies over without 
necessarily sharing that drone’s complete flight path or flight 
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history, and that information, which can be more sensitive, is not 
displayed to the public and only available to law enforcement if 
they have proper credentials and a reason to need that information. 
(Hollister, 2021) 
But the thing about license plates is, traditionally, you have to be 
within eyeshot to see them. You’d have to be physically following 
a car to track it. That’s not necessarily true of a broadcasting 
transmitter, and it’s potentially far less true of an internet-based 
solution like the one Wing seems to wish the FAA had offered 
instead. Naturally, it depends on who owns the internet-based 
solution and how much you trust them and their security. (Hollister, 
2021) 
Either way, it’s going to be a while before we find out how secure 
or vulnerable, how broad or narrow these Remote ID broadcasts are 
truly going to be. That’s because the FAA’s final rule doesn’t actually 
mandate what kind of broadcasting tech drones will be required to 
use: companies have the next year and half to figure that out, and 
they have to submit it to the FAA for approval. The FAA is also clear 
that broadcast Remote ID is just a first step, an “initial framework,” 
suggesting that internet-based Remote ID might still be an option in 
the future. (Hollister, 2021) 
 
Figure 3.5 Image: Wing. (Source: https://www.theverge.com/
2021/1/1/22209558/google-wing-faa-drone-remote-id-
broadcast-rule-privacy-security) 







Drone Privacy Laws Around the World 
The following sub sections are part of an in-depth survey 
from Surfshark regarding drone privacy laws around the world. The 
great thing about the study is that it drills down into a region-by-
region analysis. 
As the use of drones expands around the world — according to 
the Federal Aviation Administration, there are currently 1.7 
million drones registered in the United States alone — lawmakers 
have been faced with new and complex regulatory challenges to 
protect the privacy of ordinary citizens. The increased prevalence 
of drones has raised the prospect of pervasive surveillance by 
governments, companies, and individuals, and lawmakers are 
struggling to keep up with the advancing technology. (SurfShark, 
2021) 
And while at least 143 countries have enacted some form of 
drone-related regulation, many experts contend that current drone 
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regulation is insufficient to deal with the threat of widespread 
surveillance. Drone laws around the world range from outright bans 
of the technology to relatively unrestricted flight, but most 
legislation focuses on how the drone is being operated — and does 
not address nuances related to privacy. Many of the privacy threats 
that have lawmakers concerned are speculative and rely on the 
technology of tomorrow — making it difficult to pass privacy-
specific legislation today. In the meantime, lawmakers have been 
able to pass laws concerning drone operation, which are a first step 
to “privacy by design” legislation, restricting where and how a drone 
can be flown to minimize opportunities to violate privacy in the first 
place. To support the effort to establish an international regulatory 
framework for drone legislation, we looked at drone operation laws 
in over 200 countries around the world. (SurfShark, 2021) 
Lawmakers around the world have responded to the growing use 
of drones in various ways. While some countries, such as Cuba, 
Iraq, Iran, and Kuwait, have outright banned the use of unmanned 
aircraft, others have passed legislation allowing for more 
experimental use of the technology. (SurfShark, 2021) 
On every continent, at least one country allows drones to fly what 
experts term “beyond visual line of sight”, meaning the aircraft can 
fly to areas beyond the view of the pilot. In Finland, for example, 
where the home of FAI Drone Racing World Cup is held, pilots can 
obtain a permit allowing them to pilot drones outside of their view 
with special first-person view goggles. To see how drones are being 
regulated around the world, we compiled data on drone-related 
legislation for 210 countries. We looked at drone-related legislation 
for specific countries and analysis of drone-related legislation from 
sources such as UAV Coach, RAND Corporation, UAV Systems 
International, and the Library of Congress. (SurfShark, 2021) 
We found that drone regulation in each country generally fell into 
one of seven categories: 
• Outright ban 
• Effective ban 
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• Restrictions Apply (such as drone registration or licensing, 
additional observers required, no commercial usage etc..) 
• Visual line of sight required 
• Experimental visual line of sight (experiments where drones fly 
beyond the line of sight are allowed) 
• Unrestricted (when flying away from private property and 
airports, under 500 ft/150metres height and with drones 
weighing less than 250g) 





We assigned each country a category status based on its 
legislation as of October 2020. 
Europe 
Europe currently has some of the most liberal drone regulation 
of any continent. Although many of the countries in the continent 
have some form of drone legislation restricting drone usage, these 
are often in the form of simple operational guidelines. 
Drone pilots in Latvia, for example, are required to wear an 
identifying piece of clothing, such as a hat or a shirt. In Austria, 
pilots are required to get a license if the drone weighs more than 
about half a pound and flies above 98 feet. (SurfShark, 2021) 
Figure 3.6 EUROPE: Drone Privacy Laws.
(https://surfshark.com/drone-privacy-laws) 
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North America 
While the bulk of countries around the world require drone pilots 
to be able to see the UAV at all times, 33% of countries in North 
America allow for experimental drone flights beyond the line of 
sight, the largest share of any continent and far above the 22% 
global average. The large number of countries allowing 
experimental drone flights may be related to the presence of tech 
companies like Amazon, Walmart, and DHL, which are researching 
ways to incorporate drones into their delivery infrastructure and 
developing methods to ship lightweight packages short distances. 
Countries with experimental drone legislation include Canada, the 
United States, the Cayman Islands, Antigua and Barbuda, and other 
small Caribbean nations. (SurfShark, 2021) 
Figure 3.7 NORTH AMERICA: Drone Privacy Laws.
(https://surfshark.com/drone-privacy-laws) 





67% of countries with drone-related legislation in South America 
allow drones to be flown, as long as the aerial vehicle stays within 
the view of the pilot, the largest share of any continent. No 
countries in South America have outright or effective bans on 
drones. But while no countries ban drones, only one country, 
Guyana, has provisions that allow for flights beyond the line of sight 
— the fewest of any continent. Other countries in South America 
have specific drone rules geared towards safety and environmental 
conservation. In Peru, for example, drones’ flights cannot last longer 
than an hour. In Ecuador, drones are completely banned on the 
Galapagos Islands save for approved scientific usage. (SurfShark, 
2021) 
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Middle East & Central Asia 
21% of countries here with drone-related legislation have outright 
bans on drones, more than the 11% global share and the second 
largest share of any continent. Additionally, there are a number of 
countries with effective bans on drones. In Bhutan, for example, 
drone flight is only allowed by the government. Overall, 15% of 
countries in Asia have effective bans on drones, far more than the 
8% global average and the largest share of any continent. A small 
number of countries, however, are beginning to allow for drone 
flights beyond the line of sight. Japan, for example, is currently 
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developing a licensing system that will allow for drone flights 
beyond the visual line of sight for government deliveries. (SurfShark, 
2021) 




Rest of Asia and Oceania 
56% of countries in Oceania have no drone-related legislation, 
the largest share of any continent. Of the countries that do have 
drone-related legislation, a majority allow drones as long as pilots 
stay within the visual line of sight of the drone. No countries have 
outright bans or effective bans of drones. In Australia and New 
Zealand, there are provisions for drones to fly beyond the visual 
line of sight of the pilot. Currently, licenses that permit drones to 
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fly beyond the line of sight are limited among a few small aviation 
companies. According to the RAND Corporation, licenses for 
experimental flights beyond the line of sight are easier to obtain in 
Australia than in the United States. (SurfShark, 2021) 
Figure 3.10 OCEANA: Drone Privacy Laws.
(https://surfshark.com/drone-privacy-laws) 
Africa 
More than half of all countries in Africa have no drone-related 
legislation. Of the countries that do have drone-related legislation, 
21% have an outright ban on the technology, the largest share of 
any continent. Another 13% of countries have an effective ban on 
the technology, the second largest share of any continent. In Egypt, 
for example, while drones are technically legal with permission from 
the Civil Aviation Authority, it is very difficult to obtain permission. 
But while there are obstacles to drone flight in a number of African 
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countries, there are also examples of innovation in the continent. In 
Ghana and Rwanda, for example, drones are allowed to fly beyond 
the line of sight to deliver medical supplies to remote villages. Other 
African countries that allow drones to fly beyond the line of sight 
include Uganda and Zimbabwe. (SurfShark, 2021) 
Figure 3.11 AFRICA: Drone Privacy Laws.
(https://surfshark.com/drone-privacy-laws) 
 
Demand for drone technology shows no signs of slowing down. 
According to the World Intellectual Property Organization, the 
number of patents for drone technology is increasing rapidly — 
growing 34% from 7,076 in 2017 to 9,485 in 2018 alone. As 
commercial technology for unmanned aerial vehicles continues to 
advance, it is important for the legislation regulating them to keep 
up. And until there is some international standard or governing body 
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for the usage of drones established, it’s fascinating to see how the 
regulation of drones differs from country to country around the 
world. Keep scrolling down to see the full data from our study, and 
to check out the law where you live. (SurfShark, 2021) 
Methodology & Sources 
To see how drones are being regulated around the world, we 
looked at related legislation for specific countries using sources 
such as UAV Coach, RAND Corporation, UAV Systems International, 
and the Library of Congress. We found that drone regulation in each 
country fell into one of seven categories: outright ban, effective 
ban, visual line of sight required, experimental visual line of sight 
(experiments where drones fly beyond the line of sight are allowed), 
restrictions apply, unrestricted, and no drone-related legislation. 
We assigned each country a category status based on its legislation 
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4. UUVs, Advanced Sensors, 
Munitions Detection & USVs 
[Nichols] 
 Student Learning Objectives 
• – To take a birds-eye view of UUVs in service of detecting, 
assessing, and classifying underwater munitions 
• – To study the type of sensors and their performance 
objectives in underwater service 
• – To focus on a specific UNCLASSIFIED NSWC PCD 
demonstration of three UUVs used for detection of munitions 
targets (both proud and buried) 
• – To look at improvements in survey UUVs / on surface UVs 
for shallow water studies. 
• – To see the future of this technology as a Black Swan event.[1] 
 
What is the Advanced Weapons Problem that UUVs can solve? 
There are underwater munitions sites around the world where 
the quantity and the type of munitions are either unknown or not 
well documented. These sites are unsafe and can’t be used for any 
other purpose. The sites need to be surveyed and all the munitions 
identified and if necessary disarmed. (Leasko, 2014). Underwater 
munitions falls in the murky purview (CLASSIFIED) of the National 
Unmanned Systems Shared Resource Center (NUSSRC) located at 
the Naval Surface Warfare Center Panama City Division (NSWC 
PCD). It has multiple offices associated with the Office of Naval 
Research (ONR) Mine Countermeasure (MCM) UUV systems 
integrated with advanced sonar, magnetic and electro-optical 
sensors.[2] These systems provide capability  for experimentation 
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and demonstration of current Science and Technology (S&T) and 
Research and Development (R&D) program assets as they apply to 
the detection and classification of underwater mines to be used 
for detection, assessment, and characterization of underwater 
munitions. (Leasko, 2014) 
 
NSWC PCD 
The Naval Surface Warfare Center Panama City Division (NSWC 
PCD) is one of many naval installations conducting S&T research 
around the world. NSWC PCD is a particularly fascinating one and 
has a huge mission. NSWC PCD Our mission is to conduct research, 
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) and in-service support 
of the following core mission areas: Mine Warfare Systems, Naval 
Special Warfare Systems, Diving and Life Support Systems, 
Amphibious/Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare Systems and other 
missions that occur in the littoral, or coastal, regions.  NSWC PCD’s 
Technical Capabilities include: Air Cushion Vehicle Systems; 
Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare Systems Engineering and 
Integration; Special Warfare Maritime Mobility Mission Systems and 
Mission Support equipment; Mine Countermeasure Detect and 
Engage Systems; Modular Mission Packaging; Platform Integration 
and Handling; Littoral Mission Systems integration and Modular 
Mission Packages Certification; Unmanned Systems Engineering and 
Integration; Autonomous Diving and Diving Support Systems; and 
Surface Life Support Systems for Extreme Environments. Their 
major facilities include: Diving and Life Support Complex; Mine 
Warfare Complex; Special Warfare Research and Engineering 
Complex; Expeditionary Warfare Complex; Landing Craft Air 
Cushion (LCAC) Facility; LCAC Software Integration Laboratory; 
Human Systems Integration Usability Lab; USMC Amphibious Raids 
and Reconnaissance; Integration Facility; Coastal Test Range; 
Prototype Fabrication Facility; Additive Manufacturing or 3D 
printing for rapid prototyping;  and 3D Expeditionary Laser 
Scanning. This is the purview of just one of the ten plus NSCW 
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warfare centers. These are all part of the Naval Sea Systems 




We can get a OPEN SOURCE peek into the use of NAVSEA’s MCM 
UUV assets to evaluate and demonstrate current technologies with 
advanced detection, assessment, and characterization sensor 
packages. NSWC PCD published a report (UNCLASSIFIED) on their 
Post Mission Analysis (PMA) of all sensor data relating to the 
performance of UUV technologies for the underwater munitions 
problem so identified. (Leasko, 2014) [3] 
The PMA data collection / demonstration by NSWC PCD 
occurred in early 2011. 
Technology 
Three specific UUV assets in the NUSSRC inventory[4] that can 
address the detection and characterization of underwater 
munitions in an organic fashion are the Remote Environmental 
Measuring Units 100 (REMUS 100); the Blufin12 Buried Mine 
Identification (BMI) UUV systems and the REMUS 600 BMI UUV, 
with a separate magnetic sensor, the Real-time Tracking Laser 




REMUS makes four serious UUV products. REMUS 100, REMUS 
300, REMUS 600 and the REMUS 6000. Figure 4.1 shows the REMUS 
100/MK 18 Mod 1. The first two UUVs are described. 
Source: (REMUS, 2020) 
The REMUS 100 is a man-portable Unmanned Underwater 
Vehicle (UUV) designed for rapid deployment, it can be easily 
transported via helicopter and launched from a dock or any vessel of 
opportunity. With a maximum operating depth of 100 meters and a 
mission duration of up to 12 hours, it is ideal for rapid, low-logistics 
deployments. (REMUS, 2020). The UUV is 67” L x 7.5” D and weighs 
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80 lbs. It has a maximum depth of 328 ft and 6 hours operations 
time. It is equipped with the following: (REMUS -1., 2020) 
Environmental Sensor 
– Fluorometer/Backscatter Sensor 
– Fast Response Conductivity 
 
Temperature Sensor 
– Oxygen Optode 
– Turbidity Sensor 
Imaging Hardware 
– Bathymetric Side Scan Sonar 
– Video Camera Recorder (VCR) Module 
– Lightbar for VCR Module 
– Gap-Filler Sonar 
Communication/Navigation Equipment 
– Precision GPS 
– Military GPS 
– Wi-Fi Communications 
– Iridium Communications 
– NavP Inertial Navigation System 
with Payload Processor 
Software 
– Navlab Post Processing Software 
– RECON Software 
– Reflection Post-Mission Analysis Software 
 
 
Figure 4.1 REMUS 100/MK 18 Mod 1 
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Source: (REMUS -1., 2020) 
 
REMUS 600 
The REMUS 600 is a midsized UUV designed for easy transport 
and maximum versatility, the REMUS 600 (the US Navy MK18 Mod 2 
and LBS AUV Program vehicles) is a highly configurable vehicle with 
a maximum operating depth of 600 meters. Able to be deployed 
from vessels as small as an 11 meter RHIB and boasting a maximum 
mission duration of 24 hours, the REMUS 600 can be outfitted 
with a broad range of sensors to meet the requirements of nearly 
any mission. (REMUS -2., 2020) The REMUS 600 has the following 
specifications: Vehicle Diameter 12.75 in; diameter varies depending 
upon module (for 600 m depth configuration); Vehicle Length Min 
length ~9 ft to Max length ~18 ft; length varies depending upon 
module configuration; Max Weight in Air Min ~850 lbs where weight 
varies depending upon module configuration; Maximum Operating 
Depth 600 meters (1500 meter configuration available);Energy 5.4 
kWh rechargeable Li-ion battery; (Second 5.4 kWh battery tray is 
optional), exchangeable battery option available; and Endurance 
Typical mission endurance is up to 24 hours in standard 
configuration; subject to speed, battery and sensor 
configurations. (REMUS -3., 2020) It is equipped with the following 
(See Figure 4.2) : 
Standard System Configurations 
– Doppler Velocity Log (DVL) 
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– Compass or Inertial Navigation System as 
Standard Depending on Configuration 
– Acoustic Modem (Low & High Frequency Options Available) 
– Pressure Depth Sensor 
– Conductivity & Temperature Sensor 
– GPS/Wi-Fi/Iridium 
– Emergency Recovery Equipment 
– Terrain Avoidance Sonar 
Optional Equipment 
– Up to (2) Battery Trays 
– Responder for Surface Ultra Short Baseline (USBL) 
– Navigation Aiding 
– NavP/HG 9900 INS with Payload Processor 
– Obstacle Avoidance Sonar 
Optional Sensors 
– Dual Frequency Sidescan Sonar 
– HiSAS 2040 Synthetic Aperture Sonar 
– Dynamically Focused Sidescan Sonar 
– Optical Environmental Characterization Sensors 
– Video Camera 
– Multi-Beam Echo Sounder (MBES) 
– Electronic Still Camera (ESC) 
– Sub-Bottom Profiler (SBP) 
– Fish Finding Echo Sounders 
– Oxygen Sensors 
– Photosynthetically Active Radiation (PAR) Sensor 
– LED Based Lights & Strobes for Cameras 
– High Precision, Dual-Band GPS Receiver 
– Terrain Avoidance Sonar (Obstacle Avoidance Sonar optional) 
– Other Custom Sensor Options Available 
Shipboard Devices 
– Shipboard Communications Mast 
– Power Box with Battery Charger/Conditioner 
– Shipboard Communications System 
(GPS, Iridium, Wi-Fi and Optional Freewave) 
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– Acoustic Communications Bottle 
– Ranger Deck Box 
– Acoustic Transducer Towfish 
– Releasable Acoustic Transponders 
– Portable Surface Communications Station 
 
Figure 4.2 REMUS 600 UUV 
 
 
“The REMUS 6000 AUV (Figure 4.3) was designed under a 
cooperative program involving the Naval Oceanographic Office, the 
Office of Naval Research and the Woods Hole Oceanographic 
Institution (WHOI) in support of deep-water autonomous 
operations. The REMUS 6000 AUV boasts the same proven software 
and electronic subsystems found in our highly successful REMUS 
100 AUV, with a depth rating, endurance, and payload that allow 
for autonomous operations in up to 6000 meters of water.” (REMUS 
-4, 2020) The REMUS 6000 has Vehicle Diameter 28 in by Vehicle 
Length 13 ft and weighs in Air 1900 lbs; works at Maximum 
Operating Depth 6000 meters (4000 meter configuration also 
available); Energy 12 kWh rechargeable Li-ion battery pack for two 
pressure housings; a second 12 kWh set can be purchased as an 
option with system permitting 2-hour turn around; charge time is 
typically 8 hours and the batteries are rechargeable up to 300 cycles 
or for 5 years under recommended storage conditions; and has 
Endurance Typical mission duration of 22 hours; subject to speed 
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& sensor configuration. (REMUS -5., 2020) What makes the REMUS 
6000 is “technical horsepower:” 
Standard System Configurations 
– Acoustic Doppler Current Profiler/Doppler 
Velocity Log (ADCP/DVL) 
– Acoustic Modem (Low Frequency) 
– Inertial Navigation System (INS) 
– Sidescan Sonar 
– Depth Sensor 
– Conductivity & Temperature Sensor 
– GPS/Wi-Fi/Iridium 
Optional Sensors 
– Dual Frequency Sidescan Sonar 
– ECO Sensors 
– Multi-Beam Echo Sounder (MBES) 
– Video Camera 
– Electronic Still Camera (ESC) with 
200 Watt-Sec Strobe Lighting 
– Sub-Bottom Profiler (SBP) 
– NavP/HG 9900 INS with Payload Processor 
Deployment Options 
– Launch & Recovery System 
– Operations Van 
– Side Launch Rotation Table 
Shipboard Devices 
– Shipboard Communications Console 
– Power Box with Battery Charger 
– Antenna Box 
(GPS, Iridium, Wi-Fi and Optional Freewave) 
– Acoustic Communications Bottle 
– Ranger Deck Box 
– Towfish 
– Acoustic Transponders 
– HiPAP USBL Capability 
Vehicle Interface Program (VIP) 
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The REMUS 6000 uses essentially the same Vehicle Interface 
Program (VIP) as the proven REMUS 100 AUV. This highly intuitive 
VIP greatly simplifies vehicle maintenance, mission planning, 
vehicle checkout, and data analysis; and will run on any PC or laptop 
operating under Windows.® Communication between the vehicle 
and the host is conducted via a standard Ethernet connection. 
Among other features, the VIP includes: 
– An integrated text editor for construction of the mission file. 
– A map view that illustrates the planned mission for review. 
– Automatic error checking performed on all aspects of the 
planned 
mission, with warning messages that appear if any mission 
parameters are incorrect. 
– A set of quick-look indicators display system status, where 
green 
indicates OK, and red indicates a fault. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 REMUS 6000 
 
Source: (REMUS -5., 2020) 
 
Bluefin 12 Buried Mine Identification (BMI) UUV System 
In a paper by (G. Sulzberger, 2009) the Bluefin 12 BMI was 
abstracted as follows: “The Bluefin12 Buried Mine Identification 
(BMI) System is used as the platform to develop a capability for 
the identification of buried mines. This system houses the bottom 
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looking sonar, the Real-time Tracking Gradiometer (RTG), and an 
Electro-Optic Imager (EOI). 
The objective for the RTG is the enhancement of the processing 
that extracts target locations and magnetic moments from the raw 
RTG data. (G. Sulzberger, 2009) added the capability to conduct 
real-time processing capability to provide autonomous target 
classification and localization results soon after the UUV passes 
the target, while the system is still performing the mission. These 
results will be shared with the vehicle or other sensors for 
transmission back to a base station when the vehicle surfaces. The 
objectives for the EOI include additions to the control software and 
the development of a set of versatile image processing techniques. 
A significant goal is to develop the ability to make images viewable 
remotely over the vehicle’s RF link. This allows for a quick review of 
contacts and improved flexibility in mission planning and execution. 
Image processing goals included the development of image 
enhancement algorithms that could be applied to all EOI data. The 
intent of the enhancement algorithms is to enhance image contrast 
and sharpness to better differentiate targets from background and 
increase target detail. The software will be used to batch process 
large amounts of raw EOI images and save them in a format so 
that the user can scroll through the images using a standard image 
viewer.” (G. Sulzberger, 2009) (Figure 4.4) 
 
Figure 4.4 Bluefin12 BMI 
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Source: (Bluefin Robotics, 2020) 
 
Demonstration 
The objective of the NSWC PCD MR-201103  project conducted 
in 2011 was to leverage the Office of Naval Research’s (ONR) Mine 
Countermeasures (MCM) unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) 
assets to evaluate and demonstrate the applicability of existing ONR 
MCM UUV technologies integrated with advanced sensor packages 




Figure 4.5 Bluefin 12 Internals 
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Source: (Bernstein, 29 June 2012) 
 
A number of sensors were employed in the demonstration.  The 
BMI sensor suite consists of the Buried Object Scanning Sonar 
(BOSS) and the Realtime Tracking Gradiometer (RTG) fitted to the 
Bluefin-12 UUV. The REMUS100 system carries a dual frequency, 
900/1800 kHz side scan sonar. (Figure 4.5) The REMUS system 
provided high resolution acoustic images of proud objects, while the 
BMI sensor suite on the Bluefin-12 UUV provided acoustic images 
of buried objects and the magnetic moments of targets or clusters 
within range of the RTG sensor. The combination of the data from 
both UUV systems was designed to enable detection of acoustically 
reflective targets and discrimination between proud and buried 
state, provide size and aspect information, and indicate which 





Quoting from the (SERDP-ESTCP, 2012) report, the Results were 
not without Implementation errors. 
“A small underwater munitions test site was planted in the Davis 
Point area of St. Andrew Bay near Naval Surface Warfare Center-
Panama City Division (NSWC PCD). Five nominal 100-m-long target 
lines spaced 2 m apart were laid parallel to each other. The first 
two lines had individual targets spaced along the lines and aligned 
at random orientations relative to the target lines. One line had the 
targets proud and the other line had the targets flush buried. The 
third through fifth lines had two clusters of targets on each line. 
Lines one and two provided baseline measurement data for each 
individual target type. Lines three through five provided acoustic 
and magnetic data for clusters of munitions in different states of 
burial and orientation. The planted locations of the targets were 
determined by their drop locations from the surface vessel using 
plumb lines and a GPS system. 
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The BOSS sensor clearly demonstrated the capability of detecting 
and imaging unexploded ordnance (UXO) targets of the class M 
targets in proud, partially buried, and fully buried configurations. 
Discriminating between the different targets was accomplished by 
comparing the known target physical dimensions with the 
measured dimensions extracted from the BOSS imagery. However, 
discriminating multiple targets in a clustered configuration was 
difficult for the case of targets closely spaced together (target 
16-CL1-M). This is due to the medium resolution of the BOSS sensor. 
The developer of the BOSS system has recommended increasing 
the transmit frequency to increase the resolution to enhance the 
imagery but funding for this effort has not been forthcoming. 
 
The RTG experienced hardware failure during the data collection 
event at the end of June, leading to lost data. A likely candidate 
for this failure is the oil-filled cables that connect the sensor head 
to the electronics bottle. These cables and their connection points 
have failed in the past with similar effects on the data. A 
refurbishment and recalibration of the RTG system would be 
beneficial for future testing events and will be necessary to improve 
results.” (SERDP-ESTCP, 2012) 
 
Implementation Issues 
The technologies encountered numerous problems during their 
deployment, including the failure of multiple channels in each 
sensor, not allowing much of the data to be recovered. The sensor 
suite used in the experiment was unique research and development 
equipment developed by the Navy for finding buried mines. As such, 
it cannot be procured commercially. Additional equipment would 
have to be custom-built. 
 
Improvements in magnetic sensors have been made since the 
RTG sensor was constructed, and alternate sensor designs might 
be considered, including the LSG sensor. Collaboration between 
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government and contractor subject matter experts would be 
required to develop a state-of-the-art gradiometer suitable for 
integration with the Bluefin-12 UUV and the BOSS sensor for regular 
use in munitions surveying. As a part of that effort, software for 
processing gradiometer and BOSS data would be streamlined to 
enable survey contractors to use the system with minimal additional 
training. (SERDP-ESTCP, 2012) 
 
Success Criteria and Performance Objectives 
Before we describe a selected sensors and findings, it is useful to 
know what the success criteria was for this demonstration. First we 
need to think in terms of Performance Objectives. 
Performance Objectives (PO) Remote Environmental Measuring 
Units REMUS 100. 
The performance objective (PO) for the REMUS 100 was to first 
provide a wide area search over the entire site areas with the 900 
kHz side scan sonar. Once the wide area search was complete the 
sonar imagery from that search would provide information on the 
overall assessment of proud objects in the area and if any are 
contacts of interest. A follow-on lower altitude, small-area detailed 
survey and target reacquisition of the contact of interest would be 
performed operating the sonar at 1800 kHz. The 1800 kHz frequency 
provided with picture quality sonar imagery that enhances 
classification and identification of the proud contacts of interest. 
Along with sonar data camera imagery it  would provide clear 
picture quality imageries of the contact of interest. 
This PO was not accomplished because the REMUS camera was 
unavailable.  The survey was performed on a clear water day with 
the EO sensors on board the REMUS 600. 
Performance Objectives – Buried Object Scanning Sonar (BOSS) 
Table 4.1 summarizes the BOSS system POs. The objectives 
include assessment of the probability of detection, the degree of 
burial, size, shape, and orientation determined and localization 
accuracy against a combination of small and large UXO 
targets. (Leasko, 2014) The planned tests were not blind tests. They 
UUVs, Advanced Sensors, Munitions Detection & USVs [Nichols]  |  207
were designed to determine the sidescan, BOSS and RTG combined 
capabilities against proud (clearly visable and not buried) and buried 
targets and to determine whether further optimization of the multi 
sensor approach, and further performance testing was warranted. 
The PO was to demonstrate and measure the ability to classify 
all contacts using: 1) the BOSS to measure target size, shape, and 
orientation, 2) the RTG sensor to determine which BOSS contacts 
are ferrous and non-ferrous and to measure the magnetic moment 
of the ferrous contacts and 3) compare BOSS with REMUS sidescan 
data to indicate which contacts are buried and which are proud and 
to enhance localization of those contacts. (Leasko, 2014) 
Table 4.1 Performance Objectives for the BOSS Sensors 
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correct classification of 
the size, shape, and 
orientation of the targets. 
Length and burial 
measurements considered 
correct shall be within 25% 
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Source: (Leasko, 2014) 
Performance Objectives – Real-Time Tracking Gradiometer 
(RTG) / Laser Scalar Gradiometer (LSG) 
The performance objectives for the RTG system are summarized 
in Table 4.2. The objectives include a demonstration of the 
performance of detection, the ability to measure the magnetic 
moment and be able to localize the contacts or clusters of targets. 
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Performance Assessments 
Remote Environmental Measuring Units 100 (REMUS 100) 
Figure 4.6 shows the REMUS 100 UUV mission over the test field. 
The mission was a combine 900 kHz and 1800 kHz sonar surveys. 
The blue lines with arrows, represents the track lines and vehicle 
direction as it traveled though the test field surveying at 900 kHz. 
The purple lines with arrows, represents the track lines and vehicle 
direction as it traveled though the test field surveying at 1800 kHz. 
The green (+) symbol represents the locations of the targets 
detected. Sonar imagery of this is displayed in Figures 14 – 26. The 
red (+) symbol represents the location of a detected UXO target out 
of place from Cluster 16-CL1_M. It is thought that the UXO target 
was moved by a shrimper’s nets as they went through the test field. 
 
  
Figure 4.6 REMUS 100 mission map 
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Source: (SERDP-ESTCP, 2012) 
 
Figure 4.7 shows a sample RTG 1800 kHz sonar imagery of seeded 
point 04-M on Figure 4.6. 
 
 
Figure 4.7 shows a sample RTG 1800 kHz sonar imagery of 
seeded point 04-M on Figure 4.6 
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Source: (SERDP-ESTCP, 2012) 
Figure 4.8 shows the interesting navigation tracks for the survey 
missions performed on 25 June 2011. Note the search patterns are 
designed to pick up proud and buried targets from 90 degree 
approaches. 
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Figure 4.8 Navigation tracks for the survey missions performed 
on 25 June 2011. 




The BOSS images consist of the X-Y plan view showing the 
plumbed position of the target represented by an “X” and the image 
of the target of interest highlighted with a circle and labeled with 
the target’s designation. A zoomed, 3D multi-aspect BOSS image 
for each target is also provides the X-Z and Y-Z perspective views 
to show target burial state. BOSS target localization, distance from 
BOSS localization to diver plumbed positions (“X”), target 
dimensions and burial state information for each of the targets is 
provided from BOSS PMA.[11] 
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Note that all BOSS-generated images in this report are for cases 
with sub-critical grazing angles in the sand bottom field. (SERDP-
ESTCP, 2012) 
Figure 4.9 shows BOSS imagery for target 10-K: (a) plan view 
image and (b) zoom image of target 10-K. Vertical axes are cross 
track, and horizontal axes are along track, in meters. 
 
Figure 4.9 Example of BOSS imagery 
 
Source: (SERDP-ESTCP, 2012) 
 
Summary – BOSS 
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According to Leasko (Leasko, 2014), the BOSS sensor clearly 
demonstrated the capability of detecting and imaging unexploded 
ordinance (UXO) targets of the class M targets in proud, partially 
buried and fully buried configurations. Discriminating between the 
different targets was accomplished by comparing the known target 
physical dimensions with the measured dimensions extracted from 
the BOSS imagery. However, discriminating multiple targets in a 
clustered configuration was difficult for the case of targets closely 
spaced together (target 16-CL1-M). This is due to the medium 
resolution of the BOSS sensor. 
As to target localization, the BOSS system receives and uses UUV 
navigation information to calculate target localization. The present 
navigation package in the Bluefin12 UUV can be updated to improve 
its accuracy. The present method of obtaining the ground truth 
of targets deployed underwater can introduce errors especially in 
deeper water making it difficult to accurately assess target 
localization. (Leasko, 2014) 
 
Modern mine warfare challenges today 
What is the scope of the problem?  The (Bernstein, 29 June 2012) 
demonstration referred to in this chapter constitutes a relatively 
small number of UXO targets to be detected, assessed and 
classified. 
 
Mine warfare remains the most cost-effective of asymmetrical 
naval warfare. Mines are relatively cheap and being small allows 
them to be easily deployed. Indeed, with some kinds of mines, 
trucks and rafts will suffice. At present there are more than 300 
different mines available. Some 50 countries currently have mining 
ability. The number of naval mine producing countries has increased 
by 75% since 1988. It is also noted that these mines are of an 
increasing sophistication while even the older type mines present 
a significant problem. It has been noted that mine warfare may 
become an issue with terrorist organizations. Mining busy shipping 
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straits and mining shipping harbors remain some of the most 
serious threats. (Ocean Studies Board, 2012) 
 
Clearing mines is an inexact science 
Between 600,000 and 1,000,000 naval mines of all types were 
laid in WWII. Advancing military forces worked to clear mines from 
newly-taken areas, but extensive minefields remained in place after 
the war. Air-dropped mines had an additional problem for mine 
sweeping operations: they were not meticulously charted. In Japan, 
much of the B-29 mine-laying work had been performed at high 
altitude, with the drifting on the wind of mines carried by parachute 
adding a randomizing factor to their placement. Generalized danger 
areas were identified, with only the quantity of mines given in detail. 
Many WWII era still exist today. Mines aren’t the only UXO in the 
sea or close to land. Bomb fragments or UXO can still be found 
in Germany and England. More recently, Iraq and Afghanistan has 
a proliferation and specialization of IEDs. The exact number isn’t 
known but the injuries to US soldiers and indigence children / 
population is dramatic. For a lightly technically salted discussion of 
the types of mines, deployment history, and countermeasures see 
Naval Mines in Wikipedia. (Naval Mines, 2020) 
 
Innovation seems to be the name of the game in UUV / USV 
Surveying 
Shallow water has always been a captain’s concern and bottom 
conditions may obscure objects that are sonar resistant. 
Teledynemarine Oceanscience has produced a couple of interesting 
unmanned surface vehicles [boats] (USVs) for shallow water use, 
the 1250 and Boat 1800T – Trimble Edition. Teledynemarine 
Oceanscience Q-Boats® perform reliable remotely-controlled 
acoustic Doppler current profiling in streams, rivers, lakes and 
coastal waters all over the world.  They reduce survey time, keep 
people safe during difficult conditions, and can access hard to reach 
locations. (Teledynemarine, 2020) See Figures 4.10 and 4.11 
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The Teledynemarine 1800-T Trimble edition has some key 
features: 
• – Precise Trimble GNSS positioning and guidance 
• – Real-time 2D survey for inspection and identification of 
obstructions 
• – Cost effective method for ad hoc surveys 
• – Increased safety and reduced cost: replaces dangerous diver 




Figure 4.10 Q-Boat 1250 designed specifically for shallow water 
applications 
 
1250 Field shot 
Source: (Teledynemarine, 2020) 
 
Figure 4.11 Q-Boat 1800-T Trimble Ed. 
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Z-Boat fleet 
Source: (Teledynemarine-1, 2020) 
 
Conclusions: Why do the authors consider UUVs and USVs 
Disruptive Technologies of the future? 
Several reasons. 
Consider two interesting Black Swan events of the past and how 
the technology exponentially grew out of small seeds. 
The date is December 17, 1903. 
The Wright Flyer was the first successful heavier-than-air 
powered aircraft. Designed and built by the Wright brothers, they 
flew it four times on December 17, 1903, near Kill Devil Hills, about 
four miles south of Kitty Hawk, North Carolina. (Figure 4.12) 
 
 Figure 4.12 Wright brothers first flight photo 
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Source: (Crouch, 2014) 
Results: Airline Industry, USAF, Space Command, FAA, 
Passenger and Freight Travel all over the world, bad airline 
snacks, unhappy TSA employees, Space Command. To prove the 
point see Figure 4.13: 
17 Dec 1947–A mere 44 years to the day that the Wright brothers 
took to the air for the first powered flight of 12 seconds and traveled 
120 feet at Kitty Hawk, NC, the Boeing B-47 Stratojet strategic 
bomber takes to the air for the first time. The Boeing B-47 Stratojet 
was a long range, six-engine, jet-powered strategic bomber 
designed to fly at high subsonic speed and at high altitude to avoid 
enemy interception. The B-47’s primary mission was to drop nuclear 
bombs on the Soviet Union. With its engines carried in nacelles 
under the swept wing, the B-47 was a major innovation in post-
World War II combat jet design and helped lead to modern jet 
airliners. The B-47 entered service with the US Air Force’s Strategic 
Air Command in 1951. It never saw combat as a bomber but was 
a mainstay of SAC’s bomber strength during the late 1950s/ early 
1960s and remained in use as a bomber until 1965. Performance 
comparisons: Wright Flyer: wingspan: 40ft/ gross wt.: 604lbs/ 
range: 120ft/ top speed: 35mph/ ceiling: 10ft/ payload: 165lbs B-47: 
wingspan: 116ft/ gross wt.: 133,000lbs/ range: 4,000 miles/ top 
UUVs, Advanced Sensors, Munitions Detection & USVs [Nichols]  |  221
speed: 587mph/ ceiling 45,000ft/ payload 25,000lbs Incredible 
advancement in such a short period of time! 
Figure 4.13 B-47 Stratojet 
 
 
Source: (B-47 Stratojet, 2020) 
 
The Date is: September 7, 1776 
On September 7, 1776, during the Revolutionary War, the American 
submersible craft Turtle attempts to attach a time bomb to the 
hull of British Admiral Richard Howe’s flagship Eagle in New York 
Harbor. It was the first use of a submarine in warfare. See Figure 
4.14. 
Figure 4.14 “Turtle” 
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Source: (Roland, 1977) 
 
Results: Submarines, Submarine warfare, NAVSEA, precision 
munitions’, improved propulsion, nuclear -power, UXO, 1.3 Trident 
National Defense, advanced underwater technologies, Sonar 
applications, EO applications, extreme depth investigations, 
Search & Rescue, Sensors that work underwater and extreme 
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conditions, pre-positioning of marine / maintenance platforms, 
oil exploration, and treasure hunting. 
There will always be wars – somewhere. Chances are the US 
will be involved directly or selling munitions to a proxy. Terrorists 
might realize that mining the shipping areas is easier than naval 
ship warfare and its cost effective.[13] Sensors that work effectively 
underwater in hostile conditions!! This is amazing to say the least. 
Anyone who owns a recreational boat knows that they have to 
regularly clean the hulls of their boats and replace electronics 5x 
faster than the normal homeowner. Seawater is unforgiving to 
electronic and human life. UUVs and USVs handle DDD work so 
much better. 
Just like UAS is revolutionizing the airline industry for all 
applications  – especial defense, so will UUVs and USVs 
revolutionize the marine industries in both civilian and military 




1. Where do you see the next Black Swan event involving UUVs? 
2. How might this technology be used to discover, recover, 
classify ancient artifacts? 
3. How might UUVs be used to repair data communications 
cables at severe depths and tangled in unground obstructions? 
4. Design a CONOP experiment for Counter UUV operations in 
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[1] Black Swan Event- A black swan is an unpredictable event that is 
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beyond what is normally expected of a situation and has potentially 
severe consequences. Black swan events are characterized by their 
extreme rarity, severe impact, and the widespread insistence they 
were obvious in hindsight. (Black Swan Definition, 2020) 
[2] The type of precision on sensors that work effectively 
underwater is an interesting science in itself. A primary reference 
on the subject is by Kovacs entitled “Micromachined Transducers 
Sourcebook.”  (Kovacs, 1998)  There are many newer references, but 
students should start with this one to get a fundamental basis for 
the construction of specialized sensors before jumping into the next 
step in the process. 
[3] (Leasko, 2014)Published in 2014 means that we are 6-7 years 
behind further advances in the sensors and hardening capabilities 
of the assets. However, students can get a lot of information and 
strategy from this UNCLASSIFIED report to chew on. This is why the 
author chose it as a primary reference for this chapter. 
[4] The inventory has been obviously expanded and upgraded since 
this NSCW PCD evaluation. However, those upgrades have been 
in the sensor technologies not necessarily the UUV packages they 
arrive in. Concentrate on the beauty of being able to solve such a 
MCM detection / assessment / classification problem (underwater, 
cold temperatures, hostile environment, visibility issues, salt(s) 
corrosion, significant pressures, magnetic and electro-optic 
interferences, to name a few variables.) 
[5] BOSS data will be collected over the seeded areas and analysis 
will follow to identify the number of targets detected by the system. 
The number of targets detected by the BOSS system will be 
cataloged and verified against the target listing and ground truth 
localization provided by the divers. (SERDP-ESTCP, 2012) 
[6] Pd = Probability of Detection 
[7] The magnetic moment is estimated by statistically fitting 
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windowed time series to a magnetic-dipole model. The properties 
of the moment, including dipole strength and orientation, are 
extracted in this process. (SERDP-ESTCP, 2012) 
[8] RTG/LSG data will be collected over the seeded areas and 
analysis will follow to identify the number of targets detected by the 
system. The number of targets detected by the RTG/LSG system 
will be cataloged and verified against the target listing and ground 
truth localization provided by the divers. (SERDP-ESTCP, 2012) 
[9] The effectiveness of the RTG/LSG localization of proud to fully 
buried ferrous targets. (SERDP-ESTCP, 2012) 
[10] Metric: Compare the RTG/LSG target localization with the 
diver provided target ground truth and determine the percentage 
of BOSS detections of seeded targets that can be identified as non-
ferrous using RTG/LSG data. & Data Requirements: 
RTG/LSG data will be collected over the seeded areas and 
analysis will follow to identify and localize the targets of interest. 
The RTG/LSG localization for each target will be cataloged and 
verified against the target listing and ground truth localization 
provided by the divers. (SERDP-ESTCP, 2012) 
[11] Post Mission Analysis (PMA) 
[12] Disclaimer: Author has no financial or legal relationship to 
vendors discussed in this chapter. Interest is purely technical. 
[13] An example of this in the Straight of Hormuz which 5% of 
the world’s oil transportation and gas purification processes are 
located. See author article on missile effects as a another POV: 
(Nichols R. K., Randall Nichols (October 15, 2019) Implications from 
Attack by Iran on Saudi Arabian Oil Fields (implications-from-
attack-iran-saudi-arabian-oil-fields-nichols, 2019) 
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5. Challenging the Ammo 
Companies from Grass Roots 
[Mai] 
Student Learning Objectives 
 
1) The student will learn the 2nd 
2) The student will learn the major influences that resulted in the 
modern guns and ammunition we enjoy today. 
3) The student is encouraged to gain further study to understand 
how guns helped develop the United States, how guns protect the 
other amendments outlined in the bill of rights and keep and 




The Constitution of United States of America 1791 (rev. 1992) 
Amendment II states explicitly: A well-regulated Militia, being 
necessary to the security of a Free State, the right of the people to keep 
and bear Arms, shall not be Infringed. (Madison, 1791) [1] 
The wording leaves plenty of room for legal and political 
wrangling over the meaning of words like “well regulated,” “militia,” 
“right,” “people,” “keep,” “bear” and “arms.” (Ingraham, 2016) It does 
not leave room for any abridgement of the word Infringed. 
The term ‘Arms’ in the ‘Second’ Amendment refers to weapons. 
The cutting-edge technology for weapons when the Amendment II 
was written, would have been the Revolution War era smoothbore 
musket (Figure 5.1): 
 
Figure 5.1 American Revolution War era Smoothbore Musket 
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Source: (Ingraham, 2016) 
 
Without gunpowder and bullets, a smoothbore musket was and 
is nothing more than a fancy walking stick or at best an artifact 
of history.  This fact still relevant today.  The relationship between 
gunpowder, bullets and their corresponding firearms/weapons/
guns/arms is as intimate relationship as they come.  One without 
the other, the guns and bullets intended function cease to exist 
and operate as they were designed.  “….a musket is a smoothbore 
weapon much like a 12-gauge shotgun.” (Harrington, 2013) 
Few things have changed the world as much as when humans 
learned to harness the power of gunpowder.  Gunpowder in its 
earliest form, was not called, ‘Black Powder’, until an early version 
of smokeless power was invented. At that time, it became known 
as ‘Black Powder’.  At the time of original discovery, it was black 
in color.  Gunpowder was first thought to be discovered by the 
Chinese, they learned to use hollow tubes with gunpowder and 
projectiles to harness its power for something different than 
fireworks.  Black powder formula in its purest variant is synthesized 
as Potassium Nitrate (saltpeter) 75%, Carbon (in the form of 
charcoal) 15%, and Sulfur 10% See Figure 5.2. (Wallace, 2018) 
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Figure 5.2 Gunpowder Composition 
Source: (Wallace, 2018) 
 
There have been many iterations in the development of guns, 
propellants, and bullets.  The development and improvement of 
these three basics tend to occur within relative similar time frames. 
Guns over time have become more reliable and able to deliver 
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multiple shots/rounds/bullets/projectiles in a shorter time.  Black 
powder was the initial propellant of a bullet/projectile.  As guns 
evolved, their propellants and bullets/projectile evolved with them 
and were dependent on gun evolution. 
 
Relevant History – From Muzzle loaders to Modern Cartridges 
The first useable guns started as a Matchlock (Figure 5.3) where 
a burning wick, typically made from hemp, was triggered to ignite a 
small amount of powder in a flash pan. 
 
Figure 5.3 Match-Lock musket 
 
 
Source: (Kolander, 2016) 
 
This was difficult to control with a burning wick, which was not 
much more than a small burning piece of rope that maintained a hot 
ember.  In an effort to eliminate the use of a burning rope, a wheel 
lock was designed to create a rotational force that created a spark. 
The wheel would be wound with a crank then released upon a pull of 
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the trigger.  The unwinding motion would create sparks and igniting 
the powder in the open pan (See Figure 5.4) . 
 
Figure 5.4 Wheel-Lock 
 
Source: (Kolander, 2016) 
 
This method was better due to elimination of the burning rope! 
However, being mechanical it was not without design problems 
and the open flash pan was still exposed and vulnerable to 
environmental moisture. (Kolander, 2016)  The next most successful 
design was based on a piece of shaped flint-rock that was held in 
the jaws of a hammer.  It would strike an extension, “Frizzen,” on a 
flash pan cover. 
 
Figure 5.5 Flint-Lock 
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Source: (Kolander, 2016) 
 
This design (Flint-Lock shown in Figure 5.4) covered the 
vulnerable gunpowder laying in the flash pan until the trigger was 
pulled allowing the flint to strike the Frizzen on the flash pan cover. 
That action forced the Frizzen out of the way and expose the 
gunpowder in the pan, allowing it to be ignited.  It allowed for no 
burning rope and the spark created was relayed to the gunpowder 
being protected from moisture or spillage until an instant before 
firing. (Author, 2020)  The gun was placed in halfcocked position 
while the flash pan was being loaded with powder.  This design 
feature was to allow the operator to perform the pan loading 
procedure while not being in a fully cocked position, supposedly 
safer.  However, sometimes the operator would set off the trigger in 
the halfcocked position either by accident or poor design.  This is 
where we get the saying, ‘Don’t go off halfcocked!’ (Martin, 1761 (first 
Citation) 2021) 
The initial, and up to this point, guns were considered muzzle 
loaders and their barrels were smoothbore.  Muzzle loaders were 
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loaded from the end of the barrel or what is commonly called the 
business end.  Here are the loading steps for muzzle loaders (Figure 
5.6): 
• Ø 1&2) a metered amount of gunpowder was first inserted into 
the muzzle end. 
• Ø 3-7) a cotton wad with a round lead ball was inserted and 
tamped in the gun barrel until properly compacted. 
• Ø 8&9) before being able to be fired, a small amount of 
gunpowder was then placed into the flash pan. 
• Ø 10) Eventually, a percussion cap was developed, which sped 
up the operation. If everything had been done properly, the 
gun was ready to fire once the trigger was placed into the fully 
cocked position. 
 
Figure 5.6 Loading Steps of a Muzzle loader 
 
Source: (Martin, 1761 (first Citation) 2021) 
 
Figure 5.7 Bullet position in a Muzzle loaded gun 
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Source: (Youtube, 2021) 
 
 
You can see how the ball in the lower portion of Figure 5.7 is 
positioned after loading.  The upper portion of Figure 5.7 shows the 
bullet design after the round ball.  Even though, it was called the 
mini-ball, it looked nothing like the earlier round ball.  What the 
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mini-ball did was capture all the escaping gases from the barrel. 
This increased muzzle velocity, distance, and accuracy.  However, 
that caused the pressures within the barrel to increase which 
demanded that increased strength within the metallurgy of the 
barrel had to be increased.  You can almost say that ammunition 
design and gun design became like a dog chasing its tail.  An 
improvement forced and improvement in the other. 
Eventually, breech loading guns were designed so that the powder 
and bullet could be loaded from the breech end.  Several things had 
to come together to allow this to happen.  The breech loading gun 
design had to be worked out at the same time as the cartridge had to 
be invented.  The two were reliant upon each other.Early cartridges 
had a paper wrapped charge of powder and a mini-ball incorporated 
into the pre-assembled bullet or round.  A round in the world of 
guns is considered to be a single bullet or called a shot.  Many of the 
terms relating to guns and ammunitions become interchangeable 
and are usually familiar to the user or in this case the shooter. 
 
 
Figure 5.8 Bullet design progression 
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Source: (BackCountry Chronicles , n.d.) 
 
Figure 5.8 shows how the bullet progressed in design.  Muzzle 
loaded bullets and muzzle loaded guns are still used today. 
The first paper cartridges to include the bullet and placed into 
the breech were quickly replace with a canister called a shell or 
brass cartridge.  A cartridge can be called a shell and vs. versa.  A 
bullet can be called a shell, cartridge or a shell and ammunition.  The 
context the words are used in are important.  As the paper cartridge 
came into its existence breech loading guns became better. 
 
Figure 5.9 Paper cartridge used in early breech loading guns 
 
 
Source: (contributors, Paper cartridge, 2021) 
 
Figure 5.10 Early breech loader w/ fitted cartridge 
 
Source: (contributors, Breechloader, 2021) 
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The above Figure 5.10 was a very early breech loading design. 
The actual cartridge was loaded much like that of the earlier muzzle 
loaders.  However, the loading of the cartridge was then entered 
into the breech end of the gun. 
Eventually, the paper cartridge led to advent of the metallic cased 
gunpowder and bullet. See Figure 5.11. 
 
 
Figure 5.11 Bullets w/ brass casing 
 
 Source: (Jeff, 2020) 
 
Figure 5.12 Metallic cased bullet in chamber of breech loaded 
gun 
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Source: (II, 2017) 
 
Figure 5.13 Rifled barrel 
 
Source: (BackCountry Chronicles , n.d.) 
Figure 5.14 Black powder 
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Source: (YouTube, 2021) 
 
Figure 5.15 Smokeless Powder 
 
Source: (YouTube, 2021) 
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Several events came together to make a more powerful, accurate, 
reliable, and easier to use gun.  Those events included: 
Preassembled metallic case shell (see Figure 5.11), Breech loading 
gun (see Figure 5.10 & 12), Smokeless powder (see Figure 5.14 & 
15), improved metallurgy, gas operated case extraction and 
rechambering (see Figure 5. 16), center fire ammunition (see Figure 
5. 16), Barrel rifling (see Figure 5.13).  This discussion is by no means 
an all-inclusive recreation of the history of firearms and 
ammunition, only the highlights that made major shifts in the 
trajectory of guns and ammunition outcome are pointed out here. 
 




Source:  (SIMMONS, 2020) 
 
 
Figure 5.17 Shell ejection and reloading using excess gas 
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Source:  (Sagi, 2021) 
 
Summary 
To reach the technology of modern weapons (see Figure 5.17), 
it was important that a smokeless power was developed.  The 
smokeless powders do not only give us less smoke but also greater 
chamber pressures that could push a soft metal such as lead 
through a rifled barrel that had no leakage around the bullet.  The 
rifling spins the bullet giving it greater accuracy but also requiring 
higher chamber pressures to push it through the barrel that was 
fit so tightly.  Only a shell that houses its propellant and bullet 
could assist with the tight fit.  It also allowed for ease of loading 
and once the round was expended a grove at the base of the shell 
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could be gripped by an extractor that is powered by some of the 
excess gas of the spent round to automatically remove the spent 
shell casing.  This action was important to take place at the breech 
and is why breech loading designs became so very important to 
the semi-automatic weapons we see today.  The early smokeless 
powder was from a nitrocellulose and nitroglycerin mix that gave 
less smoke, higher chamber pressure, by complete combustion and 
left less corrosive remains since it was mostly consumed, unlike 
Black powder that would not work in today’s guns. 
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Today’s shooters are typically more informed than ever before. 
Many hold conceal/carry licenses, have taken hunter safety 
courses, abide by all laws and regulations, some belong to hunting 
clubs where ideas and understand is shared and peer reviewed. 
Their reasons for owning and shooting guns vary from sport/target 
shooting, personal protection, game hunting to provide food for 
their families.  Today’s shooters understand the need to practice 
because shooting is a perishable skill and the need to be familiar 
with their gun is a must.  This should be understood then that a gun 
owner will not buy a gun to put in a box unless they intend act as 
a collector.  Just like a pilot that flies, a gun owner must practice. 
That being said, ammunition will be consumed on a regular basis; 
therefore, there is a continual need to replace a gun owner’s 
ammunition stock. 
 
The Nub – Ammunition shortages and government suppression 
of stocks 
At the start of this writing there was rationing of ammunition and 
complete shortages.  The next section was happening just 20 hrs. 
while these very words being typed: 
[OREM, Utah — an amazing sight outside a Utah County gun store 
as hundreds lined up to buy ammo. 
The line stretched around Gunnies, located at 396 South State 
Street in Orem, all throughout the day on Saturday. 
Some traveled as far as Kamas to wait for hours in the cold. 
KSL-TV spoke to a number of people — some said they came for 
the restocked ammo; others were more anxious. They mentioned 
current political events — the GA runoff, a soon-to-be transfer of 
power and Wednesday’s violence at the U.S. Capitol. Many in line 
also yelled out: “Biden is going to take our guns.” 
“There were people down here, 200 lined up before the store 
opened,” said gun owner Mark Greer who drove from South Jordan. 
Recently, there has been a shortage on the most popular ammo. 
“It goes fast because there’s none out there,” said Greer. 
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The ammunition shortage started in late spring of 2020 when the 
coronavirus altered manufacturing. 
Ammo has been on and off shelves, but Gunnies restocked its 
AR-15 ammo supply on Saturday. 
“Perfect storm for gun supply,” said gun salesman Chris Hansen. 
The masses came to get their hands-on part of that shipment. 
One Gunnies employee couldn’t get the ammo on shelves fast 
enough. 
“This case has 1,000 rounds,” said the worker. “I have gone 
through 10 boxes already in two hours.” 
Because the store has seen hoarding in the past, there was a limit 
placed on what a customer could buy. 
“On this 223-556 that we got in that everybody’s here for today, 
we’re allowing 200 rounds per customer,” said Hansen. 
Gunnies sales reps said they have seen some of their busiest days 
ever this year, adding that the shop is not usually busy like this in 
January. 
“We have seen a rush on guns and ammo before – but never in 
January,” said Hansen. “Typically, after Christmas it slows down, but 
this year has been just the opposite.” 
They mentioned that when Obama was elected in 2008 and again 
in 2012, there was a run-on guns and ammo. 
Those in line expressed different reasons for showing up. 
“With the changes coming of a new Presidential Administration, 
people are concerned about their 2nd Amendment rights,” said 
Greer. “That’s why you see so many here today.” 
“People are coming in and they are pretty scared. They feel they 
are being attacked,” said Gunnies employee Josh Hansen. “They feel 
the need to fight back, or at least protect themselves.” ]  (Tait, 2021) 
 
According to United States Government Experts, any proposed 
amendment to the Constitution needs to be passed by both the 
House and the Senate, with two-thirds majorities. It would then 
need to be ratified by three-fourths of the 50 states, or 38 of them. 
Historically, that’s proved unlikely and challenging. In the history of 
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the United States, the only amendment that’s ever been repealed is 
Prohibition. (Tait, 2021) 
 
So, what is happening?  With close to 8 million new gun owners 
there is no doubt that there is increased demand on the 
ammunitions supply chain.  But why are there so many new gun 
owners?  Is it because of the individuals wanting to impose gun 
control on the nation?  Is it because of the riots of 2020 in the 
Portland area?  Is because of the worries of the pandemic of 2019? 
The pandemic did create the toilet paper shortages, but they 
rebounded quickly.  You cannot go to any of the stores and find 
ammunition.  Even though the manufactures claim they have 
increased production. 
One more little item almost 7+ years old and no one really took 
notice. 
“The Denver Post, on February 15th, ran an Associated Press 
article entitled Homeland Security aims to buy 1.6b rounds of ammo, 
so far, to little notice.  It confirmed that the Department of 
Homeland Security has issued an open purchase order for 1.6 billion 
rounds of ammunition.  As reported elsewhere, some of this 
purchase order is for hollow-point rounds, forbidden by 
international law for use in war, along with a frightening amount 
specialized for snipers. Also reported elsewhere, at the height of 
the Iraq War the Army was expending less than 6 million rounds a 
month.  Therefore 1.6 billion rounds would be enough to sustain a 
hot war for 20+ years.  In America.” (Benko, 2013)  The interesting 
question to ponder is how much more ammo has been purchased 
since 2013 for DHS “practice?” 
  
Figure 5.19 Empty shelves at a local gun store courtesy of 
Randall Mai 
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Figure 5.20 online buying Courtesy of Randall Mai 
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It is possible that hording, scalping, increased demand, fear 
buying will throw off the normal supply and demand.  However, 
every caliber of ammunition and most of the guns are gone.  It 
starts to make a person wonder if there is more at play.  Especially 
when the incoming president says he is coming for people’s guns. 
 It should be noted that the 2nd Amendment is considered a right 
from God and not given to people by the government.  But it is 
considered to be protected by the government, as it says, ‘…shall not 
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be infringed!’  This may be true but by not supplying ammunition 
to the public has the same effect as disarming the American public 
and as stated at the start of this chapter, without ammunition, a 
gun is nothing more than a stick.  Some gun owners have resigned 
themselves to reloading their own ammunition.  But stores do not 
have reloading supplies.  It is a little ironic that it’s not just the 
popular calibers no components are available to reload but ever 
caliber has NO supply.  That makes no sense!!  Every re-loader will 
tell that they do not have the apparatuses to reload all calibers 
across the caliber spectrum.  It makes no economic sense and would 
simply not be cost effective.  Another red flag! 
 
Ammunition – Like water in an ocean, everywhere but not a 
drop to drink 
 
What do gun owners do for ammunition?  Let’s take a look at 
what other authors are saying:  Ammunition purchasers across 
America—or make that would-be purchasers in record numbers—are 
finding shelves bare, and unfortunately that’s hardly breaking news. 
If this were simply a Christmas-season run, we could insert a Grinch 
joke here and assume things would return to normal after the 
holidays. But, in fact, this shortage, as many readers can attest, 
traces back at least to spring when COVID mania shocked the 
country and has since intensified under an unprecedented chain 
of cultural phenomena. Many gun owners feel that the only way to 
ensure they have ammo when they need it is to buy in bigger-than-
normal quantities, and the result is hoarding. 
 
As detailed in a recent “Keefe Report,” nearly any caliber that’ll 
go bang in whatever quantity is up for grabs is snapped up almost 
immediately. (Keefe, 2020) Consumer frustration is rampant, and 
there’s a real concern about personal- and home-defense shooters 
not being able to get ammo they need to be prepared. 
Anyone who’s been a gun owner and at least a semi-active shooter 
going back a decade can remember earlier shortages, and while 
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those were truly galling and nationwide, this one’s different. It’s 
even more widespread and more pervasive in terms of unattainable 
calibers—nearly all of them, from what we’re hearing. Like that other 
lingering current event on everyone’s mind, we’re left wondering: 
When it will end? 
That question is landing in record numbers, too, in the inboxes, 
customer-help lines and direct attention of nearly everyone 
working for America’s ammunition manufacturers. We talked to a 
few key executives who spoke about the inquiries and criticism 
coming their way—so much of it that, at times, it threatens to 
impede normal operations—and who shared anecdotal requests that 
would be comical if the shortage weren’t so serious. They were 
also frank in answering the question about when relief will come, 
and while there are bits of good news, the outlook for returning to 
normal supply-and-demand in 2021 remains murky. (Zent, 2020) 
 
Let’s Listen to the Manufactures (See Table 5.1) : (Zent, 2020) 




“Ammunition is the new toilet paper…… 
“The big problem here-we’ve seen it before, but not like this- 
is folk’s panic thinking they won’t be able to get any more and 
so buy more than normal… 
“We make it one day and ship it the next.” 
“I’ve seen shortages six times in my career,” said Hornady, 
“but the difference this time is the string of events—Walmart, 
Virginia [anti-gun legislature], coronavirus, riots, an influx of 
[6-7 million] new gun owners, a bad election. 
 





“After seeing big sales spike as a result of COVID, civil unrest 
and then so many more people getting out this year going 
hunting – license sales are up like crazy…… 
“But ever since Joe Biden was named the presumed 
presidential-election winner, we have seen a reaction in the 
marketplace, and it hasn’t subsided… 
“Demand has been strong across the board—any type or 
caliber of handgun ammo; small rifle, big rifle, hunting rifle; 
even rim-fire—all of it really picked up. 
 
“We make it one day and ship it the next.”  “We talk to a big 
database of users on a monthly basis, and one thing we’re noting is 
that what we call ‘heavy shooters,’ those who shoot 10,000 rounds 
or more per year, a lot of them haven’t been purchasing. They’ve 
seen the frenzied activity and are holding back in hopes it’ll subside. 
Well, we all know what’s going to happen when they work through 
their stockpiles and at some point, come back to the market. So, 
no, we don’t foresee any slowdown in the demand in 2021.”Jason 
Hornady vowed his company is doing everything it can to meet 
that demand but not without concerns. “Our workforce has pushed 
hard through this but is fatigued. We have an issue finding people 
to keep the machines running, and trust me, everyone is working 
a lot of hours,” he said. “I was in a camp back in September where 
someone commented that such-and-such gun company was 
‘shipping only 20 percent more than last year’ and that ‘they just 
don’t care about making more.’ Please. There’s no factory of any kind 
that doesn’t want to make as much as they possibly can. That’s us. 
We’re doing as much, making as much as we can,’ said Hornady. “For 
2020, we’ve shipped 30 percent more than we did a year ago. We are 
adding capacity, but according to an existing plan. 
“I’ve seen shortages six times in my career,” said Hornady, “but the 
difference this time is the string of events—Walmart, Virginia [anti-
gun legislature], coronavirus, riots, an influx of [6-7 million] new gun 
owners, a bad election. It all adds up. Right then, hunting season 
comes along, and you know what consumer is the maddest? The 
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ones who normally buy two boxes of deer ammo a year. They go into 
their local gun shops and can’t believe [the shelves are bare]. Our 
local gun-store owner called to tell me about two guys who came 
into his place looking for hunting ammunition, and then they told 
him that Hornady has been shut down since June. Crazy!(Zent, 2020) 
“At the same time, COVID is a reality for us, too,” said Hornady. 
“If an employee has to quarantine, even if they’re not sick, we can’t 
just send a loading press home with them. We’ve had to spread out 
and guard against super-spreader events so that it won’t shut down 
a big part of the factory.” 
Both industry leaders cited shortage of raw materials as a 
concern, too. Hornady said his firm laid in a “… six-month supply 
at the first signs of how serious COVID might be. We’re grateful 
that we did, but when you have a six months’ worth of material, 
you also have a space problem. And not just copper and lead, it’s 
also packaging, staples and other supplies. Did you know there’s 
a shortage on the DOT-approved cardboard required for shipping 
our loaded ammunition? We’re now having to ship in white boxes 
instead of brown ones because we can get more of that.” 
Chris Metz echoed that, saying it’s been challenging for his 
ammunition brands—Federal, Speer and CCI to keep enough brass 
and primers on hand, despite the fact that Federal and CCI are two 
of the world’s biggest primer manufacturers. 
The same has been true for Vista’s newest brand, Remington 
Ammunition, which the outdoor conglomerate acquired in 
September. “Both the workers at Remington and those of us from 
Vista see this as a marriage made in heaven,” said Metz. “And it 
couldn’t have come at a better time from a capacity standpoint. 
That factory wasn’t working, which contributed to the shortages.” 
The high-production facility in Lonoke, Ark., which for decades 
has produced the familiar green-and-yellow-boxed ammunition, is 
ramping up this month, offering one glimmer of hope that the 
supply side will be buoyed.(Zent, 2020) 
“We’ve been working to rehire 400 to 600 furloughed workers, 
have been retraining them and getting the manufacturing processes 
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back in place,” reported Metz. “Supplies of Remington ammunition 
should be coming back on the market in early January. We all grew 
up with the brand, we love it, and we know we’re not alone.” 
It will also be interesting to see if some of the other names in U.S. 
ammunition manufacturing are able to step up production on the 
heels of developments in this pivotal industry segment. SIG Sauer, 
for one, is operating an ultra-modern plant in Jacksonville, Ark., and 
its loads have gained traction with several gun-owner segments. 
Sierra Bullets began selling its own branded cartridge a few years 
back, primarily hunting rifle cartridges, but the company made a 
strong growth statement when it acquired Barnes Bullets during 
the Remington Outdoor Corp asset sell-off in late September. The 
Barnes installation in Mona, Utah, while not as large as the legacy 
brands’ plants, has a history of producing a full range of highly 
regarded rifle and pistol ammo, and now that it’s out from under 
the Remington corporate umbrella, is expected to again contribute 
more to the national supply chain.(Zent, 2020) 
A third maker that bears watching is Fiocchi USA, which 
announced in July that it will be expanding its stateside 
manufacturing by adding a facility in Little Rock, Ark., to supplement 
an existing plant in Missouri. Expect to see an expansion in 
domestic-made Fiocchi product lines, which produces top-quality 
rifle, pistol and shotshell products. Furthermore, Fiocchi 
announced it has acquired Baschieri & Pellagri, who’s high-end 
shotshells are the gold standard for many European clay’s 
competitors and hunters, and they too will be produced in the 
United States. 
When contacted, a spokesman for 
the Winchester and Browning ammunition brands simply 
commented: “Like many manufacturers in the shooting-sports 
industry, we are experiencing extremely high demand for our 
products. We are continuing to manufacture and ship our high-
quality products on a daily basis.” 
Those final words really tell the tale. All hands in the ammunition 
industry are waging a daily battle to meet the unprecedented 
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demand. Though there are a few reasons to expect supply to 
increase, those who know this market best are forecasting 
continued shortfalls. AmericanRifleman.org will keep you posted as 
developments occur. (Zent, 2020) 
Other difficulties affecting the ammunition industry are the fact 
that many of the raw materials are no longer manufactured in the 
United States.  For example: any lead is either imported or 
reworked.  Many store owners have claimed they here that primers 
are in short supply.  It is easy to understand when components can 
be made cheaper elsewhere why it would be tempting to outsource 
it; however, it makes about as much sense to outsource of critical 
computer systems to a country that does not have America’s best 
interest at heart. 
Let’s play this shortage scenario out to absurdity.  Let’s say no 
more ammo is ever manufactured ever again.  What then?  It is 
pretty hard to follow a business model in times like these.  It is very 
easy in business to get in over your head.  Scaling up to a new level 
of production is not always wish.  Yes you can increase output of 
existing machines and increase schedules.  But to what percent?  If 
you over commit in times like this by purchasing more equipment, 
what happens if there is a return to productions levels prior to the 
pandemic, administration change, hording and fear purchasing? 
You could easily bankrupt a busy in uncertain business cycles, like 
too much demand.  Better to stay in business and let frustrations 
play out. 
Let’s not forget the North Korean’s gave a U.S. lead NATO army a 
run for their money in the 1950’s. (Figure 5.21) There source of small 
arms ammunition was created underground in caves and still almost 
defeated NATO.  Production can be increased but to what level and 
how long can that be sustained in a society where people perform 
based on greed rather than with a whip at their backs. 
 
Figure 5.21 N. Korean small arms manufacturing 
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Source: (Netflix, 2021) 
 
How do we get away from all the scarcity?  What paradigm shift 
can occur?  Well, it already has!    There are individuals that believe 
they can reproduce or substitute materials by either acquiring them 
from other sources or recycle parts that are somewhat available. 
The problems these individuals will encounter is substandard 
materials/parts.  They will be difficult to obtain and most likely 
inconsistent in quality.  This is not what I would consider a good 
replacement for the current ammunition industry.  By no means 
could scavenging parts ever attain the level of production needed 
to supply all gun enthusiasts with replaceable ammunition.  Because 
the base elements for bullets would have to come from such things 
as old car batteries, dental waste, plumbing waste, wheel weights, 
scrap yards, thrift stores, or maybe old sailboat ballasts/keels, yard 
sales, roofing companies.  Then there would have to be knowledge 
of component assembly.  Building dyes and running a foundry would 
be another skill-set most will never have.  What about the 
propellant?  Will you have the license to create your own propellant 
or knowledge?  Not only is it illegal to manufacture explosives 
because personal and public safety would be in danger if every gun 
enthusiasts were running around trying to manufacture their own 
propellants.  Casing and primers, where would they come from? 
 
The paradigm may have already shifted right under the noises 
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of the gun world.  There may already be a replacement for the 
gun and its history of using propellants that detonate.  Who needs 
gunpowder when you have air?? 
 
Figure 5.22 AirForce Texan 
 
Source: (Depot, 2020) 
AirForce Air guns (Figure 5.22) says this is the most powerful 
production air rifle in the world. It shoots .45-caliber lead 
projectiles at up to 1,000 fps for over 500 foot-pounds of energy. 
This is a single-shot, precharged pneumatic with a sidelever action 
and a 490-cubic-centimeter pressure tank equipped with a built-in 
pressure-relief device. It will effectively contain up to 3,000 psi of 
pressure.  (Larson, 2015) 
Several calibers of air rifles are being manufactured and many 
of the States are allowing hunting with these air guns.  Calibers 
range from .177, .22, .25, .30, .338, .45, .50.  There are .25 caliber guns 
that can shoot up to 60 times before needing a charge.  Air guns 
you could argue are in their infancy much like the early musket 
muzzle loading guns.  As materials, design, and projectiles improve 
its anyone guess to the level of quality, accuracy, and stopping 
power these forms of weapons could achieve. 
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Figure 5.23 Hatsan Big Bore Carnivore 
 
 
Source: (Depot, 2020) 
 
Figure 5.24 Whitetail with an Airgun 
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Source:  (Clayton, 2019) 
 
A 45 caliber Airforce Air guns Texan air rifle on the Dale River 
Ranch (www.daleriverranch.com) to harvest a whitetail buck with 
an air rifle.  (Clayton, 2019) 
The air rifle may not be the only firearm that totally disrupts the 
powdered firearm industry.  A new kid is on the block and he is 
definitely in his infancy but shows beautiful room for improvement 
that would definitely be at its matchlock stage.  What gun am I 
referring to you may wonder!!  The hand-held coil gun.  This gun 
is definitely in its infancy.  Even though this gun appear to bigger 
and bulker, it tends to be lighter.  That is because it is not slinging 
around bunches of weight from the cartridge ammo.  Thanks to lead 
being too heavy.  However, the coil gun makes some weight up with 
coils that are heavy. (See Figure 5.25) 
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Figure 5.25 Coil gun 
 




Since 2020 ammunition has become less available for all calibers 
in all places.  Retailers, in store and online have seen less and less 
ammunition come into theirs stores.  The manufactures have 
claimed to step up their operations.  But it seems to still be getting 
worse.  The claim is the COVID, safety fears, hording, administration 
changes, increased gun ownership is having something to do with 
the lack of availability.  It may not be the agenda, but the hard reality 
is that by not keeping the store shelfs stocked it has the effect of 
disarming the American public.  And let’s not forget the incoming 
administration has been noted for saying they want to take the guns 
away.  Whatever the situation really is, people dedicated to having 
guns will switch to using something as air rifles.  If they then try to 
regulate air, the author will  have to claim that the desire to disarm 
the American public was the desire from the beginning.  So rather 
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than the air guns being the disruption, the government is the true 
disrupter. 
Questions 
1. What basic components and tools are necessary to load you 
own ammunition? 
2. What would be necessary to build a small factory, secure the 
basic materials and manufacture ammunition at less than 50% 
of the market price. Develop the economic business model and 
consider the regulatory and public responses. Consider risks. 
Consider expected profit and market share. 
3. What legal / international / ATF road blocks must be hurdled 
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[1] The word Infringed means “act so as to limit or undermine 
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(something); encroach on” and “actively break the terms of (a law, 
agreement, etc.) (Wiki Dictionary, 2021) 
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6. Future Proof Security 
[Shields] 
Student Learning Objectives 
 
Using IEC 62443 and other evolving standards, as inspiration for 
requirements, Chapter 6 is dedicated to the importance of both 
security and authentication in providing secure integrity 
management for systems now and the foreseeable future. 
The student will be introduced to Autonomous Key Management 
(AKM) and its importance in replacing Blockchain – because it is 




New and evolving threats to security include not only attacks 
on the security of the protected assets (both “in-motion” and “at 
rest”), but also to the validity of the protected assets.  Requirements 
focused on both simultaneously securing the data as well as 
authenticating the source of the data are rapidly increasing in 
significance. 
 
Standards like IEC 62443 (ISA, 2021), have evolved over the past 
five years to address this exact problem.  IEC 62443 specifies a 
framework to address and mitigate current and future security 
vulnerabilities in industrial automation and control systems (IACSs). 
It also provides a firm foundation for other industries that are 
neither mission critical nor safety critical, but whose applications 
are just as important to their stakeholders and for whom value 
security and authentication as much as the stakeholders in mission 
critical and safety critical applications. 
Security and Protecting Critical Assets 
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Malware on the rise and intruders increasing the scope, 
sophistication, and frequency of their attacks, the realization has 
been made that encryption alone cannot protect a system.  The 
consensus is that a more wholistic approach must be taken and this 
is where IEC 62443 and other similar methodologies come to bear. 
(Michelle Michael, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, TÜV NORD 
GROUP, 2021)[1] 
 
In parallel, those whose responsibility it is to provide network and 
asset security have accepted the notion that breaches are inevitable 
and thus, constant analysis of the system and its assets must be 
done perpetually for the life of the system.  What this means, is that 
it is not enough to simply focus on protecting files and/or data. 
The focus initially shifted to intrusion detection, but then quickly 
expanded beyond that to include monitoring the entire system and 
integrity management. 
 
Each data set, each hardware element, and each electronic 
component, must be identified, verified, and validated: 
Asset Authentication = Asset Identity Validation + Asset Identity 
Verification         (Eq 6.1) 
 
Identity Validation refers to the concept that the identity is valid. 
That it is real.  For instance, the verification of a social security 
number will determine if the number is a legitimate social security 
number, but not necessarily if it belongs to a specific individual. 
 
Identity Verification refers to the concept that the validated 
identity is verified as being associated with the context it is being 
tested for.  Again, using the concept of a social security number, not 
only is the social security number valid (i.e., associated with a real, 
living person), but it is indeed associated with the specific person 
who is claiming it as their own. 
Put the two together and the result asset authentication. 
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By authenticating each asset, the integrity of the overall system 
is maintained.  Additionally, authenticated physical assets, can then, 
themselves, become trust anchors and a means for extending the 
overall integrity and security of the entire system. 
 
One-time authentication is not sufficient for protecting the 
overall system integrity.  It is a process that must be repeated from 
power-on to power-down/reset and for the lifetime of each 
individual device and the system as a whole. 
 
The driving factor for this is that the issues and concerns of what 
was once the dilemma of the Information Technology (IT) domain 
has now crept into the Operational Technology (OT)[2] domain as 
well. It is especially true for the critical infrastructure subset portion 
of OT represented by Industrial Automation Control Systems.  This 
is because in an effort to interconnect OT and IT systems, OT 
systems now have many of the same components as IT.  Thus, they 
automatically inherit and/or are susceptible to the same problems. 
 
The problem with that is while there are plenty of security 
solutions for IT, OT presents a more difficult landscape to protect 
because of its diversity of systems, including systems that are 
comprised of many (if not all) proprietary solutions. 
 
The below Table 6.1, obtained from a whitepaper created by 
TUViT (Michelle Michael, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, TÜV 
NORD GROUP, 2021), illustrates the disparity differences between 
traditional IT Security and IACS Security (and is also largely true 
for many OT systems because of proprietary and non-standard OT 
implementations): 
Table 6.1: Differences between Traditional IT Security and IACS 
Security 




Systems IACS Systems 





















































Source: (Michelle Michael, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, TÜV 
NORD GROUP, 2021) 
 
The takeaway from Table 6.1 is that while IT systems are 
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challenged to keep up with the rapidly changing and increasing 
complex and sophisticated security attacks, OT faces almost 
insurmountable obstacles to overcome just to get near the same 
level of protection as IT.  The challenge for OT Industrial Automation 
Control Systems they are almost always managing critical 
infrastructure that must operate in an environment of continued 
availability and stability.  Not only is there an additional constraint 
that these systems can ill-afford to go offline because of the safety 
concerns of the resources they are managing, but these systems 
must be continually operational. 
 
The foundation of why new and more comprehensive approaches 
for providing security and integrity services to OT, particular those 
managing critical infrastructure, have evolved.  But one need not 
think that these approaches are limited to and benefit only OT 
critical infrastructure systems.  These approaches also can provide 
great benefit to IT based systems, particular those which directly or 
indirectly impact the very fabric of our society. 
 
Protecting Industrial Control Systems via Comprehensive & 
Secure Integrity Management & Monitoring 
Having now established that security solutions for systems 
require more than simply encryption of data.  That the basic 
integrity of those systems must also be maintained.  The question 
then becomes, how to do this? 
First, it will be easier and more straightforward to consider 
systems whose operating environment can be limited.  That is 
systems that operate mostly as closed systems, with little to no 
interaction to external networks.  Second, and with the 
aforementioned in mind, focusing on Industrial Control Systems 
(ICS) will have the greatest impact.  As these systems can least 
afford to have a breach and the resultant behavior as consequence 
of a breach, can be catastrophic to both human life and property. 
Protecting these systems provides the ultimate ROI, by saving both 
money and human life. 
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Given this focus, the logical progression for thoroughly examining 
the challenges Industrial Control Systems face: 
1) Describe characteristics of what sets Industrial Control Systems 
apart from typical IT systems. 
2) Outline what an ideal solution would be 
3) Given the ideal solution provided in (2) above, describe how 
current solutions fit within this framework, and 
4) Provide alternative, perhaps yet to be defined solutions that can 
address the goals of the framework described in 2) above. 
 
Secure Communication & Integrity Management & Monitoring 
Challenges for Industrial Control Systems 
Systems which are typically considered as Industrial Control 
Systems, usually manage mission and/or safety critical types of 
systems, including critical infrastructure systems (that manage 
essential services).  Typical examples of such systems are: 
•  Electricity: Power Generation and Power Distribution. 
•  Petroleum/Natural Gas: Exploration, Extraction, Pipeline, 
Production. 
•  Wastewater: Treatment/Purification. 
•  Transportation: 
◦  Aviation: Traffic Control, Aviation Vehicles. 
◦  Rail: Traffic Control (BackOffice, Wayside, and Onboard), 
Other non-traffic, onboard systems. 
◦  Maritime: Traffic Control, Onboard Shipping Control 
systems. 
◦  Automotive: Traffic Control, Individual Vehicle Control 
systems. 
•  Manufacturing 
•  Mining 
 
These systems come under a variety of names: 
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•  Industrial Control Systems (ICS). 
•  Operational Technology (OT). 
•  Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA). 
•  Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC). 
•  Proportional-Integral-Derivative (PID). 
 
And, usually have most, if not all of the following characteristics: 
• Communication within the system is local to the closed system. 
Typical examples of this would be virtually all vehicles and 
other types of mission and/or safety critical systems. 
• Hardware components are static and do not change. Thus, all 
possible combinations of communication paths are known up 
front. 
• Communication may be physically and/or logically separated 
into mission/safety critical communication and non-mission/
non-safety critical communication. 
• Updating of traditional security credentials is often physically 
prohibitive, difficult to do, and/or financially impractical or 
costly. Some practical examples of this are: 
 
• Updating the security credentials in automotive vehicles would 
be inordinately costly and practically impossible in all cases 
given that some vehicles may never visit an authorized service 
center to connect to the OEM backend server. 
• Remote updating of security credentials of high-security 
military installations is usually prohibited and done locally. 
Making the overall security credential update process 
inordinately costly. 
• Remote updating of security credentials of space systems is 
problematic both for reasons of security and practicality 
(including huge delays because of time and distance from 
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Earth). 
• Updating of security credentials within nuclear facilities must 
be done locally. Making the overall security credential update 
process inordinately costly. 
• Availability for many of these systems must be at or close to 
100%. Meaning, the systems they control must remain online 
24-hours a day, 365-days a year, without interruption.  Systems 
that fall under this category usually have double or triple 
redundancy systems, but if there is a security breach, 
depending upon the redundancy is achieved, it may easily affect 
all of the redundant systems as well. 
These systems, particularly those protecting critical infrastructure, 
are considered to be excellent targets by potential attackers.  A 
successful attack on such a system can incur a huge loss to both a 
country and its economy. 
 
Even though these systems usually have limited (or restricted) 
external network connectivity, because of their operational 
requirements and the aforementioned potentially catastrophic 
consequences in the event of failure or breach, their security 
requirements are far more demanding than most IT based systems. 
Careful thought must be given as to what the ideal solution would 
be to solve the security and integrity challenge for Industrial 
Control Systems. 
The next section focuses on collating suggested requirements for 
providing security and integrity management to Industrial Control 
Systems, keeping in mind, the demanding nature of their 
operational environment. 
 
Ideal Secure Communication & Integrity Management & 
Monitoring Requirements for Industrial Control Systems 
 
Before delving into the suggested requirements, the concept of 
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a security relationship must be defined.  Which is, a security 
relationship is a set of two or more endpoints that form a 
communication network sharing a common set of security 
credentials.  Another way of viewing the concept of security 
relationship would be that of a “security mesh”, given that the set 
of endpoints is not restricted to point-to-point communication, but 
rather multipoint to multipoint communication. 
 
Logically, it is easier to break this task into two sections. 
First, is to examine what the ideal security solution should look 
like.  Then, using the security framework specified for the ideal 
security solution, the ideal Integrity Management framework can 
then be examined as well. 
 
Ideal Secure Communication Requirements for 
Industrial Control Systems 
 
Features and associated reasoning for each suggested 
requirement are provided below: 
• Security Credentials should be unique per security relationship, 
with no interdependencies on security credentials of other 
security relationships. Different security relationships should 
have nothing in common with other security relationships. 
• Shared secrets that could lead to a breach of one or more security 
relationships, shall not be communicated between hardware 
modules and preferably, are never exposed outside of a 
hardware module’s secure storage. Implies, security 
credentials are pre-provisioned, with no key exchange. 
• Security credentials should never be static and should be 
updated/refreshed on a regular basis. 
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• Security credentials should not be predictable. 
• Security credentials should have Perfect Forward Secrecy (even if 
someone discovers the current security credentials, it should 
not give them any insight as to what prior security credentials 
were). 
• A single set of security credentials should be capable of securing 
a communication mesh of two or more nodes. That is, it shall be 
possible to have security relationships of more than two nodes 
(i.e., a multipoint, security mesh and not simply a P2P security 
connection). This is a property of scalability. 
• Hardware Modules may have multiple, overlaying 
communication security relationships. Ideally, these security 
relationships shall be application specific and enable different 
virtual communication security relationships within the same 
hardware module. Hardware Modules may have multiple, 
overlaying communication security relationships.  Ideally, 
these security relationships shall be application specific and 
enable different virtual communication security relationships 
within the same hardware module.  This is also a scalability 
property. 
• Capable of authenticating the transmitting hardware module. 
• Has little to zero latency (zero ideally) (There is no session 
establishment phase, implying that it automatically comes up 
in “bulk encryption” mode). 
• Capable of providing same level of security to small hardware 
modules (ex. sensors) with minimal processing and storage 
capabilities, ideally, security related algorithms are of linear 
complexity and utilize less than 15-KB in executable and 
runtime storage requirements. 
• Initial Provisioning of new security credentials shall be 
autonomous. 
• Refreshing of security credentials shall be both frequent and 
autonomous 
• Prevention of Replay Attacks should be a built-in feature. 
• Must be quantum resilient. With the advent of quantum 
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computing on the horizon and serious discussions about the 
negative implications for existing security, particularly the 
asymmetric algorithms used for sharing the bulk encryption 
key in Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).  It is imperative that any 
proposed ideal solution be absolutely quantum resilient. 
The basis for each requirement is: 
 
Unique Security Credentials per Relationship 
Ensuring uniqueness amongst different sets of security 
relationships eliminates the possibility that a breach of the security 
credentials can provide insight into the credentials of other security 
relationships (as would be the case with a PKI asymmetric 
encryption breach of one Public Key/Private Key pair could lead to 
the breach of other Public Key/Private Key pairs). 
 
No Communication of Shared Secrets 
Eliminating communication of shared secrets prevents the attacker 
from directly discovering security credentials exchanged over the 
communication network.  Elimination of shared secrets has the 
side-benefit of mitigating Man-In-The-Middle attacks, as it severely 
minimizes useful information an unwanted observer could use to 
launch such an attack. 
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Continually Refreshed Security Credentials 
Security credentials should be updated frequently.  Ideally, they 
should be updated every session, so that the security credentials are 
constantly moving target. 
 
Security Credentials Cannot be Derived/Predicted 
What this means is that even if an attacker gains access to a prior 
set of credentials, they should not be able to predict what future 
sets of credentials are.  Credentials should have a legitimate amount 
of randomness within the security credential creation process to 
ensure future iterations cannot be mathematically derived or 
predicted. 
 
Security Credentials should have Perfect Forward Secrecy 
This is a follow-on to the previous requirement, but in the opposite 
direction.  What this requirement means is that in the event of a 
breach and if the current security credentials are compromised, 
there is no way to backwards engineer what prior sets of security 
credentials were.  In other words, if an unwanted observer had 
recorded prior sessions, a breach to the current set of security 
credentials would not enable them to decrypt prior sessions that 
had been previously recorded. 
Security Credentials shall be Capable of Protecting Multipoint 
Networks (i.e., creating a Security Mesh) 
It shall be possible to have security relationships of more than two 
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nodes (i.e., a multipoint, security mesh and not simply a P2P security 
connection).  Thus, increasing the scalability of a solution. 
 
Hardware Endpoints may Have Multiple, Overlaying 
Security Relationships 
This is another scalability property by allowing security 
relationships to be application specific with different virtual 
communication security relationships across one or more of the 
same physical hardware components.  Thus, enabling hardware 
endpoints to have multiple, overlaying communication security 
relationships. 
 
Authenticates Hardware Endpoint 
Automatic authentication of the hardware endpoint both ensures 
against hardware spoofing as well as establishing the hardware 
endpoint as a local trust anchor. 
 
Significantly Mitigates Latency 
Ideally, latency is reduced down to zero, as an efficient solution will 
not have a session establishment phase. 
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Provides Consistent High-Level Grade Security Regardless of 
Processing Capability 
The solution should be capable of providing the same high-level 
of security to small hardware modules (ex. sensors) with minimal 
processing and storage capabilities as it does with more capable 
hardware architectures.  Ideally, security related algorithms are of 
linear complexity and utilize are capable of being compressed down 
to 15-KB or less in executable and runtime storage requirements. 
 
Initial Provisioning of New Security Credentials is 
Autonomous 
This feature significantly mitigates need for administrative 
personnel by enabling automatic new security relationships to be 
established without need for administrative oversight.  The most 
obvious way to implement this into a security relationship would 
provide for an in-network management device the ability to 
automatically configure new security relationships in accordance 
with the direction of a downloaded (or modified) configuration file 
or database. 
 
Autonomous and Frequent Refreshed/Updated New Security 
Credentials 
This feature significantly mitigates need for administrative 
personnel by enabling the frequent, automatic update of new 
security credentials for perpetuity, presumably in accordance with 
some preconfigured policy. 
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Elimination of Replay Attacks 
This is an easy enough feature to implement by including an 
unmodifiable replay counter within every frame. 
 
Must be Quantum Resilient 
Effectively, this means that no brute force attack with infinite 
resources is capable of breaching the security. 
 
Ideal Integrity Management Requirements for 
Industrial Control Systems 
As will be obvious after reviewing the requirements, many of the 
requirements for the ideal Integrity Management & Monitoring 
(IM&M) solution are identical or closely related to the requirements 
for the ideal Secure Communication solution.  Thus, the ideal IM&M 
solution should be based on the ideal Secure Communication 
solution and listed below. 
 
The IM&M Validates Hardware Endpoint 
Automatic authentication of the hardware endpoint both ensures 
against hardware spoofing as well as establishing the hardware 
endpoint as a local trust anchor.  This is identical to the Ideal Secure 
Communication requirement. 
 
280  |  Future Proof Security [Shields]
The IM&M Validates Every Software Component 
Every electronic image that is part of the core application and 
required supporting infrastructure should be validated.  This usually 
consists of a minimum of: 
1) The Bootloader. 
2) The Runtime Operating System Environment. 
3) The Core Application (that implements the actual functionality 
for which the hardware module was designed). 
4) Related Data Files. 
 
Validates Every Subsystem 
Every subsystem should be validated, where a subsystem is defined 
to be a collection of logically grouped, hardware modules. 
 
Validates Every System 
Every system should be validated, where a system is defined to be 
a collection of all subsystems and/or hardware modules within a 
physically distinct system 
 
The Integrity Management & Monitoring System Shall 
Enforce the System Configuration 
Every hardware module, subsystem, system and shall be defined as 
designated by a resultant configuration management file capturing 
the configuration of each individual hardware module, subsystem, 
and overall system. 
Future Proof Security [Shields]  |  281
Enforcement of the System Configuration shall occur for the 
Life of the System 
The configuration specified for the overall system, its individual 
subsystems, and hardware modules shall be enforced throughout 
the life of the system from cradle to grave to comply with the 
specified configuration (which can and usually will change over 
time). 
 
Enforcement of the System Configuration shall occur 
Continuously in Periodic Intervals During Runtime 
Every aspect of the configuration, including the overall system 
itself, the subsystems within the system, and the hardware 
endpoints within the subsystems, shall be re-validated on a 
continual, periodic basis throughout the life of the system, including 
and especially during runtime. 
The System Configuration Shall be Simple and Crosschecked 
with Other Components and Subsystems within an 
Individual System 
The validation process shall be simple, immutable, and 
crosschecked with other components and subsystems within the 
system.  Thus, ensuring that one module within a subsystem cannot 
be changed without simultaneously altering all other modules 
within the same subsystem. 
 
Normal Operation of the Ideal IM&M, including 
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Enforcement of the System Configuration, Shall be 
Autonomous 
The system should be simple and explicitly designed to 
automatically enforce the system configuration, so as to mitigate 
the possibility of nefarious alteration of the associated image 
integrity code and/or image.  To ensure absolute compliance, 
images and their integrity codes can be configured to be cross-
checked again immediately prior to them being loaded.  Of course, 
this is the age-old tradeoff of security verses efficiency, and will be 
determined by the individual customer. 
At a minimum, an image to be loaded should have its integrity 
code recalculated just prior to it be being loaded, to ensure it 
matches the integrity code value held within the local hardware 
store of the secure element. 
 
Hardware Endpoints May be Members of Multiple 
Subsystems Simultaneously 
This enables overlaying of security relationships in accordance with 
customer defined groupings and is an extension to the Secure 
Communication requirement stating that Hardware Endpoints may 
have multiple, overlaying, security relationships. 
 
All Communication Between Logical Elements within the 
System Shall be Secure 
All communication between logical elements shall use a secure 
communication solution that meets the requirements of an ideal 
secure communication solution outlined previously. 
 
How do Current Solutions fit within the Outlined Ideal 
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Framework for Secure Communication and Integrity Management 
& Monitoring? 
 
It should come as no surprise that existing solutions (ex. PKI + TLS 
and/or Blockchain) do not fit within the ideal outlined framework. 
The reason for this is simple.  The ideal solution was derived with 
the goal in mind of solving issues currently plaguing existing 
solutions.  This set of ideal requirements was created with the 
specific goal of correcting problems that have been discovered over 
time in how security and integrity management & monitoring works 
today.  Thus, the only way to truly address these problems is with 
a new solution that is specifically and explicitly designed to solve 
these problems. 
 
Current Solutions vs. the Ideal Secure 
Communication Solution 
It is nonetheless instructive to compare the ideal requirements with 
the nominal solutions in use today, namely, the Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) Key Management System (KMS) and the 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) communication security protocol. 
 
How Do PKI + TLS Address the Ideal Requirements for 
Secure Communication? 
Unique Security Credentials per Relationship 
 
PKI (plus TLS) Violation! 
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PKI is explicitly designed to enable one to many relationships, 
for as long as the security credential is in operation.  Effectively, 
PKI is designed to explicitly violate this principal.  Further, for many 
closed systems (like automotive passenger vehicles), their PKI 
certificate may never be updated.  Thus, leaving a single certificate 
for the life of the vehicle. 
No Communication of Shared Secrets 
PKI (plus TLS) Violation! 
The asymmetric key exchange phase of PKI is used to share the 
symmetric key used for bulk encryption with the other side of the 
PKI/TLS connection. 
Continually Refreshed Security Credentials 
PKI (plus TLS) Violation! 
In many ICS/OT/SCADA/Etc. applications, security credentials 
are changed at best, every 9-12 months.  In the case of automotive 
and automotive related passenger vehicles, these credentials may 
never be changed and could be static for the life of the vehicle. 
In the automotive vertical, the logic used to defend this decision 
is simple: 
1) It would be both prohibitively costly and physically impractical 
to update the security credentials in automotive vehicles. 
2) Because automotive vehicles are closed systems, the likelihood 
and impact of a breach is relatively small. 
Where that logic falls apart is simple.  The goal of an attacker is 
not necessarily a total and complete takeover of every system.  The 
goal of the attacker is varied and victory for some attackers could be 
achieved if they were able to significantly disrupt a specific industry, 
infrastructure, or company.  A complete devastation of the economy 
would be at the top of the list of their wildest fantasies. 
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Just like prior to September 11th, 2001, it was inconceivable that 
someone would hijack a plane for the sole purpose of crashing it 
into a building.  Similarly, if a state sponsored attacker wanted to 
significantly disrupt the economy, they would not need to hack 
all automotive vehicles, most vehicles, or even a large plurality of 
vehicles.  A very minute subset, strategically placed, would do just 
fine. 
We already know that many of these attackers have engineering 
backgrounds and could easily work within any number of vehicle 
manufacturers.  All it takes is time, motivation, and planning and 
anything is possible. (Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, 
Manor Road Oxford OX1 3UQ, 2008) [3] 
 
Transportation Terrorist Scenario [4] 
Let’s take the following example. (CENSEC, DK, 2019) 
Suppose a state sponsored terrorist organization was able to gain 
insight into the security credentials used for twenty vehicles each 
of five of the major automotive companies.  Meaning, a total of 100 
vehicles.  Suppose also they were patient in planning this, with their 
plans measured in years, not months or days. 
If you had personnel who worked at these automotive 
manufacturers, discovering the security credentials programmed 
into a small subset of vehicles is very much within the scope of 
reality. 
Now, suppose they planned the attack as such: 
1) On the first day of the attack, they took over control of ten (10) 
vehicles of OEM brand 1 during peak traffic hours, causing all the 
ten vehicles to crash. 
2) One week later, the attackers launch the second attack. This 
time doing the same thing to ten (10) vehicles of OEM brand 2. 
3) Then, just to mix things up a little, the attackers waited for two 
weeks and one day, and launched a similar attack on ten vehicles of 
OEM brand 3. 
4) Then, some arbitrary number of days later, they launched the 
same attack on ten vehicles of OEM brand 4. 
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5) They wait another arbitrary period of time and launch another 
attack on ten vehicles of OEM brand 5. 
6) They, then wait another arbitrary period of time and launch a 
second attack on five vehicles of OEM brand 1. 
7) They again wait some arbitrary period of time and launch a 
second attack on five vehicles of OEM brand 2. 
Keeping in mind that at this point, they still have forty (40) 
vehicles at their disposal, how far into this series of attacks do you 
think it would take before significant numbers of people simply 
stopped driving their cars? The answer is, of course rhetorical, one 
should look no further than the current COVID-19 crisis to know 
this would devastate our infrastructure, our trust in government, 
our economy, and our entire way of life as we know it. 
 
Now, to add a bit of excitement into this thought experiment, 
suppose that they anticipated that people would at some point 
switch to mass transit, so they also infiltrated companies that 
manufactured busses used for public transportation.  Thus, after 
there was significant paranoia and anxiety created by the 
automotive vehicle attacks, they started doing the same thing to 
public transportation. 
Suppose they anticipated that if people stopped using both 
private and public transportation, they would switch to a work-
from-home based economy as a stopgap measure.  Thus, delivery 
trucks would become even more important than they are today. 
Suppose this really patient group of attackers, had also infiltrated 
companies that made delivery trucks for companies like DHL, 
FedEx, and UPS, and launched similar attacks on these delivery 
trucks. 
Now, for the final coup de grâce, they also infiltrated 
manufacturers of semi-trucks, doing the same sort of attacks with 
them, and thus affecting how the vast majority of goods are 
transported significant distances. 
Think about this! 
People would stop driving! 
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People would stop taking public transportation (at least they 
would stop using busses)! 
People working for delivery company would demand something 
be done before they drive their vehicles again! 
Truckers would stop driving and like the delivery truck drivers, 
would demand something be done before they drive their vehicles 
again. 
Without question, the entire economy of the Western World 
would come to a grinding halt. 
All of this damage could be done to the entire combined 
economies of U.S., Canada, U.K., and Europe, just by having the 
ability to hack into less than 200-different vehicles. 
All of this could have been avoided if the security credentials were 
constantly changing, not predictable, and maintained within a 
tamper resistant KeyStore. 
This is well within the realm of reality and it is not a matter of “if”, 
but “when” someone decides to do this. 
Until then, the automotive and related industries will continue 
to ignore these warnings, citing the extreme unlikelihood of this 
happening, just like flying planes into buildings seemed equally 
unlikely prior to 9/11/2001. 
 
The automotive vertical is an extreme case, most other verticals 
within the ICS/OT/SCADA/Etc. landscape do not maintain static 
certificates.  Most other verticals do update their certificates on a 
regular basis, but as stated in the beginning of this section, this is 
a period of time that is measured in months and not weeks or days 
(with the recommended period being every 9-12 months).  Thus, 
leaving as a static target the certificate until it is updated and, in 
a world, where quantum computing has been presupposed to be 
a legitimate threat to traditional cryptographic methodologies like 
PKI and TLS, this does present a significant problem once quantum 
computing is available. 
Even without the availability of quantum computing, traditional 
cryptographic methods are vulnerable if the attacker is able to 
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garner even a minimum amount of information about the 
certificate.  From there, it would just be a matter of time before the 
security credentials were fully or even partially hacked.  The longer 
the time between updates, the greater the exposure of the security 
credentials. 
 
Security Credentials Cannot be Derived/Predicted 
PKI (plus TLS) Violation! 
If the static certificate is breached in any way, even partially, the 
derived security credentials are predictable. 
 
Security Credentials should have Perfect Forward Secrecy 
PKI (plus TLS) Violation! 
PKI’s version of Forward secrecy typically uses an ephemeral 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange to prevent reading past traffic. The 
ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange is often signed by the 
server using a static signing key. If an adversary can steal (or obtain 
through a court order) this static (long term) signing key, the 
adversary can masquerade as the server to the client and as the 
client to the server and implement a classic Man-in-the-Middle 
attack. 
 
Security Credentials shall be Capable of Protecting Multipoint 
Networks (i.e., creating a Security Mesh) 
PKI (plus TLS) Violation! 
Standard PKI (plus TLS) is limited to binary security relationships. 
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Thus, in order for multiple nodes to participate in a multimode 
secured connection, there must either be an extension/deviation 
added to PKI (plus TLS) or multiple PKI security relationships must 
be created in order to provide secure communication to 
interconnect all nodes within the proposed security mesh. 
Example: In order to interconnect 50-nodes using PKI (plus TLS), 
you would need 1,225 (i.e., [(n-1) + (n-2) + (n-3) + …  3+ + 2 + 1] or 
[((n-1)**2 + (n-1))/2]) separate PKI (plus TLS) connections. 
 
Hardware Endpoints may Have Multiple, Overlaying Security 
Relationships 
PKI (plus TLS) Violation! 
The PKI Public Key/Private key pair is usually reserved for ALL 
communication between EXACTLY two nodes and does not usually 
allow different security credentials for different applications 
between the same two nodes. 
 
Authenticates Hardware Endpoint 
PKI (plus TLS) Violation! 
This is not a capability of either PKI or TLS. 
 
Significantly Mitigates Latency 
PKI (plus TLS) Violation! 
PKI requires initialization of security credentials (the asymmetric 
key exchange phase) before it can begin its initial encryption 
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session.  How does this address or violate the previously stated IIoT 
Security Ideals? 
• Requires an additional step prior to being able to initiate bulk 
encryption. 
• By definition, an asymmetric key exchange is significantly 
greater than linear complexity. 
• In order to avoid initial delay, PKI security credentials (the bulk 
encryption key shared by the Public Key/Private Key, key 
exchange) may remain static for a period of time. 
TLS always requires a session establishment phase, prior to any bulk 
encryption phase starting (meaning, in addition to any delay added 
by PKI, TLS has its own delay). 
 
Provides Consistent High-Level Grade Security Regardless of 
Processing Capability 
Possible PKI (plus TLS) Violation! 
Not automatically a violation, but because of the asymmetric 
encryption, key exchange phase, as well as TLS session 
establishment, PKI (plus TLS) is challenged when it comes to 
processor architectures with minimal amounts of processing power 
and/or storage capacity. 
 
Initial Provisioning of New Security Credentials is 
Autonomous 
Possible PKI (plus TLS) Violation! 
Initial provisioning of the PKI certificate itself is definitely a 
violation, but that is so infrequently done, it is not really worth 
considering here.  Insofar as the security credentials themselves, 
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the vast majority of the time, the policy will be that new security 
credentials will be issued when the TLS session is renewed (which 
could be frequent). 
 
Autonomous and Frequent Refreshed/Updated New Security 
Credentials 
Possible PKI (plus TLS) Violation! 
The vast majority of the time, policy will dictate that new/
refreshed security credentials will be issued when the TLS session 
is renewed (which could be frequent). 
 
Elimination of Replay Attacks 
Possible PKI (plus TLS) Violation! 
TLS only protects the transport and thus it provides protection 
against modifying or replaying of the encrypted data only.  It does 
not protect against any kind of modifications or replaying of the 
data before the encryption or after decryption. Sending the same 
data again over a TLS connection is actually perfectly valid. The 
cryptographic nonce and timestamp that are used to detect replay 
attacks do not protect against modification or replaying. The sender 
can still use the same data but “protect” these “replayed data 
frames” with a new cryptographic nonce and a new timestamp. 
 
Must be Quantum Resilient 
Possible PKI (plus TLS) Violation! 
While no one will argue that PKI in its current form is quantum 
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resilient, there are efforts under way to modify PKI in order to make 
it quantum resilient.  Perhaps this is possible, but it will be just 
another band-aid that increases the threat surface of PKI and does 
not fit within anyone’s concept of an ideal secure communication 
solution. 
In fact, Roger Grimes, a well-known, published security expert 
had this to say about quantum computing and traditional security 
mechanisms:[5] 
“Quantum computers will likely soon break traditional public key 
cryptography, including the ciphers protecting most of the world’s 
digital secrets. These soon-to-be-broken protocols and 
components include HTTPS, TLS, SSH, PKI, digital certificates, RSA, 
DH, ECC, most Wi-Fi networks, most VPNs, smartcards, HSMs, most 
cryptocurrencies, and most multifactor authentication devices that 
rely on public key crypto. If the list just included HTTPS and TLS, 
it would cover most of the Internet. On the day that quantum 
computing breaks traditional public crypto, every captured secret 
protected by those protocols and mechanisms will be readable.” 
(Cryptography Apocalypse Preparing for the Day When Quantum 
Computing Breaks Today’s Crypto, 2021) 
Current Solutions vs. the Ideal Integrity 
Management & Monitoring Solution 
When considering technologies for configuration management, a 
common technology for consideration is blockchain, mostly 
because of its immutable ledger capabilities.  Thus, given 
blockchain’s relative popularity in this regard, it will be examined 
for its capabilities as an Ideal Integrity Management & Monitoring 
solution. 
 
Future Proof Security [Shields]  |  293
How Does Blockchain Address the Ideal Requirements for 
Integrity Management & Monitoring? 
Blockchain is a technology (and not a product) that is primarily used 
for protecting the integrity of the information stored within the 
Blockchain.  Thus, any Integrity Management & Monitoring product 
based on Blockchain will need to be developed, since it is not an 
inherent feature of blockchain. 
Blockchain certainly has the fundamental infrastructure to 
address Integrity Management & Monitoring, but in addition to 
whatever effort it will take to first design and then subsequently 
implement an IM&M application, Blockchain is well-known for being 
a heavy and overly complex solution. 
Therefore, because Blockchain is overly complex and heavy, any 
implementation utilizing blockchain will certainly fall short in terms 
of processing overhead, ease of use, complexity, security (given that 
it is based on encrypting its data via PKI), etc.  Thus, it is relatively 
straightforward to eliminate consideration of blockchain without 
going into further detail. 
 
Provide Solutions that Address the Goals for Ideal Secure 
Communication and Integrity Management & Monitoring (IM&M) 
There are such solutions that exist today.  As of November of 
2020, a leading manufacturer of trains in it is now the official IM&M 
preferred solution for a major rail manufacturer in Germany has 
adopted the AKM-based Ideal Integrity Management & Monitoring 
solution for all of their trains being built in the future and addresses 
all facets of CENELEC 50701 (a new rail standard adopted in May of 
2020 and still in a draft state, that was specifically designed to be 
the rail application of the ISO standard, IEC 62443 (ISA, 2021) and 
scheduled for release in mid-2021). (European Railway Association, 
2020) 
 
Earlier, it was stated that he ideal IM&M solution should be built 
on top of a solution that meets the aforementioned specified goals 
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for an ideal secure communication solution.  In keeping with this 
philosophy, that is exactly what was done for the IM&M solution 
described here. 
 
Autonomous Key Management (AKM), the Ideal 
Secure Communication Solution 
The secure communication solution is a concept known as 
Autonomous Key Management (AKM) and was initially conceived 
in November of 2014 to provide complete communication security 
for automotive vehicles. (SAE International, USA, 2017) (SAE 
International, USA, 2017) 
AKM is both a Decentralized, Distributed, Ledger-Based, Key 
Management System (KMS) and Multi-point communication 
security protocol layer.  AKM can naturally act as a drop-in 
replacement for PKI + TLS.  AKM uses a Broadcast Architecture, that 
supports true, multi-point end-to-end encryption. [6] 
AKM ideally sits on top of UDP and/or TCP and can be 
implemented directly on top of a physical layer driver using a 
proprietary thin transport layer.  And, in fact, it has even been 
integrated into the MAC layer of a transceiver as the security layer 
for a deterministic, industrial wireless communication protocol. 
Below is a list of AKM features and the underlying basis for how 
each feature is provided: 
• Maintenance Free – Once a security group has been 
provisioned, no external maintenance should ever be required 
(thus, all AKM relationships are self-maintained and 
decentralized and require no external maintenance once 
provisioning has been completed). 
• Real-time Data Analytics – Because AKM is a protocol, Data 
Analytics are available on a per frame basis and thus, in real-
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time. 
• Intrusion Detection – Because Data Analytics can be constant 
and immediate, if enabled, intrusion detection is a natural 
extendable feature of AKM. 
• Automatic Breach Recovery and Re-provisioning – If enabled 
because Intrusion Detection is a natural extendable feature, 
automatic re-provisioning of infected relationships can be re-
configured according to policy. Thus, effectively neutralizing 
threats as soon as a breach is discovered. 
• Secure Boot with Device Authentication – This feature uses the 
unique AKM Protocol Identifier associated with the device, in 
combination with an onboard, AKM enabled HSM or hardware 
secure element to provide a Secure Boot Feature to AKM 
enabled devices. Thus, ensuring only the precise associated 
host hardware is being used. 
• Anti-spoofing and Network Authorization – Because AKM can 
uniquely associated with a specific device, and because 
security relationships are constantly being automatically 
updated, stale or substitute devices cannot be re-inserted into 
an AKM protected network without being re-provisioned. This 
also ensures that only authorized devices can ever be inserted 
into an AKM protected network. 
• Replay Attack Protection – The AKM protocol has a replay 
counter located within every frame. Thus, preventing previous 
frames from being retransmitted. 
• Perfect Forward Secrecy – Because Next Session Security 
Credentials are calculated based upon a randomly selected 
subset of parameters from an AKM security relationship 
specific vector, termed, the Parameter Data Vector (PDV), 
there is no mathematically available means to determine which 
parameters were used in prior sessions for calculating previous 
session Security Credentials. The PDV minimum size is 
128-bytes and can be longer if desired by the customer. 
• Security Credentials are Re-Generated and NOT Derived – 
Because the Parameter Data Vector (PDV) is periodically 
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updated based upon configured policy, next session 
credentials cannot be predicted subsequent to the 
replacement of the PDV, which is randomly generated and 
locally distributed within the de-centralized security group. 
• Enterprise Grade Entropy – Because the minimum PDV size is 
128 and because the smallest allowable PDV subset is 15, 
assuming an evenly distributive function is used for selecting 
the PDV parameter subset, the entropy as calculated by the 
nPr function (the function which calculates the number of 
permutations of set size, ‘n’, and subset size, ‘r’), is said to be: 
1.72831541602 x 1031. For reference the age of the universe as 
calculated in seconds is said to be somewhere between 1016 
and 1017.  Thus, even with a quantum computer, these 
parameters cannot be predicated without also knowing 
information that is never exposed (i.e., the internal seeds 
which are part of each set of AKM Security Credentials). 
• Scalability at IoT Scale – Because AKM may be configured as a 
broadcast architecture, and Security Credentials can be 
configured for any number of ‘n’ nodes, where ‘n’ is any value 
greater than ‘1’, there is no limitation with respect to the 
number of nodes or size of an AKM Security Group 
Relationship (a security group is the entity for which the 
security credentials protect). 
• Unlimited Virtual Security Relationships (i.e., Security Groups) 
– Each security relationship is unique from every other 
security relationship. Security relationships may be defined 
according to attributes and may co-exist with other virtual 
security groups on the same AKM Node.  Thus, communication 
can be performed securely on a per attribute basis. 
• Each member of a security group maintains the same exact 
ledger containing the security credentials. This is the primary 
mechanism for how all nodes within the same security 
relationship can stay in sync with each other because they all 
have the exact same information stored within their ledger. 
Thus, if any information within a particular ledger is not in 
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100% agreement with the information contained within the 
same security group ledger for the other members (hardware 
devices) of the group, then it will become immediately 
detected and the security group will become out-of-synch. 
Thus, a security group ledger may be considered to be 
immutable. 
• All security groups have at least two levels of 
resynchronization in the event that one or more members of a 
group becomes out-of-synch. In truth, more than two levels 
exist within AKM, but the methods beyond the initial two levels 
are for special circumstances and add additional features; 
primarily for mobility and dynamic expansion/contraction of a 
security group and are not covered within this chapter. 
• Low-Power and Energy Efficient – Because only linear hashing 
functions and symmetric encryption are used, implementation 
of AKM requires minimum computational resources. 
• Low-overhead – Because Bulk Encryption begins with the very 
first frame of an AKM session, there is no appreciable latency 
(other than the protocol header) associated with an AKM 
protected network. 
• Minimal Digital Footprint – Edge Node AKM Software Applets 
are typically under 20K bytes and can be compressed down to 
below 10K bytes. 
• True Multipoint End-to-End Encryption – Security Credentials 
applied to ‘n’ nodes, where ‘n’ can be any number greater than 
or equal to 2. 
• Quantum Resilient – Because no public key is used (as in PKI 
with asymmetric encryption used for the key exchange, which 
in a closed IOT system is usually there for the lifetime of the 
system) and because AKM does not share any secrets, there is 
nothing for a quantum computing device to attack. 
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AKM Based IM&M, the Ideal Secure 
Communication Solution 
Based on AKM which was explicitly designed to be an “ideal secure 
communication” solution, it was simple and straightforward to 
design a corresponding ideal solution for Integrity Management & 
Monitoring, building on the principles already present within AKM. 
As AKM provides the framework for many of the concepts that the 
ideal IM&M solution also needs.  This concept of the ideal IM&M 
was derived over a period of two years, between May 2018 and 
August 2020 and is designed directly from requirements contained 
within CENELEC 50701 (which as mentioned previously is the rail 
application of the ISO standard, IEC 62443). 
Features of the AKM-based IM&M solution are: 
• Physical Device Validation (i.e., Identification + Authentication 
of the Physical Hardware) – This feature uses the unique AKM 
Protocol Identifier associated with the device, in combination 
with an onboard, AKM enabled HSM or hardware secure 
element to provide a Secure Boot Feature to AKM enabled 
devices. Thus, ensuring only the specified associated host 
hardware is being used.  This guarantees against accidental 
misconfigurations or intentional spoofing of the hardware. 
• Electronic Image Validation (i.e., Identification + 
Authentication of the electronic image)– This feature Identifies 
and Authenticates every electronic image within the release 
set for the specified hardware. 
• Subsystem Validation (i.e., Identification + Authentication of 
the logical subsystem) – This feature uses a combination of a 
unique AKM Protocol Identifier associated with the subsystem 
and shared immutable ledgers of all of the physical devices 
within the subsystem (direct downlinks at the subsystem level). 
• System Validation (i.e., Identification + Authentication of the 
entire system) – This feature uses a combination of a unique 
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AKM Protocol Identifier associated with the system and shared 
immutable ledgers of all of the subsystems that are 
immediately beneath the system level (direct downlinks within 
at the system level). 
• User Validation (i.e., Identification + Authentication of the 
individual users, both human and otherwise) – This feature 
uses a combination of a unique AKM Protocol Identifier 
associated with user and a physical ledger item maintained 
locally within the secure element hardware store of the 
devices, subsystems, and systems, for which the user is 
associated with to ensure the validity of the user. 
• Remote Access – This feature enables remote access to the 
system via both legacy mechanisms like RADIUS, as well as 
AKM protected communication. 
• Audit Trail of Assets with Tamper-proof Audit Logs – This 
feature is derived from the AKM concept of shared immutable 
ledgers for members of the same security relationship and 
extends the ledger by adding the capability of an audit trail. 
• Military Grade Secure Communication between Devices – This 
feature comes from multiple facets of the AKM framework. 
First, because AKM is crypto-agile, any cryptographic function 
or encryption algorithm may be used.  Second, because of the 
extremely limited threat surface, protecting the threat surface 
is straightforward and simplistic.  Third, there is no 
information that are ever communicated as part of the normal 
session security credential update process that could ever lead 
to a breach if intercepted.  Fourth, as is mentioned within the 
list of AKM features, new and refreshed security relationships 
are created with Enterprise Grate Entropy (which can be easily 
increased with minimal increase in overhead).  Last, all 
sensitive information is continually protected within a 
hardware secure element or Hardware Security Module (HSM) 
and is never exposed outside of the hardware secure element 
or HSM. 
• Real-time Data Analytics – This feature is inherited directly 
300  |  Future Proof Security [Shields]
from AKM, given that AKM is used to exchange information 
between hardware devices, and subsystems. Thus, AKM-based 
IM&M inherits and extends real-time data analytics as well. 
• Intrusion Detection – Again, this is an inherited feature of 
AKM, and is facilitated by an IM&M Network Management 
Module, which locally manages the entire system (or 
subsystem if a large system and hierarchical management is 
required) and utilizes the real-time data analytics gathered by 
AKM as well as utilizing traditional intrusion detection 
mechanisms. 
• Maintenance Free – This is another inherited feature of AKM. 
Once an IM&M security group has been provisioned, no 
external maintenance should ever be required (thus, all AKM 
IM&M relationships are self-maintained and decentralized and 
require no external maintenance once provisioning has been 
completed). 
• Automatic Breach Recovery and Re-provisioning – Because an 
IM&M Network Management Gateway is required within the 
system or subsystem level (depending upon complexity of the 
overall network), this feature is always present, but the degree 
of automation is determined by configured policy. The IM&M 
Network Management Gateway automatically configures the 
network and acts as the local trust anchor.  Thus, Intrusion 
Detection is a natural extendable feature, as is, automatic re-
provisioning in the event of infected relationships that require 
re-configuring (in according to policy).  This feature effectively 
neutralizes threats as soon as a breach is discovered. 
• Anti-spoofing and Network Authorization – Because AKM is 
uniquely associated with a specific device, and because 
security relationships are constantly being automatically 
updated, stale or substitute devices cannot be re-inserted into 
an AKM protected network without being explicitly re-
provisioned by a trusted device (such as the Backoffice server 
remotely or the In-Network Management Gateway locally). 
This also ensures that only authorized devices can ever be 
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inserted into an AKM protected network. 
• Other features directly inherited from AKM are: Replay Attack 
Protection, Perfect Forward Secrecy, Security Credentials are 
Re-Generated and NOT Derived, Scalability at IoT Scale, 
Unlimited Virtual Security Relationships (i.e., Security Groups), 
True Multipoint End-to-End encryption, Quantum Resilience. 
• Low-Power and Energy Efficient – Another AKM inherited 
featured, but also because IM&M uses static integrity codes 
that are calculated based upon linear hashing functions, AKM-
based IM&M requires minimum computational resources. 
• Low-overhead – Because AKM-based IM&M runs in the 
background during runtime, uses only linear hashing functions 
for the integrity code calculation of the individual components, 
and simple compares of the integrity codes for validating the 
components, the overhead of AKM-based IM&M is extremely 
low, with the frequency of background component integrity 
code recalculation adjusted in accordance with policy. 
• Minimal Digital Footprint – Edge Node AKM Software Applets 
are typically under 20K bytes and can be compressed down to 
below 12K bytes. 
Summary 
While both of these solutions were initially designed for OT centric 
closed systems, over time, the author has discovered that they are 
equally applicable to the IT world and many of the problems that IT 
faces. 
 
AKM can easily be a drop-in replacement in IT applications for the 
traditional cryptographic Key Management Systems (KMS) of Public 
Key Infrastructure (PKI) and the secure communication protocol, 
the Transport Layer Security protocol, with the most current 
revision being TLS 1.3.  As AKM and AKM-based IM&M addresses 
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all of the problems plaguing both PKI and TLS because that is what 
it was explicitly designed to do (address problems in IoT centric 
systems for both solutions). 
More recently, it was discovered that the IM&M solution would 
provide an excellent framework for solving the larger problems of 
ransomware, malware, and zero-day attacks. 
Using AKM & AKM-Based IM&M for Solving the Most Difficult 
Problems Plaguing IT Communication and Systems 
AKM and its IM&M derivative provide the perfect foundation for 
solving the Ransomware/Malware/Zero-Day Attack, computer 
problem at the enterprise level (a solution for the individual small 
business/home office solution has also been addressed but will 
be presented in a future edition for the purpose of brevity and 
importance).  Using both AKM and its derivatives, like IM&M, an 
extension to the concept of whitelisting, which is termed, White 
boxing within this document, is able to: 
1) Identify, verify, authenticate, and monitor all known executables 
and data, marking them as “safe to use” once authenticated and 
moved to the “Trusted Component” list (the White box). 
2) Calculate an integrity code derived from a hash based, digital 
signature for each “safe to use” software component. Thus, enabling 
instant verification of all known, components on the “Trusted 
Component” box. 
3) Identify, verify, authenticate, and monitor each hardware 
endpoint, ensuring that only trusted hardware devices are on the 
network. 
4) Create a digital signature for each “trusted” hardware device, 
that is based upon the aggregation of all “Trusted Components” 
within the device. Thus, enabling instant verification of each 
“trusted” hardware device. 
5) Create logical security groups of hardware devices in 
accordance with application context and customer preferences, for 
which all hardware devices within the security group will 
communicate integrity data using its own, unique set of security 
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credentials that is refreshed on a per session basis, with perfect 
forward security, and without exchanging any secrets. 
6) Ensure the immutability of each trusted device’s integrity code 
information (distributed ledger based) given that all integrity codes 
and other related information for each trusted device within a 
security group is shared with all other trusted devices. Thus, 
ensuring that the integrity code of an individual device cannot be 
altered without altering the same integrity code contained within 
the secured integrity information of the other trusted devices that 
are part of the same security group (i.e., each device within a 
security group contains a copy of the integrity codes of all of the 
other devices within the same group, plus an integrity code 
representing the security group itself). 
7) Create a digital signature for each security group based upon 
the aggregation of integrity codes of the individual trusted devices 
within each group. Thus, enabling instant verification of each 
security group. 
8) Group the security groups hierarchically, so that the top-level 
security group represents the entire network, thus, enabling a quick 
check of the entire network, with a very simple, fast, linear cross-
check of the system integrity code. 
9) Periodically update the integrity codes of each component, 
both hardware and software within the entire system, on an 
ongoing and continual basis in the background, so as not to 
interfere with normal processing. 
10) Using malware scanning functionality, scan each unknown 
application (or single executable if not contained within an 
encapsulating application) for validation of existing threats. If it is 
not on the existing threats list, add it to the list of applications to be 
cross verified by a human operator. 
 
Figure 6.1 White boxing 
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Source: Olympus Sky (See endnote 5) 
 
 
11) Once authorized personnel have authorized a new/unknown 
application (set of executables & related files) as safe, the IM&M-
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based White-boxing solution automatically updates the “Trusted 
Component” box with the new, trusted, application. 
 
Figure 6.2 Human Operator moves Application V to Trusted 
Applications 
 
Source: Olympus Sky (See endnote 5) 
 
12) Application White-boxing denies the execution of any 
application that has not previously been explicitly approved as 
“known to not be malicious” (i.e., has not been previously placed 
within the Trusted Component” box). This “default deny” approach 
offers a much higher degree of security than traditional antivirus 
blacklisting approaches for a number of reasons, with the single 
biggest reason that it denies “zero-day” attacks. Whereas, with 
standard “blacklisting”, typical antivirus blacklist databases will not 
recognize the malware on “day zero”, because it has never seen it. 
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The most difficult part of Application White-boxing (AWB) is 
admittedly managing what is and is not within the White-box.  It 
is extremely difficult to keep the list of what is and is not allowed 
within a system where there are hundreds of thousands of files 
and many of them have a legitimate need to dynamically change 
at runtime.  This is perhaps the core problem that modern AWB 
solutions exists to solve and is a very solvable problem.  What makes 
it solvable is not expecting end users or IT administrators to figure 
out the details, but to ask them only for high-level approval of an 
entire action and then using software to track the precise details of 
exactly what files need to change, which is exactly how the IM&M-
based White-box Enterprise solution operates (see steps (10) and (11) 
above). 
 
Core elements of the IM&M-based White-box Enterprise solution 
are: AKM and AKM-based IM&M.  The IM&M-based White-box 
Enterprise application sits on top of AKM-based IM&M, which in 
turn sits on top of AKM. 
AKM-based IM&M first validates and authenticates the hardware 
device it resides in and then, for each software component within 
the hardware device that is part of a designated set of release files, 
executables, database files, configuration files, html files, etc., the 
AKM-based IM&M derives a unique integrity code for each software 
component.  AKM-based IM&M then uses a hash of an aggregation 
of values from the hardware device in combination with the 
integrity codes from each software component within the 
designated set of release files, to create an integrity code for the 
hardware device. 
 
Files that are part of the specified set of release files are all 
tracked and controlled using the aforementioned, unique integrity 
code.  The AKM-based IM&M maintains a list of all integrity codes 
that are part of the system’s release file set.    Executable files that 
are part of this file list form the initial set of trusted applications. 
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The AKM-based IM&M then, on a periodic basis, performs a check 
to ensure that the list of known valid files remain intact. 
 
AKM-based IM&M maintains integrity across all nodes within a 
system by allowing nodes to be organized into logical groups in 
accordance with user preferences.  Then, each node within that 
a logical group will form a security group based upon those user 
defined preferences.  Using ledger-based technology, each 
individual node that is part of a security group, maintains a ledger 
both for itself, as well as each of the other nodes within its same 
security group.  Therefore, rendering the ledgers of the individual 
nodes immutable, since identical copies of all ledgers are 
maintained across all nodes within the same group. 
 
 
AKM-based IM&M allows as many of these logical group 
relationships as the customer wishes to create and they may be 
formed into any combination, and hierarchically as well.  Thus, 
enabling the integrity code of any logical group to be an instant 
indicator of whether or not all hardware and software components 
within that group have been identified and authenticated.  Meaning, 
the ability to discern the state of any part of the system is 
instantaneous and because the components are continually being 
reverified and authenticated in the background, the likelihood of 
malware being able to spread throughout the system is significantly 
mitigated. 
 
This is the best of both worlds.  AKM-based IM&M ensures release 
set files remain valid, while intrusion detection monitors for 
anomalous digital signatures. 
 
The IM&M-based White-boxing solution takes this a step further, 
by managing the contents of the White-box.  Only trusted 
applications will be allowed to execute.  All other executables will 
be denied the ability to run.  Working with the intrusion detection 
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module, non-release set executables can be added to the list of 
trusted applications, but first must be checked against the known 
set of malware digital signatures for verification purposes. 
 
Once a non-release set executable has been added to the set of 
trusted applications, it too is added to the designated set of release 
files and is assigned an integrity code, thus being tracked in the 
same way as if it had been one of the original sets of release files.  In 
this way, the ability to instantly and continually verify the integrity 
of each hardware component, its subgroup, and the overall system 
to which it belongs, is maintained even as the system grows in its 
components list while simultaneously decreasing the overall threat 
surface. 
The key attributes of this approach are threefold: 
 
1) Using information known at system instantiation, it creates 
a list of all known good (validated) applications and continually 
verifies these known good applications throughout the lifetime of 
the system using a simplistic method for maintaining the integrity of 
the individual applications and comparing the resultant calculated 
integrity code with the previous known value of the application’s 
integrity code. 
2) Disallows any unknown application from running and isolates it 
a logically separate part of the system. 
3) Uses human validation to admit new and/or unknown 
applications into the White box. 
Clearly, the potential for exploitation is the human aspect, but a 
clear audit trail will be created for each interaction ensuring at the 
very least, the ability to trace actions with resultant consequences. 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has focused on current problems plaguing both 
secure communication and the overall integrity of systems today. 
It has also suggested sets of requirements for what “ideal” solutions 
for both secure communication and integrity management and 
Future Proof Security [Shields]  |  309
monitoring. Looking into the future, it has suggested a solution 
for some of the biggest remaining issues in IT and OT today, 
ransomware and malware, including zero-day attacks. 
Questions 
1. AKM states that it has the concept of Perfect Forward Secrecy. 
What is this feature and why is it important? Does this give 
AKM an advantage over PKI? 
2. AKM couples a hardware endpoint (i.e., a hardware module) to 
a particular AKM Hardware Identifier ( which is similar to a 
MAC address). How does this feature help AKM prevent 
hardware spoofing or ransomware? 
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7. Failure of Climate Change 
[Nichols] 
 “The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed 
– and hence clamorous to be led to safety – by menacing it with an 
endless series of hobgoblins[1], all of them imaginary.” 
– L. Mencken(Wrightstone G. , 2017) 
 
Student Learning Objectives 
Man-made / Influenced Catastrophic climate change (CC) and 
global warming (GW) are contentious issues hyped in the news and 
parroted with almost a religious following. It is time to at least 
understand the basic scientific elements that make up the climate 
change claims and real natural phenomena and driving forces. 
It some cases, we need to push back against the outrageous and 
irresponsible. Our SLO is 
• To understand the CC / GW processes, 
• To separate facts from fiction regarding key natural 
phenomena: CO2 emissions, warming, temperature rise, 
tornadoes, hurricanes, forest fires, greenhouse gases (GHG), 
• To develop facts that we can use to make up our own minds 
about CC / GW and its correlation to man-made behavior – 
especial in the last 50 years. 
 
Introduction 
Amy Coney Barrett declined to say that climate change is real, 
calling it instead a “a very contentious matter of public debate, 
especially one that is politically controversial.” during the third day 
of her Supreme Court confirmation hearings. (Boyle, 2020)[3] The 
judge made the comment on Wednesday as she was questioned by 
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California Senator Kamala Harris, the Democratic vice-presidential 
nominee, (now VP)  and a member of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee. The Supreme court nominee doubled down on 
comments she made on Tuesday, where she said that she has no 
“firm views” on climate change because she is “not a scientist”. [4] 
(Boyle, 2020) 
 
According to the UK Independent (Bolton, 2016), “Some 97 
percent or more of climate scientists  agree that climate-warming 
trends over the past century are being driven by human activities, 
largely the burning fossil fuels.”  Maybe. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a point – counterpoint 
discussion of fundamental concepts underlying climate change / 
global warming (GW). If we accept climate change as a disruptive 
technology or clear global megatrend, it behooves us to at least know 
the facts. 
 
The Open Mind 
Let’s take a step back for a moment and recognize four key 
concepts: 1) science is not accomplished by consensus – just the 
opposite; scientists constantly challenge the status quo to improve 
understanding of our world; 2) since 1785, scientists have used a 
very organized methodology to continually test the validity / 
repeatability of the status quo by the Scientific Method. It is based 
on fact and quantifiable observations, not on political motivation, or 
money (university or private funding) or hyped up news; 3) humans 
do not control / influence everything in their world – it is arrogant 
to think so; and 4) data  based on limited or biased scope yields 
limited / incorrect / spurious / or potentially fraudulent results. 
Policy decisions made on such reduced data / observations are 
bound to be incorrect. 
This chapter is not meant for those who have made up their minds 
and will never challenge themselves or change – irrespective of 
political organization. It is meant for those who are uncomfortable 
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with the information that we are barraged with each day and at 
are least open to discussion so that they can make up their own 
minds. The author will concentrate heavily on two important and 
diametrically opposing references with widespread appeal. Pierre 
Coutu wrote Global Megatrends and Aviation: The Path to Future-
Wise Organizations. (Coutu, 2019) He devotes a full 77 pages to the 
subject of climate change. His book is the status quo. The second 
reference is by Gregory Wrightstone entitled Inconvenient Facts: 
The science that Al Gore doesn’t want you to know.  (Wrightstone 
G. , 2017) It is packed with facts and counterpoints, 2000 years 
of reference temperature data, and exquisitely sourced for each 
observation. Science, unlike religion or politics, is not a belief 
system. Science is based on a disciplined method of inquiry, by 
which a scientist applies pre-existing theory to observation and 
measurement, so as to develop or reject a theory, so as to unravel 
as clearly and as certainly as possible the distinction between “that 




The scientific method is an empirical method of acquiring 
knowledge that has characterized the development of science since 
at least the 17th century.[5] It involves careful observation, applying 
rigorous skepticism about what is observed, given that cognitive 
assumptions can distort how one interprets the observation. It 
involves formulating hypotheses, via induction, based on such 
observations; experimental and measurement-based testing of 
deductions drawn from the hypotheses; and refinement (or 
elimination) of the hypotheses based on the experimental findings. 
These are principles of the scientific method, as distinguished from 
a definitive series of steps applicable to all scientific enterprises.[6] 
(Wikipedia, Scientific Method, 2020) 
 
Although procedures vary from one field of inquiry to another, 
they are frequently the same from one to another. The process 
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of the scientific method involves making conjectures (hypotheses), 
deriving predictions from them as logical consequences, and then 
carrying out experiments or empirical observations based on those 
predictions. A hypothesis is a conjecture, based on knowledge obtained 
while seeking answers to the question. The hypothesis might be very 
specific, or it might be broad. Scientists then test hypotheses by 
conducting experiments or studies. A scientific hypothesis must be 
falsifiable, implying that it is possible to identify a possible outcome of 
an experiment or observation that conflicts with predictions deduced 
from the hypothesis; otherwise, the hypothesis cannot be meaningfully 
tested. (Wikipedia, Scientific Method, 2020) 
 
The purpose of an experiment is to determine whether observations 
agree with or conflict with the predictions derived from a hypothesis. 
Experiments can take place anywhere. There are difficulties in a 
formulaic statement of method, however. Though the scientific 
method is often presented as a fixed sequence of steps, it represents 
rather a set of general principles. 
Common steps /elements of the scientific method are: Question, 
Hypothesis, Prediction, Experiment, and Analysis. 
There are additional components to the scientific method even 
when all iterations of the steps above have been completed. 
 
Replication 
If an experiment cannot be repeated to produce the same results, 
this implies that the original results might have been in error. As 
a result, it is common for a single experiment to be performed 
multiple times, especially when there are uncontrolled variables or 
other indications of experimental error. For significant or surprising 
results, other scientists may also attempt to replicate the results for 
themselves, especially if those results would be important to their 
own work. Replication has become a contentious issue in social and 
biomedical science where treatments are administered to groups of 
individuals. (Wikipedia, Scientific Method, 2020) 
External review 
316  |  Failure of Climate Change [Nichols]
The process of peer review involves evaluation of the experiment 
by experts, who typically give their opinions anonymously. Some 
journals request that the experimenter provide lists of possible peer 
reviewers, especially if the field is highly specialized. Peer-review 
does not certify the correctness of the results, only that, in the opinion 
of the reviewer, the experiments themselves were sound (based on the 
description supplied by the experimenter). If the work passes peer 
review, which occasionally may require new experiments requested 
by the reviewers, it will be published in a peer-reviewed scientific 
journal. The specific journal that publishes the results indicates the 




Scientific inquiry generally aims to obtain knowledge in the form 
of testable explanations that scientists can use to predict the results 
of future experiments. This allows scientists to gain a better 
understanding of the topic under study, and later to use that 
understanding to intervene in its causal mechanisms (such as to 
cure disease). The better an explanation is at making predictions, 
the more useful it frequently can be, and the more likely it will 
continue to explain a body of evidence better than its alternatives. 
The most successful explanations – those which explain and make 
accurate predictions in a wide range of circumstances – are often 
called scientific theories. (Wikipedia, Scientific Method, 2020) 
 
Most experimental results do not produce large changes in 
human understanding. Improvements in theoretical scientific 
understanding typically result from a gradual process of 
development over time, sometimes across different domains of 
science. Scientific models vary in the extent to which they have 
been experimentally tested and for how long, and in their 
acceptance in the scientific community. In general, explanations 
become accepted over time as evidence accumulates on a given 
topic, and the explanation in question proves more powerful than 
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its alternatives at explaining the evidence. Often subsequent 
researchers re-formulate the explanations over time, or combined 
explanations to produce new explanations. 
 
Properties of scientific inquiry 
 
Scientific knowledge is closely tied to empirical findings and can 
remain subject to falsification if new experimental observations are 
incompatible with what is found. No theory can ever be considered 
final since new problematic evidence might be discovered. If such 
evidence is found, a new theory may be proposed, or (more 
commonly) it is found that modifications to the previous theory are 
sufficient to explain the new evidence. The strength of a theory can 
be argued [by whom?] to relate to how long it has persisted without 
major alteration to its core principles. (Wikipedia, Scientific Method, 
2020) 
 
Beliefs and biases 
Scientific methodology often directs that hypotheses be tested in 
controlled conditions wherever possible. 
The practice of experimental control and reproducibility can have 
the effect of diminishing the potentially harmful effects of 
circumstance, and to a degree, personal bias. For example, pre-
existing beliefs can alter the interpretation of results, as in 
confirmation bias; this is a heuristic that leads a person with a 
particular belief to see things as reinforcing their belief, even if 
another observer might disagree (in other words, people tend to 
observe what they expect to observe). (Wikipedia, Scientific Method, 
2020) 
This is a good place to Segway into the 97% claim. 
 
97% Consensus can’t be spelled without “con” 
 
We have heard the drumbeat that 97% of scientists agree on 
human-driven climate change. (Bolton, 2016) (Coutu, 2019) We have 
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also heard that those that don’t buy into the climate -apocalypse 
mantra are Luddite science deniers. The author has been 
questioned “do I believe in climate change? His answer: “of course, 
it has been happening for hundreds of millions of years.” The real 
question relates to the human-driven actions. 
Scientists do agree on two quantifiable truths: 
• Carbon dioxide concentration has been increasing in recent 
years 
• Temperatures, as measured by thermometers and satellites, 
have been generally increasing over the last 150 years. 
What is impossible to quantify is the actual percentage of 
warming that is attributable to increased anthropogenic (human- 
caused) CO2. There is no scientific evidence or method that can 
determine how much warming we’ve had since 1900 was directly 
caused by us. (Wrightstone G. , 2017) We know that temperature 
has varied greatly over the millennia. (Coutu, 2019) We also know 
that for virtually all of time, global warming and cooling were driven 
entirely by natural forces, which did not cease to operate at the 
beginning of the Industrial Revolution. (Wrightstone G. , 2017) 
The claim that most modern warming is attributable to human 




The primary paper that is often cited as the ultimate source of the 
97% consensus “con” was written by John Cook and his merry band 
of climate extremists. He maintains a website where the paper has 
been downloaded more than 600,000 times. Cooks’ volunteer team 
[7] reviewed abstracts from 11,944 peer-reviewed papers related to 
clior global warming, published over 21 years 1991 -2011 to assess 
the extent to which they supported the “consensus view” on climate 
change. (Cook, 2013) Per Cooks paper: 
“ We analysed a large sample of the scientific literature on global 
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CC [climate change], published over a 21-year period, in order to 
determine the level of scientific consensus that human activity is 
very likely causing most of the current GW (anthropogenic global 
warming), or AGW)….” (Cook, 2013) 
The paper concluded, 
“Among the abstracts that expressed a position on AGW, 97.1% 
endorsed the scientific consensus… Among the papers expressing a 
position on AGW, an overwhelming percentage (97.2% based on sel-
ratings, 97.1 % basted pon abstract ratings) endorses the scientific 
consensus on AGW.” (Cook, 2013) 
Cook’s paper asserted falsely that 97% of the papers the reviewers 
examined had explicitly endorsed the opinion that humans are 
causing the majority of the warming on AGW! (Wrightstone G. , 2017) 
 
When one looks closely at the data, one finds that 7,930 of the 
papers took no position at all on the subject and were arbitrarily 
excluded from the count on this ground. Adding these back into the 
total papers reviewed in the 97% count , the actual claim falls to 
32.6%! But a further look at the data shows that three categories of 
endorsement. (Table 7.1) Only the first category amounts to explicit 
statement that humans are the primary cause of recent warming. 
The 2nd and 3rd categories would include most of sceptics of AGW. 
(Wrightstone G. , 2017) 
Table 7.1 Expanding the “consensus” broadly 
 







Explicitly states that humans are the primary cause 





Explicitly states that humans are causing global 
warming or refers to AGW /CC as a known fact 
(3) Implicit 
endorsement 
Implies humans are causing AGW; e.g. research 
ASSUMES greenhouse gas emissions cause warming 
without explicitly stating that humans are the cause 
Source:  (Cook, 2013) 
 
Here is a new word: Agnotology.[8] David Legates and his co 
authors used this word to review / describe the Cook paper as an 
attempt to falsely promote the notion of broad scientific consensus 
surrounding the subject  of a looming, man-made, climate 
apocalypse. (Legates, 2015) Legates reviewed their actual papers 
used by Cook and found only 0.3% of the 11,944 abstracts and 1.6% of 
the smaller sample that expressed those papers expressing no opinion 
endorsed man-made global warming as they defined it. (Legates, 
2015) 
97% [9]  Consensus = con. 
 
 
Global Warming – Status Quo ( as applied to the aviation 
industry) 
According to Contu, “at the heart of global warming are 
greenhouse gases (GHG) which are generated by human activity.” 
He also states that “climate change is both a reality and a potential 
threat that “experts” believe could lead to global catastrophe if not 
addressed diligently and with vigor.” “Lastly, the potential 
catastrophic consequences of climate change and global warming 
loom large in the public discourse, from headlines in the news and 
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social media to boardrooms and living rooms, yet current measures 
to mitigate the phenomenon and begin reversing its destructive 
effects seem eerily wanting.” (Coutu, 2019) [10] 
Contu leads us down a path of 77 pages increasing expenditures, 
extreme policy making, fear and complete hype applied to emission 
controls in the aviation industry.  Try these on for size: “ The global 
climate change is one of the greatest, if not THE greatest human-
made threats to its survival that humanity has ever faced.”[11] 
“Humanity may not survive..”  “There is no doubt that the 
Environmental / Climate Change megatrend will have major 
impacts on the aviation industry over the next 15-20 years and 
beyond. “ (Coutu, 2019) Finally, his core premise is “ Greenhouse 
gases (GHG) generated mostly by human activity are at the heart 
of climate change, (aka global warming). Half the fossil-fuel CO2 
emissions produced by human activity in the last 300 years have 
occurred since the late 1980’s and the 2014 global fossil-fuel carbon 
emission estimate was an all-time record.”  (Coutu, 2019) Again we 
have a good segway into a discussion about GHG. 
 
Greenhouse Gases – our security blanket 
The greenhouse effect,(GE) the important mechanism by which 
the earth remains, comfortably warm, and livable, is also the pretext 
for the advancement of the doomsday predictions about carbon 
dioxide-driven global warming. It is central to the CC debate. It is 
central to the (Coutu, 2019) presentation. Lets see if we can boil 
down the GE to basics. 
While 30% of the Sun’s radiation is reflected by clouds, most of 
it passes through the earth’s atmosphere and strikes the surface. 
There it is absorbed and its energy is emitted in the near-infrared 
spectrum. [12]  Some of the re-emitted energy is absorbed by 
greenhouse – gas molecules. As they absorb radiation, they in turn 
emit energy in the form of heat. This is the greenhouse effect.
(Wrightstone G. , 2017) 
Greenhouse gases and the warming they cause keep the Earth at 
a comfortable average temperature of 15o 
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Celsius (59o Fahrenheit). Without them, the Earth would be 
unlivable – 18o C (-0.4o F). (Wrightstone G. , 2017)[13] Extremes of 
GE warming are nearby planets of Venus & Mars. See Table 7.2 The 
Goldilocks effect. (Wrightstone G. , 2017) 
 
Table 7.2 The Goldilocks effect. 
Planet Atmospheric composition 
Surface 










Venus 96% CO2 –40 oC (-40 o F) 100 462 oC (863 o F) 
Earth 
0.04% CO2 
Ideal for life 
-18 oC (-0.4 o F) 1 15 oC (59 o F) 
Mars 95% CO2 -56 oC (–69 o F) 0.1 -55 oC (-67 o F) 
 
Source: (Wrightstone G. , 2017) 
 
The most significant greenhouse gas (driver) of all is water vapor. 
CC enthusiasts (Coutu, 2019) do not mention it at all. National 
Geographic and EPA list the greenhouse gases “include carbon 
dioxide (CO2) , methane, nitrous oxide (N2O), fluorinated gases, 
and ozone.” (Wrightstone G. , 2017) A breakdown of these gases 
excluding water vapor is methane 19%, carbon dioxide 63% and 
other 18%. But including water vapor the breakdown is water vapor 
90%, carbon dioxide 6%, methane 2% and other 2%.  So water vapor 
contributes the lions share of the greenhouse effect. (Wrightstone 
G. , 2017) Both (Coutu, 2019) and (Wrightstone G. , 2017) agree that 
water vapor is a primary driver. There is serious disagreement on 
how much warming will occur due to increases of GH gases, or 
how much of that warming is or will be man-made. (Wrightstone 
G. , 2017) Warming allows the atmosphere to increase the amount 
of water vapor it can carry, which can then add to the GH effect 
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(water-vapor feedback), but neither reference agrees on magnitude 
of this multiplier effect on global warming. Overblown estimates 
of water-vapor feedback will lead to overestimating the future 
warming in the climate models. This is why they fail. (Wrightstone 
G. , 2017) 
 
Fact 1 
Carbon dioxide is NOT the primary greenhouse gas. 
Analysis 
It is no more sensible to attempt to regulate weather by declaring 
CO2 to be a pollutant than it is to try to regulate water vapor or 
declare it to be a pollutant. Water vapor is the main contributor 
to the GH effect. (Wrightstone G. , 2017) The role of water vapor 
in climate models and predictions on it is an inexact science. The 
amount of water in the atmosphere varies markedly from place to 
place and from day to day. Absolute humidity can range from near 
zero in deserts and Antarctica – the Earth’s driest continent to 
about 4% in the steamy tropics. Small changes in water vapor can so 
affect the GH effect as would a doubling of the present CO2 in the 
atmosphere. (Wrightstone G. , 2017) Downplaying or disregarding 
water vapor, or assigning too large a magnitude to feedbacks such as 
water vapor feedback will amplify the direct warming from CO2, and 
overemphasize man’s contribution to the GH effect. (Wrightstone G. 
, 2017) 
Fact 2 
The warming effect of CO2 declines as its concentration 
increases. 
 
The warming effect of each molecule of CO2 decreases 
logarithmically as its concentration increase. (Wrightstone G. , 2017) 
Think about Fact 2 for a moment. Why haven’t we experienced 
runaway GH warming when the concentration of CO2 was 
approaching 20X that of today? If you think about this fact, it 
undermines the theory of future catasphrophic climate change. 
[prediction per (Coutu, 2019)] Figure 7.2 shows that the principle of 
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diminishing returns applies, i.e. as CO2 concentrations increase, the 
global warming effect diminishes. (Hoskins, 2014) 
 
Figure 7.1 The Greenhouse Effect 




Figure 7.2 The diminishing influence of increasing Carbon 
Dioxide on temperature 
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Source: (JoNova, 2010) 
 
From Facts 1 & 2, we note that CO2 is a GH gas and that increasing 
CO2 concentrations will increase global temperature to a small 
degree. However, is this slight warming effect overwhelmed by 
natural climate drivers that have been active for hundreds of 
millions of years? (Wrightstone G. , 2017) And is it worth $100 trillion 
dollars or more to reduce a small increase of CO2? 
 
Combined Fact(s) 3 
CO2 is not the demon causing catastrophic global warming; it is 
in fact an essential plant food. It means more plant growth, more 
food for people worldwide, and soil with more moisture. 
According to the NIPCC, higher CO2 concentrations has the 
following benefits: 
• Nearly all plants increase photosynthesis in response to 
increasing CO2 (CO2 fertilization)[14] 
• More CO2 makes plants grow faster, with less stress and less 
water. 
• Forests grow faster in response to increasing CO2 
• More CO2 stimulates growth of beneficial bacteria in both soil 
and water. 
• CO2 fertilization, leads to more plant growth, means less 
erosion of topsoil. 
• More CO2 means bigger crop yields, and bigger flowers. 
• More CO2 fosters glomalin, a beneficial protein created by 
root fungi. 
• More CO2 means less water loss, less irrigation, and more soil 
moisture. 
•  More CO2 helps plants to create natural repellents to fight 
insect predators. (Carter RM, 2014)(Wrightstone G. , 2017) 
Figure 7.3 improves on the above benefits description. 
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Figure 7.3 Shows 45 crops with crop yield growth and cash 
benefit with 300 ppm more CO2 (based on 3,586 experiments on 
549 plant species) 








“We are on the precipice of climate system tipping points beyond 
which there is no redemption.” 
–James Hansen, Former head of NASA’s Goddard Institute for 
Space Studies. (Wrightstone G. , 2017) 
 
“This March [2014], global levels of CO2 passed 400 PPM..Already 
we are seeing the deadly effects of climate change in the form of 
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rising seas, monster storms, wildfires, and extreme weather of all 
kinds. Passing 400 PP is an ominous sign of what might come next.” 
[15] (400.350.org, 2014) 
 
The concentration of CO2 in the air has increased from about 280 
PPM by volume in the mid-18th century, to a little above 400 PPM 
today. If we view this recent data through a narrow time-frame of a 
few decades 
or centuries, this increase in 120 PPM in CO2 appears significant. 





Figure 7.4 Carbon Dioxide – 600 Million Years of Data 
Source: (Berner RA, 2001) 
 
The notion of a “tipping point” beyond which Earth cannot 
recover, without a drastic reduction in CO2 emissions, is not 
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science. It is disinformation by climate extremists and contradicts 
Earth’s history (reality). 
Figure 7.4 shows that CO2 levels were many multiples of 400 PPM 
during virtually all of Earth’s history. 
400 PPM represents an arbitrary number that was selected 
because it could likely be reached by 2014. (Wrightstone G. , 2017) It 
was an easy way to stoke fires of anti-CO2 legislation. 
 
Fact 5 
Our current geological period (Quaternary)  has the LOWEST 
average CO2 levels in the history of the Earth[16] 
 
Contrary to the disinformation from the media that today’s CO2 
concentration is unprecedented, our current geologic period, has 
seen the lowest average levels of carbon dioxide in the Earth’s long 
history. The average CO2 for the past 800,000 years was 230 PPM. 
(Lüthi, et al., 2008) 
 
The average CO2 concentration in the preceding 600 million 
years (Figure 7.4) was more than 2600 PPM, nearly 7X our current 
amount and 2.5 X the worst case predicted by the IPCC for 2100. Our 
current geological period (Quaternary) has the LOWEST average 
CO2 concentration in the history of the Earth. (Berner RA, 2001) 
 
Ed Ring wrote a scathing letter which is quoted in part: 
 
“What historians will definitely wonder about in future centuries 
is how deeply flawed logic, obscured by shrewd and unrelenting 
propaganda, actually enabled a coalition of powerful special 
interests to convince nearly everyone in the world that carbon 
dioxide from human industry was a dangerous, planet-destroying 
toxin.” 
“It will be remembered as the greatest mass delusion in the 
history of the world; that carbon dioxide, the life of plants, was 
considered for a time to be a deadly poison.” [17] (Ring, 2015) 
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The carbon dioxide molecule, which has been more recently 
defined by radical environmental groups as a pollutant or poison, is 
absolutely essential to sustain plant and animal life here on Earth. 
To corrupt the English language in this way is simply a sleazy tactic 




Climate change enthusiasts tell us that the warming of recent 
decades is unusual and unprecedented. (Coutu, 2019) Climate 
-science research has focused on recent record – 250 years for 
thermometers and 50 years for satellites. This short time span 
skews interpretation of data. (Wrightstone G. , 2017)[18]  To put the 
data into proper context, we need to take a long-term geologic 
perspective – thousands and millions of years. 
 
Hockey- Stick Graph and prediction of Unprecedented Global 
Warming 
Until 1998 the consensus view was that over the last several 
thousand years temperatures had risen and fallen as shown in noted 
climatologist Hubert Lamb’s graph, Figure 7.5. (Houghton J. J., 1990) 
 
 
Figure 7.5 Hubert Lamb’s temperature graph of the past 1,100 
years 
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Source: (Houghton J. J., 1990) 
Study this figure. The figure shows warming beginning in the late 
17th century as earth began to extract itself from the Little Ice Age 
(1250-1850). It was followed by recent temperatures significantly 
less than those experienced in the Medieval warming period 
(950-1250).  Previous “consensus” established several warm periods 
had occurred over the last 10,000 years[19] and all were warmer 
than today, even though CO2 concentration was only 70% of today’s. 
Note that higher temperatures at lower CO2 concentrations does 
not support the notion that connects rising CO2 to a harmful 
temperature increase to justify draconian measures to reduce 
carbon footprint. (Coutu, 2019) v (Wrightstone G. , 2017) Another 
observation by IPCC is that the current warming trend began more 
than 200 years before any significant man-made contribution to the 
GHG in the atmosphere. (Houghton J. e., 2001) See Figure 7.6. 
 
Michael Mann 
Mann and his team purported to reconstruct 1,000 years of the 
Earth’s temperature. They stated “ temperatures in the latter half 
of the 20th century were unprecedented and that even the warmer 
intervals in the reconstruction pale in comparison with the mid-
to-late 20th- century temperatures.”  This is the famous “hockey 
-stick graph” which shows the 900-year shaft of slowly declining 
temperature followed by by a short blade of rapidly increasing 
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temperature. (Mann ME, Global-Scale temperature patterns and 
climate forcing over the past six centuries , 1998) (Mann ME, 
Northern Hemisphere Temperatures during the post millennium: 
Inferences, Uncertainties, and Limitations, 1999) (Houghton J. e., 
2001) 
The hockey-stick graph became the linchpin as “proof” of the 





Figure 7.6 Mann-made Hockey Stick 
 
Source: (Mann ME, Global-Scale temperature patterns and 
climate forcing over the past six centuries , 1998) (Houghton J. e., 
2001) 
 
If Mann’s depiction of temperature is correct, then his work is 
fundamental basis for recent warming being man-made. However, 
both sides of the CC argument have criticized the Mann graph. 
Two fundamental errors are data sourcing and data handling. Mann 
based his work on temperature proxies on a relatively small dataset 
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of tree-ring data from California bristlecone pines, and a very small 
sample from cedars on the Gaspe Peninsula. The IPCC (his biggest 
fan) challenged the sourcing as a poor choice because the width of 
annual tree-ring will grow thicker only when the weather is warmer, 
but also wetter, or when more CO2 in the air fertilizes the tree and 
boosts growth. (Wrightstone G. , 2017) Mann ignored a significant 
number of trees in the sample area that did not show results that he 
desired. (Mann ME, Global-Scale temperature patterns and climate 
forcing over the past six centuries , 1998) 
Two Canadian researchers McIntyre and McKitrick (MM) found 
that ANY data they plugged into Mann’s formula produced the 
hockey-stick effect. They concluded that the temperature 
reconstruction was fatally flawed, poor handling of data and 
incorrect calculation. (Mann, 1998) (Jones, 2004) (Rutherford, 2004) 
To be fair, the MM challenge was also challenged by climate change 




Of the three ways to measure atmospheric temperature: land 
and ocean surface thermometers (since 1659); weather balloons 
(mid-1950’s) and satellites (since 1979) , satellites is the most reliable 
but with a short history. So what does this tell us? For the last 50 
years , temperature measurements are accurate and this supports 
the Mann proposition of rapidly accelerating temperature data in 
the most recent five decades. If Mann’s modelling of global 
temperatures were correct, then 900 years of cooling would be 
followed by a sharp temperature increase in the 20th century. This 
would be strong evidence linking man’s activities to modern GW. 
The counter evidence to the Mann argument would be data showing 
that modern warming began before CO2 began to rise sharply. 
(Wrightstone G. , 2017) (Coutu, 2019) does not address this 
important issue. If the latter can be demonstrated , it would suggest 
that natural forces were the primary driver of warming prior to 1900 
and likely remain in effect today. 
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HadCET 
The Central England temperature record (HadCET) contains the 
longest continuous measured regional temperature dataset in the 
world. It goes back more than 350 years. It began in 1659, during 
the coldest temperatures in the last 4,500 years. (Parker DE, 
1992)(Boden TA, 2016)(Wrightstone G. , 2017) 
 
Fact 6 
Modern Warming began long before SUVs, Model T’s or coal-





Figure 7.7 Central England Temperatures (CET) from 1659-2017 
and CO2 levels 
Source: (Best, 2017)[21] 
Each period on Figure 7.7 has a name and associated effects on 
humanity. The key takeaway is that warming began more than 200 
years before any significant contribution of man-made CO2 to the 
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atmosphere. This contradicts the Mann  hockey-stick depiction of 
steady cooling during this time. The natural forces driving 
temperature increases during the 18th and 19th centuries did not 
abruptly cease to act during the 20th century. (Wrightstone G. , 
2017) (Boden TA, 2016) sees the same CET data but measures the 
CO2 in billions of metric tons emissions globally on the right 
horizontal axis. This is more dramatic in that CO2 emissions (bmt) is 
practically zero in 1759 -1859; is still less than 2 bmt in 1959 and then 
rises to 11 bmt in 2009. (Boden TA, 2016) 
 
Melting Glaciers and Rising Sea Levels 
(Wrightstone G. , 2017) spends considerable space on the 
argument that melting glaciers and rising sea levels confirm 
warming predated increases in CO2. The most significant Figure is 
his I-30 showing 10,000 years of warmth. Look at Figure 7.8. 
 
 
Figure 7.8 10,000 years of warming 
Sources: (Alley, 2004) 
Figure 7.8 is a substantial dataset that shows that modern warming 
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is neither unusual or unprecedented. The data show that for more 
than 6,100 years (60%) of the current interglacial warm period, 
the temperature was warmer than it is today. Of the 9 significant 
periods of warming, since the last ice age, 5 had higher rates of 
temperature increase and 7 had larger total increases in 
temperature. This should lead to fact 7. 
 
Fact 7 
The current warming trend is a natural and predictable result 




Noted climatologist and egg layer, VP nominee Kamala Harris , in 
her attacks on Supreme Court nominee, Judge Amy Coney Barrett 
(ACB) stated unequivocally that forest fires are accelerating in 
frequency and size, owing to man-made climate change.   The 
National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) provides extensive 




Figure 7.9 More CO2 but fewer forest fires 
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Source: (NIFC, 2017) 
Fact 8 
Forest fires in the northern hemisphere are decreasing 
A supporting study by the Canadian Forest Service (CFS) 
compared temperatures, CO2 concentrations and forest fire 
frequency over 150 years in North America. (Flannigan, Bergeron, 
Engelmark, & Wotton, 1998) 
Their conclusions: 
“Despite increasing temperatures since the end of the LIA[22], 
wildfire frequency has decreased as shown in many field studies from 
North America and Europe. We believe that GW since 1850 may have 
triggered decreases in fire frequency.”[23] 
Tornadoes 
Tornadoes are scary because they kill and injure US citizens more 
than any other storm.  The unique geography of the US makes it 
tornado-prone. The Rocky Mountains and the Gulf of New Mexico 
provide the key ingredients for formation of severe thunderstorms 
that spawn tornadoes: warm, moist air close to the ground; cool, 
dry air aloft; and horizontal winds that travel faster aloft than near 
the surface. (Wrightstone G. , 2017) NOAA keeps the records on 
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tornadoes. [24] (NOAA, NOAA NCEI Historical Records and Trends, 
2017) NOAA recommends only using the strongest tornadoes as 
a measure of pre-radar numbers. Doppler radar detection has 
facilitated better identification and reporting of tornados after 
WWII. Table 7.3 shows the tornados rank. NOAA recommends using 
3+ on the scale for reporting. (NOAA, NOAA NCEI Historical Records 
and Trends, 2017) 
Table 7.3 The Fujita tornado scale 
F 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Fastest ¼ mile 
(mph) 40-72 73-112 113-157 158-207 208-260 261-318 
Fastest 3-second 
gust (mph) 45-78 79-117 118-161 162-209 210-261 262-318 
Source: (NOAA, NOAA NCEI Historical Records and Trends, 2017) 
Combined Facts  9 
1. The number of tornadoes is decreasing with 2016 showing 
the lowest on record (NOAA, NOAA NCEI Historical Records 
and Trends, 2017) 
2. CO2 global emissions has increased at the same time severe 
tornadoes ( F3+) has decreased (Boden TA, 2016)[25] 
3. US tornado deaths per million population continues to fall 
through 2000 (NOAA, us-annual-tornado-death-
tolls-1875-present/, 2009) 
4. Science and data show no correlation between tornadoes and 
rising temperatures over the last 50 years. (Wrightstone G. , 
2017) 
Figures 7.9-7.11 support the above FACTS 9. Figure 7.10 shows the 
decline of severe tornadoes (F3+) over last 50 years. Figure 7.11 
shows that 2016 was a banner year. Figure 7.12 shows that tornado 
deaths per million population is also decreasing than 50 years ago. 
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Figure 7.10 Severe tornadoes (F+4) are less frequent 
 
Source: (ustornadoes.com, 2015) 
(Boden TA, 2016) confirms the growth of CO2 global emissions 
(bmt) [26] plotted against the same Figure 7.10 as increasing from 
1954 -2015 to just under 10 bmt. 
 
 
Figure 7.11 Lowest number of tornadoes in 2016 
 
Source: (NOAA, Storm Prediction Center, 2020) 
Note that 2106 had 901 tornadoes. 2020 logged 1004. 
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Figure 7.12 US tornado deaths per million population 




Noted climatologist and egg layer, VP nominee Kamala Harris 
(now elected VP), in her attacks on Supreme Court nominee, Judge 
Amy Coney Barrett (ACB) also stated unequivocally that hurricanes 
are accelerating in frequency and size, owing to man-made climate 
change. The conventional wisdom behind this thinking is that GW 
raises ocean temperatures, fueling tropical cyclones and hurricanes. 
Actually, this sounds reasonable. However, we saw in our treatment 
of deadly tornadoes that the CW was wrong, and that the evidence / 
data suggested that frequency of deadly tornadoes was decreasing 
over last 50 years. (NOAA, NOAA NCEI Historical Records and 
Trends, 2017) 
Promoters of the notion of GW causation of more severe 
hurricanes includes the National Climate Assessment (NCA) of 2014. 
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(Kossin JP, 2007) There review of power dissipation index vs time 
, using satellite-based re-analyses does show an solid increasing 
trend. Dr Ryan Maue challenged that data for insufficient range 
analysis.[27] (Maue, 2016) Using the entire dataset (not 15% like 
the NCA2014) and including land-falling hurricanes his conclusions 
were quite a bit different. (Maue R. , 2017) See Figure 7.13. 
 
Figure 7.13 Global tropical storm and hurricane frequency is 
falling 
Source: (Maue R. , 2017) 
Dr Maue concluded that from 1970-2018 there is a downward 
trend of hurricane and tropical storm frequency. The author 
reviews the same data and sees an even or slight downward trend 
but not increasing. 
Fact 10 
There has been no increase in frequency of hurricanes in 
recent data 
 
But what about the warming argument? Dr Landsea, a 
meteorologist at the National Hurricane Center (NHC) has 
quantified what an increase in intensity of major hurricanes, driven 
by GW, might mean. (Landsea, 2011) His work indicates that the 
warming over the last several decades translates into an increase of 
Failure of Climate Change [Nichols]  |  341
intensity of 1%. For Katrina (Cat 5), the wind speed would increase 2 
mph. He wrote: 
“The 1-2 mph change currently in the peak winds of strong 
hurricanes due to man-made GW is so tiny that it is not measurable 
by our aircrafts or satellites technologies available today, which is 
only accurate to about 10 mph for major hurricanes.” (Landsea, 2011) 
Which brings to Fact 11. 
 
Fact 11 
There is no significant increase in hurricane intensity due to 
warming 
(Landsea, 2011) (Wrightstone G. , 2017) 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has taken the idea that because of man-made GW 
/ CC, our society is headed for climate Hell from which we cannot 
return. But Earth, its ecosystems, and we humans are actually 
thriving because of the increasing CO2 and rising temperatures, not 
in spite of it! (Wrightstone G. , 2017) 
Yes there is a GH effect. Yes there is some warming. Yes, some 
of it might be man-made. We can expect more. They are all 
demonstrable. (Wrightstone G. , 2020) 
But no, past and future anthropogenic warming does NOT mean 
that catastrophe will follow, or that measures to prevent GW are 
scientifically and economically justified. (Wrightstone G. , 2017) [ 
Here we drastically differ from the thrust / organizational and 
investment measures suggested by (Coutu, 2019).] 
As Wrightstone suggests, “the first and most important conclusion 
is that the correct policy to address the non-problem of man-made 





1) There are other claims about GW affects: ocean acidity, polar 
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bears, melting ice caps, droughts, crops, and sea-level rise to name 
just a few. Choose one topic to research and see if you agree with 
the conventional wisdom and “consensus” or can you develop / find 
data / synthesize data using the scientific method that at least puts 
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[1] Translate as “crises.” 
[2] Special Disclaimer: 
The author of this chapter is not a climatologist. His formal 
training in weather is limited to USCG courses taken as an Ensign 
in USCGA,  to better his experience as a boat captain. He is an 
experienced engineer, scientist, advanced mathematician, author, 
managing editor, and qualified researcher. His experience includes 
five decades of advanced simulation and modeling experience for 
chemical engineering, business, and INFOSEC / counterterrorism 
processes. He is recognized as a Subject Matter Expert in 
cryptology and forensics by the USDOJ and an SME in 
counterterrorism by the DTRA. He knows how to differentiate facts 
from fiction and to develop complex risk assessments of key threats, 
vulnerabilities, impact, and countermeasures for information and 
intelligence systems – most recently with unmanned aircraft 
systems. The point is he is neither a sheep nor parrot of 
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conventional wisdom. He knows how to think and judge for himself 
the issues/ information in dispute.  Climate change is a contentious 
issue where many minds are closed to challenges of their basic 
beliefs. However, by definition, scientific research is a constant 
challenge of our beliefs in the natural processes and order. By its 
very nature and methodology, scientific research provides us with 
tools to better understand our environment free (or should be free) 
of political or financial pressures to divine an answer because of 
popularity or agenda. Recognizing that the author does not breathe 
in a vacuum, this chapter does not necessarily represent the 
opinions of my employer, my professional Board(s) associations, 
certifying authorities, my team, my colleagues, my oldest daughter 
or newest daughter-in-law, my congressmen or state senators and 
any individual or organization that sponsors / reads my work or 
hears my presentations on unrelated issues like counter unmanned 
aircraft systems.  The information provided is based on personal 
reasonable research and proffered as an alternative to “conventional 
wisdom.” 
[3] This is exactly what a SCOTUS nominee should do. Remain 
neutral and avoid public comment on contentious issues of public 
policy. 
[4] This statement has been thrown around in so many media that it 
goes unchallenged. Saul Alinsky in his “Rules for Radicals” is credited 
with “if you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will 
eventually come to believe it.“ The actual source is Joseph Goebbels, 
Nazi propaganda minister. (JVL, 2020) 
[5] The author is both a scientist and engineer. He was introduced 
to the method in 1959. In 1962, the author was awarded, as a senior 
in HS, a scientific internship and scholarship to Rockefeller Institute 
of Technology in NYC. In that august body one of the most famous 
scientific discoveries was made and awarded the Nobel Prize to 
James Dewey Watson KBE  an American molecular biologist, 
geneticist, and zoologist. In 1953, he co-authored with Francis Crick 
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the academic paper proposing the double helix structure of the 
DNA molecule. Watson, Crick and Maurice Wilkins were awarded 
the 1962 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine “for their discoveries 
concerning the molecular structure of nucleic acids and its 
significance for information transfer in living material” (Wikipedia, 
James_Watson, 2020) The author’s contribution to DNA human 
genome mapping project was merely running a gas chromatograph 
and summarizing datasets for the “suits.” But I met the top guns 
at a celebration of Nobel Prize in the auditorium. My point – the 
DNA project is a terrific example of the application of the scientific 
method. The reference also details the methodology. (Wikipedia, 
Scientific Method, 2020) 
[6] Note there is no political, financial influence  or consensus 
required in this definition. 
[7] Cooks’ team has 12 volunteers who classify themselves as 
activists and 9 of them have no training at all in any science. 
[8] Agnotology is defined as the study of how ignorance arises via 
circulation of misinformation calculated to mislead. 
[9] It appears that Cook and his co-authors manipulated the data to 
present an altogether untrue narrative of overwhelming support for 
catastrophic human-caused warming. 
[10] Try to recognize the bias, hysteria, and lack of scientific basis in 
this status quo approach. Look at the inflammation in the words. 
[11] Seems to me that nuclear war at the instigation of hostile 
nations or complete economic failure of society might rank fairly 
high. 
[12] See Nichols CUAS textbook (2020) for a complete description 
and frequency allocation of the EMS and small the near-infrared 
spectrum is in terms of the entire allocation of frequencies. (Nichols 
R. K., et al., 2020) 
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[13] Fahrenheit is the authors choice, but the world adores Celsius. 
Engineers can work with both F or C.  o F = 1.8 (o C) +32 
[14] Photosynthesis is the process by which green plants and some 
other organisms use sunlight to synthesize foods from carbon 
dioxide and water. Photosynthesis is important to living organisms 
because it is the number one source of oxygen in the atmosphere. 
Green plants and trees use photosynthesis to make food from 
sunlight, carbon dioxide and water in the atmosphere: It is their 
primary source of energy. Photosynthesis is usually represented by 
the equation 6 CO2 + 6 H2O + light –> C6H12O6 + 6 O2. During this 
process, organisms such as plants go through the light-dependent 
and light-independent reactions to convert carbon dioxide and 
water into sugars and oxygen. The O2 produced is used by living 
organisms as a vital part of the synchronicity of the ecosystem. 
(Wikipedia, Photosynthesis, 2020) 
[15] We will examine some of these extreme weather conditions in 
this chapter. 
[16] All “Facts” statements in blue are based on or quoted from 
(Wrightstone G. , 2017) 
[17] Ed Ring writes for the Climate Disinformation Database, 
https://www.desmogblog.com/global-warming-denier-database . 
(Ed Ring, EcoWorld, 2008) Dick Pilard picked up his Letter in 
Aspentimes https://www.aspentimes.com/opinion/letters-to-
the-editor/letter-politics-disguised-as-science/ 
[18] During the writing of this chapter, the author of (Wrightstone 
G. , 2017) was suspended for 3 weeks for his anti-global warming 
opinion piece on LinkedIn.  I personally felt that Linkedin was the 
last bastion of reasonable professional level discussions. Such 
censorship and non-acceptance  of differing professional opinions 
on key issues is common place to the level of vulgarity on Twitter 
and Facebook. Their leaders are under investigation by Congress. 
It is most disappointing that a professional network like Linkedin 
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should join the anti-FOS crowd. (Author opinion only) It behooves 
us to remember that science is NOT consensus and consensus is 
not science. Another interesting issue is does the First Amendment 
apply to publicly held social networking corporations. Evelyn 
Beatrice Hall wrote the phrase: “I disapprove of what you say, but I 
will defend to the death your right to say it.” (Tallentyre, 1906) This 
quotation – which is sometimes misattributed to Voltaire himself 
– is often cited to describe the principle of Freedom Of 
Speech. (Boller & George, 1989) 
[19] This included the Modern,  Medieval, Roman, Minoan, Egyptian 
Old Kingdom and Holocene climate optima periods. 
[20] The author has reviewed all four documents. The counterattack 
on MM claims by an anonymous “mike @ 4 December 2004” has 
some interesting points but hiding from the public strains the 
credibility. 
[21] The Best figure is better representation of CET data than Figure 
I-24 in (Wrightstone G. , 2017)  However, there many images 
covering the same CET / Hadley dataset and some showing 
declining warming. This contradiction can be resolved by 
presentation XY  scales and units. 
[22] LIA = Little Ice Age (1250-1850) 
[23] The Flannigan team further attributed the decline in wildfires 
to the combined effect of CO2 fertilization and rising temperature, 
leading to greater soil moisture. 
[24] For a tornado to be counted, it must be observed. Early records 
and evidence of tornadoes – even in Tornado Alley – are unreliable 
for the sparsely populated early 20Th century. (NOAA, NOAA NCEI 
Historical Records and Trends, 2017) 
[25] CO2 emissions per bmt previously shown in Figure 7.8. (Boden 
TA, 2016) 
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[26] Bmt = billions of metric tons 
[27] Insufficient range = “cherry picking the data” 
[28] Keep looking because there are active efforts to censor any 
dissent. Scientific inquiry and discoveries are not political tools, 
they are the basis of intelligent life. 
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8. Nightmare Technologies 
[Nichols] 
Student Learning Objectives 
Two simple objectives: To be technology aware and think about 
their harmful effects on your life.[1] 
Emerging vs Disruptive Technologies 
There is a difference between emerging technology trends and 
disruptive ones. Emerging technologies are technologies whose 
development, practical applications, or both are still largely 
unrealized, such that they are figuratively emerging into 
prominence from a background of nonexistence or obscurity. (Wiki, 
2021) Some sources say that emerging technologies are taking over 
the world by a storm and if misused, it could turn out to be our 
worst enemy. (Rose, 2019) Toward Data Science magazine lists Drone 
Swarms as number one in their list. The topic is covered in detail 
in (Nichols R. , et al., 2020). Smart home devices that spy, ex. IoT or 
AI / IoT is number two, followed by facial recognition, spy dust and 
autonomous robots. (Rose, 2019) 
 
A Disruptive technology is one that displaces an established 
technology and shakes up the industry or a ground-breaking 
product that creates a completely new industry. (Rouse, 2021) , 
In this chapter, we  explode and explore  nightmare disruptive 
technologies, that if they come to full fruition may do more harm 
than good. Some of them might reach Black Swan event status.[2] 
The technologies are not presented in any particular order. They 
all have the capability of bringing evil to our doorstep and crushing 
what is left of our right of privacy. 
 
Surveillance Technologies 
On 6 January 2021, the author asked his writing team of twelve 
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SMEs in their respective fields, the following questions: 1) What 
surveillance technology would you consider the most invasive to our 
privacy as citizens? 
2) What surveillance technology has the potential to be the most 
damaging to our society or military defenses or law enforcement 
operations? The list was fascinating and ranged from the real to 
semi- fantasy. 
The list included: 
• Alexa / Siri / Cortona [ASC group] (cute names for a massive 
systems of systems – always “listening” ) 
• Quantum computing, especially when coupled with the ASC 
group, 
• AI driven quantum systems 
• Voting machines that tilt the scales or select a candidate rather 
than tabulate / confirm results. Voting machines designed to 
be the perfect transparency laundering tool. This results in the 
ability to fake manual voting in scale. 
• Cellphones (an addition that has destroyed personal 
communications and catalogued our lives for fodder). They are 
vessels for listening / data collection / tracking / and 
biometric identification theft. 
• Implant technology – for use on humans – similar to use on 
animals for location rendering 
• AI driven mechanics / robotics -replacements for humans 
when not really justified 
• IoT – connecting things that were not meant to be connected 
and made available online. 
• Blockchain (however, two major pitfalls exist: a) a replacement 
better security technology see our Chapter 6 on Future Proof 
Security and b) regulations by banks, IRS, agencies will crush 
speculative use.) 
• Exploiting Automation & Human-Machine Symbiosis for the 
wrong reasons. See chapter 2 on this subject. 
• Mini drones (covered in (Nichols R. , et al., Unmanned Aircraft 
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Systems (UAS) in Cyber Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced Air 
Assets, 2nd Edition, 2019) . Drones can be made so small 
Chinese stink bugs can’t tell the difference. 
• Nanobots or intelligent sand (aka MEMS) 
• Drone Swarms [covered in detail in (Nichols R. , et al., 2020) 
and (Nichols R. , et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in 
Cyber Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets, 2nd 
Edition, 2019)] 
• Face / Voice / Biometrics recognition 
• Weaponized social media – especially FB, & Twitter 
• GPS units in everything from cars, phones, boats, animals, 
aircraft, watches, hearing aids, you name it the technology has 
become ubiquitous. 
• Identity cards / Health vaccination cards / Social media 
scores ( like the Chinese experiment) Real ID/ ammunition 
purchase cards / gun registration – bureaucratic control 
-paperwork designed to erode U.S Constitution and its 
amendments for purposes of “our safety or for our kids” 
• Legalization of every known illegal drug – tracking by health 
agencies and permission slips to replace doctor’s script. 
• Enforcement of politically correct speech by investigations, 
informants, indoctrination camps 
• Surveillance of radio stations and advertisers with federal 
enforcement of against alternative views. 
• Registration and subsequent licensing of every facet of our 
lives. 
• Coordinating databases and information storage facilities ( 
where every conceivable piece of information on individuals 
and All their communications, in every media; in every 
language with translation capabilities are kept, catalogued, 
interrogated using keywords and summarized for intelligence 
dossiers.) (Burrington, 2015) Large amounts of encrypted data 
are also sucked up by this surveillance vacuum on the 
assumption that new crypto-cracking methods will be 
developed as they have since 1972. (Nichols R. K., ICSA Guide to 
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Cryptography, 1999) 
• Ransomware, AI, and Bot-enabled Blackmailing, Hacking and 
Extortion 
• AI Cloning – Deep fake Technology for Voice and Video 
recordings. 
 
The above list combines actual technologies with the abuse of 
those technologies. It is not all inclusive. Every new method of 
control and surveillance has been abused by authorities and 
recently by corporations. This abuse is usually discovered and 
legislated against – from habeas corpus to mail, telegraph, 
telephones, cell phones, internet, GPS on transportation, to 
implants. (Elliott, 2019) The trend according to Timo Elliott, noted 
Innovation Evangelist, is bound to continue – and potentially get 
much worse- with AI -powered technologies such as face 
recognition. (Elliott, 2019) 
 
All the above technologies bring together many diverse / 
disparate information sources [3] to get a single view of an 
operation, location, geopolitical activity, defense theater of 
operations, or market. (Elliott, 2019)[4] 
This can be a boon to businesses but a nightmare for society if 
used by malevolent minds. 
Col Joel Anderson,[5] OVPR at KSU is quoted: “ He who controls 
information controls the world.” 
To that the chapter author would add that the most effective vehicle 
to gain information is unrestricted surveillance. 
For years businesses and agencies around the world were 
essentially leveraged or perhaps held hostage for ransom using 
software and network flaws that were kept deliberately secret by 
NSA and CIA to use for 1) against enemies and 2) wield influence. 
(Elliott, 2019) (Zegart, 2017) 
But these same agencies were hacked, and their secrets exposed 
/ spread across the globe. (Kass, 2020)  (Shane, 2019) 
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Today’s secrets will not stay secret for long. All you have to do 
is look at the deleted, purged emails, text messages, GPS locations, 
of politicians, criminals, cheating spouses, drug dealers, terrorists, 
and movie stars exploited every day in the news media to convince 
yourself of this fact. 
 
Alexa / Siri / Cortona [ASC group] 
Perhaps the most invasive of the ASC group is Alexa. “Would you 
let a stranger eavesdrop in your home and keep the recordings? For 
most people, the answer is, “Are you crazy?” Yet that’s essentially 
what Amazon has been doing to millions of us with its assistant 
Alexa in microphone-equipped Echo speakers. And it’s hardly alone: 
Bugging our homes is Silicon Valley’s next frontier.” (Fowler, 2019) 
“Many smart-speaker owners don’t realize it, but Amazon keeps a 
copy of everything Alexa records after it hears its name. Apple’s Siri, 
and until recently Google’s Assistant, by default also keep recordings 
to help train their artificial intelligences.” (Fowler, 2019) Fowler 
really hits the target point blank: “For as much as we fret about 
snooping apps on our computers and phones, our homes are where 
the rubber really hits the road for privacy. It’s easy to rationalize 
away concerns by thinking a single smart speaker or appliance 
couldn’t know enough to matter. But across the increasingly 
connected home, there’s a brazen data grab going on, and there are 
few regulations, watchdogs, or common-sense practices to keep it in 
check.” (Fowler, 2019) 
Author Privacy Recommendation: Disconnect and delete 
everything you can find associated with ASC group. 
 
Addiction 
We are addicted to our cellphones! We are addicted to cell phone 
market basket of technologies.  Forget the standard addictions 
(drugs, booze, cigarettes, sex, news, TV, porn). These pale in 
comparison to the need to immediately respond to a text message 
(even when driving at 60 mph). 
Here is a fun set of statistics compiled by GSAA. 
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Smartphone usage statistics suggest that an average person 
spends 2 hours and 51 minutes per day on their mobile device. 
What’s more, 22% of us check our phones every few minutes, and 
51% of users look at it a few times per hour. (Miljic, 2019)  [ My 
personal stats show a daily average of 8h 16m] [6] Some more fun: 
• 71 billion people in the world own a smartphone in 2019. 
• More than 5 billion people in the world own mobile devices. 
• Kids get their first mobile device around the age of 12. 
• 194 billion mobile phone apps were downloaded in 2019. 
• 92% of Americans believe that cell phone addiction is real. 
• Two-thirds of the world is now connected via mobile devices. 
• Mobile owners worldwide will increase to 7.33 billion by 2023. 
• An average smartphone user has 63 interactions on her phones 
a day. 
 
Have you ever tried counting the number of times you check your 
phone during the day? According to recent findings, an average 
person casually checks his/her phone about 63 times a day. Even 
87% of us do it one hour before going to bed, while 69% check 
smartphones within the first five minutes of waking up. 
Further, smartphone usage stats say that 86% of people 
constantly check their phones while talking to friends, which can 
be pretty annoying if you are the other person in the conversation. 
(Miljic, 2019) 
 
5+ hours of smartphone usage a day increases the chances of 
obesity. Recent health studies have revealed an alarming number of 
obese people in the world. The risk of obesity has increased by 43%, 
and much is to blame on the modern and unhealthy lifestyle many 
people are leading. (Miljic, 2019) 
 
Cellphone usage statistics coincide with this trend, and many 
doctors suggest that the prime cause for obesity are computers and 
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handheld devices. Some doctors go as far as to say that cell phones 
and their overuse are the prime cause for some people getting 
overweight. (Miljic, 2019) 
 
Increasing smartphone usage can diminish our ability to interpret 
information. A recently published study revealed a fascinating 
insight into smartphone use. The study included two controlled 
experiments that were based on current smartphone usage trends. 
It shockingly revealed that using smartphones too much diminishes 
our ability to understand the deeper meaning of the information 
that we get. (Miljic, 2019) You need more proof than the attention 
the public has on taking selfies and videotaping everything from 
bugs to riots to ? Do you think people really care about the subject 
or is it some deep down loss of connection which we had before the 
cellphone explosion? I have seen an employee fired with just a text 
or a date dumped on Valentines Day with a brief email. What does 
that tell you about the level of rudeness that we are experiencing 





Some clever people are designing algorithms to maximize 
engagement by ad clicks. This is an awful metric for society. Casino’s 
use analytics to determine exactly how to get gamblers back to the 
gaming tables after losses – so they can lose more. Social media 
and gaming companies do the same thing on a massive scale, to 
make their platforms as “sticky” – i.e., as addictive – as possible. 
(Elliott, 2019) More engaging does not mean better. Hate is a virus, 
and we are spreading it more efficiently than ever before thanks to 
modern algorithm targeting. (Elliott, 2019)  Fake news is engaging, 
interesting, but it is a lie and those that spread it or create it have no 
Honor. (Nichols R. , A Case for Honor, 2017) Speaking of fake news, 
lets look briefly at Deep Fake technology. 
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AI Cloining (Deep Fakes) 
All that is needed to clone a person’s voice is AI and a snippet of 
audio. Similarly, AI can take several photos or videos of a person 
and then create an entirely new – cloned video that appears to 
be original but with a very different message. AI can create an 
artificial YOU. The results are so convincing our brains have trouble 
differentiating between what is real and what is cloned. (Marr, 2019) 
 
Deep fake technology uses facial mapping, machine learning, and 
AI to create representations of real people doing and saying things 
they never did. Celebrities are not the only targets; ordinary people 
are too. The technology is so advanced that it does not require 
much raw data to create a convincing fake video, plus there are a lot 
more images and videos of ordinary people from the internet and 
social media channels to use. (Elliott, 2019) An example is Facebook 
(FB) which people use extensively to swap images or post publicly 




There is an interesting analog to deep fake technology called de-
censoring images. The technology is not perfected but is making 
great strides via AI.  A censored photo is an image with certain parts 
of it painted over or pixelated. Like this: 
Figure 8.1 Censored Image The Birth of Venus by Sandro 
Botticelli, 1480 Source: (Birth of Venus, 2021) (InPlant, 2021) 
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It seems surprising that anyone would want to censor the 
extraordinary skill of Botticelli.  Can this somehow be fixed? Is there 
a way to uncensor such an image and get its censored parts back? 
To answer this question, let’s go into what a censored image is. A 
photo can be censored in multiple ways of which the most popular 
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are two: painting over and pixelating. Censorship of the first type is 
a black (or any other color) box painted over some part of the image, 
possibly with a “censored” mark on it. The second censoring method 
takes the area of the photo to censor and artificially lowers the 
image resolution of that area. The resulting image loses quality and 
becomes unreadable. Censoring is irreversible. You cannot restore 
original pixels of the image that are now painted over or blurred. 
There is a way to recover a part of original information using the 
surrounding (uncensored) pixels using Inpaint.© There are three 
steps: 1) Load the image into implant; 2) Mark the censored area 
using the marker tool; and 3) Run the retouching process.  Inpaint 
lets you retouch the censored area and hide it from the picture by 
extrapolating surrounding pixels to the censored part of the image. 
Inpaint© will try to recover information from the surrounding pixels 
and makes the whole image look like it is not censored. (InPlant, 
2021) 
 
Can I uncensor a face or a bikini? 
No, not yet. The censored image simply does not contain 
information about face or body features anymore. After all, that’s 
the point of censorship, is it? Inpaint can only restore the censored 
part of the image by analyzing its other parts and applying them as a 
patch to the censored zone. As long as your photo does not contain 
another copy of the same face, there is nothing you can do here. 
However, Inpaint© can remove censored boxes from logotypes, 
labels, vehicle number plates and such. It can recover non-essential 
parts of the photo that was censored, like smoking cigarettes or 
any other small objects, censored territories on satellite photos and 
such. (InPlant, 2021) 
 
Weaponized Algorithmic Addiction (Social Asymmetric Warfare) 
 and Asymmetric Warfare 
On Asymmetric Thinking / Warfare / Fear (Nichols R. , 2017) 
 
Before we jump into social asymmetric warfare (aka Weaponized 
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Algorithmic Addiction), let’s review some important concepts: 
 terrorism, asymmetric thinking / warfare, and fear. 
 
 Terrorism 
Terrorism is violence or threatened violence against innocent 
people or symbols to change behavior by producing fear. Our foes 
of the future, will by necessity, engage in asymmetric warfare – the 
strategy, tactics, and tools a weaker adversary uses to offset the 
superiority of a foe by attacking the stronger forces vulnerabilities, 
using both direct and indirect approaches to hamper vital functions 
or locations to exploit advantage. 
The author sees this as a struggle of intangibles constituting will: 
fear, morale, surprise. We will see both the kinetic (symmetric) 
elements (bullets, bombs and attrition) and non-kinetic elements 
(asymmetric) – such as perception management, deception, 
knowledge exploitation, and cyberspace assault. The war against 
terrorism is a struggle for survival for a way of life and conflicting 
cultural and religious perspectives. 
 
Our asymmetric foes of the future hope to recreate the massive 
second-and third- order effects that struck our country’s social, 
political, economic, financial, military, and information systems on 
11 September 2001. Asymmetric warfare and hence thinking, 
involves intangibles- achieving offsets through surprise, shock 
effects, and the ability to influence information ICGs[7] to create 
aggregate effects in command-and- control systems, the decision 
making of leaders, the will of the public to support them. (Nichols R. 
, 2017) 
 
Knowledge War and Fear 
Two areas where everybody can help defeat terrorism are: 
Knowledge war and recognizing Fear for what it is. Knowledge war 
deals with how people use information and knowledge in the 
intellectual sense – it’s about superior thinking, planning and 
decision making under uncertainty. 
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One of the most important implications for people involved in 
knowledge war lies in the absolute requirement for expending 
resources to find and identify the intricacies of the opponent’s 
decision-making processes. The concept of information center of 
gravity (ICG) has emerged. ICG is confluence of streams of 
communication, collection, automation, thinking, planning, and 
decision-making. Whether found in physical or virtual space, it is so 
important that its demise or manipulation can seriously jeopardize 
the success of a mission or task. 
 
 Aggregation 
Asymmetric thinking involves aggregation. A great force comes 
from the power of aggregation. When we find relationships, then 
combine and exploit them, we are aggregating for advantage. A 
certain degree of synergy (the whole greater than the sum of the parts) 
comes from aggregating and connecting things, activities, actions, 
networks, and societal values. When things are connected in tightly 
woven relationships, they move together. However, the slightest 
perturbation or variance in one critical element can cause dramatic 
changes to whole (dominoes falling). This also explains the incredible 
power in the second-and third order cascading effects we 
witnessed after 11 September 2001. 
 
Our most recent example of aggregation was on 6 January 2021, 
when the capital was stormed and Congress was breached by 
protestors. They were allegedly unhappy about President Trump’s 
loss of his presidency and VP Pence not standing up to decertifying 
the results of the electoral college. They wanted an  an audit of 
states laws, practices, and alleged allegations from 1000’s of 
deposed witnesses in 6 key states. Witnesses claimed they were 
involved with / or witnessed fraudulent ballot counting or 
practices, and allegedly questionable results from Dominion 
machines. 
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Coping with Asymmetric Warfare 
Asymmetric warfare represents the most significant challenge to 
this country in our entire history. How do we cope? First, we must 
change the way we think, plan and view the world. Second, people 
involved with security have to accept the concept of possibilities 
(potentialities not bound by constraints and avoid falling into the 
well-camouflaged trap of following the past and concentrating on 
capabilities (potentialities bound by constraints) and intent. Third, 
we must avoid mirror imaging our self on the world. This is a fatal 
flaw in our national character. Fourth, planners must consider the 
perceptions of the public, because asymmetric foes will target them 
as soft and vulnerable. The next big attack is on the National Will. 
The opponent’s perception is more important than ours in this 
concept. Fifth, asymmetric assaults should be anticipated from any 
quarter, any time, and any place. Sixth, a learning, adaptive threat 
could very well know and understand our systems, process, and 
psyches almost as well as we do. Knowledge is available to all people 
and this must force improved decision-making and anticipation on 
our security people. (Nichols R. , 2017) 
 
FEAR 
The second factor is Fear. In teaching my self-defense and rape 
defense courses, I ask participants to experience meeting their 
Fears head-on. We all have them. Many of them irrational and many 
are real. Note, I did not say understand Fear. (In life, understanding 
is the door prize, whereas experiencing something is truth and self-
actualizing.) Let me give you a new definition for Fear. Fear is False 
Evidence Appearing Real. Fear can be reduced / controlled / used 
to our own advantage / energizing and channeled into effective 
action through training and practice of skills. 
 
In life, with or without terrorism, we have One Encounter- One 
Chance to make the correct decisions to protect ourselves. There 
is no going back. We embrace our fears, we improve our skills, 
we challenge our knowledge assumptions, we create new choices, 
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we think asymmetrically (potentialities not bound by constraints), 
better, faster, more holistically, making more effective decisions. 
(Nichols R. K., ONE ENCOUNTER – ONE CHANCE, 2018) 
 
Weaponized Algorithmic Addiction (aka Asymmetric Social 
Warfare) 
In traditional fighting, smaller armies using guerrilla tactics win 
much more often than would be expected. Now we are seeing 
asymmetric social warfare, where small groups with an agenda can 
destabilize society. Large companies like Facebook,© Google, © and 
Twitter© who all have public, on-camera, clear biases can leverage 
the potential deliterious effects of these small groups with an 
agenda by setting their business algorithms to support their attacks 
(aggregation). There are two very decent examples of this 
weaponization COVID-19 and social media reaction to POTUS after 




COVID-19 (and variants) has viciously struck the world. So many 
have died. COVID -19 does not discriminate on the basis of color, 
race, origin, sex, time, curfews, laws, business type, or age. It doesn’t 
give a damn. It just kills. Evidence of the terrible numbers and 
losses are out there, all you have to do is let the information in. 
[8] Scientists all over the globe have been developing a vaccine 
to counter COVID-19. At least two companies, Pfizer and Moderna 
in the US have reached the goal posts and are distributing their 
life-saving vaccines in two inoculation packages. They are ~95% 
effective! It is no secret that the US government under President 
Trump’s urging / direction sped up the normally long-time federal 
approval process and contracted for millions of doses to be 
distributed to the American populace. It is also no secret that 
Democrats as a group are not fans of the outgoing president. 
Extremists in their party have publicly derided the effort and 
fostered FEAR about the vaccine as ineffective (all scientific 
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evidence to the contrary). Many have called for Not taking the 
vaccine even though it represents a life-saving measure available to 
100,000’s citizens / non-citizens – especially seniors. 
 
Americans have a relatively low understanding of disease and 
vaccines, in general. Many respondents a consumer survey[9] were 
unable to name the leading COVID-19-vaccine manufacturers and 
had limited knowledge of the vaccine candidates’ key attributes. 
There are multiple reasons for this reality including the emergence 
of social media as a major source of information and the well-
documented growth of the “antivaccination” or “ANTIVAX” 
movement. A recent in-depth analysis of online narratives about 
vaccines on social media by the organization First Draft found that 
the majority of social media discussions about COVID-19 focus on 
“political and economic motives” of actors and institutions involved 
in vaccine development and the “safety, efficacy, and necessity” 
concerns around vaccines. (Conway, 2020) 
 
Regardless of which vaccines emerge, it is reasonable to assume 
that significant amounts of incorrect or misleading information will 
be spread. This is especially problematic given that, based on a 
recent survey, more consumers source their COVID-19-vaccination 
information from social media (27 percent) than from physicians (16 
percent) or from state-, local-, and federal-government officials (22 
to 24 percent). (Conway, 2020) 
 
According to a recent US-consumer research, 63 percent of 
respondents are cautious about or unlikely to adopt COVID-19 
vaccination. The “cautious,” who comprise 45 percent of 
respondents (the largest segment), are those who will wait and see 
how a vaccine performs in the “real world” before deciding if they 
will get vaccinated. Another 18 percent say they are unlikely to 
vaccinate. The relative proportion of consumers in the “interested,” 
“cautious,” and “unlikely” segments has remained largely consistent 
in the past five months, with some slight positive shifts in 
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subsegments of the “cautious”, even following positive readouts 
from the clinical trials of the Moderna and Pfizer–BioNTech 
vaccines. (Conway, 2020) 
 
At-risk Americans are also uncertain. Despite the well-
documented risks that elderly people face when contracting 
COVID-19, only 65 percent of respondents older than 65 years 
reported that they are interested in getting vaccinated. Only 31 
percent of black respondents and 36 percent of Hispanic 
respondents said that they are interested. Other recent surveys 
show similar results. While 60 percent of those earning more than 
$100,000 per year report that they are interested in getting 
vaccinated, only 31 percent of those who earn less than $25,000 
report the same. These findings are consistent with observed, 
historical behavior among higher-risk segments with respect to 
other vaccines. (Conway, 2020) 
 
Consumer sentiment does not always predict actual behaviors, 
of course. First, sentiment can and does evolve. Second, there has 
always been a gap between what people say they will do about 
public health and what they actually do. That said, the research 
suggests that about 30 to 50 percent of people are interested in 
getting vaccinated against COVID-19, and the other 50 to 70 percent 
are uncertain or unlikely. That means that among the 195 million 
Americans who would likely need to be vaccinated to reach herd 
immunity in the population, about 100 million to 150 million would 
need to be engaged further to decide and take action to get 
vaccinated. (Conway, 2020) 
 
Another look at the COVID-19 through the eyes of a destabilizing 
social agenda is superbly illustrated in the cartoon ( Figure 8.2) 
below on the ANTIVAX movement by Dragoes de Garagem. 
Figure 8.2 Antivax Movement by Dragoes de Garagem (Elliott, 
2019) 
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Twitter© & Facebook© Actions 
The headline read Twitter, Facebook (permanently)[10] block 
Trump from posting amid Capitol violence. In an unprecedented 
step, Facebook and Twitter suspended U.S. President Donald Trump 
from posting to their platforms Wednesday following the storming 
of the Capitol by his supporters. (Hindi Staff Editor, 2021) 
 
Twitter locked Mr. Trump out of his account for 12 hours and 
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said that future violations by Mr. Trump could result in a permanent 
suspension. The company required the removal of three of Mr. 
Trump’s tweets, including a short video in which he urged those 
supporters to “go home” while also repeating falsehoods about the 
integrity of the presidential election. Mr. Trump’s account deleted 
those posts; had they remained; Twitter had threatened to extend 
his suspension. (Hindi Staff Editor, 2021) Facebook followed up in 
the evening, announcing that Mr. Trump wouldn’t be able to post for 
24 hours following two violations of its policies. 
 
While some cheered the platforms’ actions, experts noted that 
the companies’ actions follow years of hemming and hawing on 
Mr. Trump and his supporters spreading dangerous misinformation 
and encouraging violence that have contributed to Wednesday’s 
violence. (Hindi Staff Editor, 2021) 
Forget the obvious position of the aforementioned report and 
clearly recognize two things: 1) two organizations have so much 
control that they can cut off millions of interested people (globally) 
from any discussion or reasoning because they are setting the 
agenda. They can force their opinions and bias on a huge populace. 
This is a disturbing technology trend. How can an organization be so 
arrogant as to think they know the hearts and thoughts of millions 




The British, Chinese, Russians, Israelis, Iranians, Syrians, North 
Koreans, South Koreans, and United States  armed forces are testing 
how interconnected, cooperative drones can be used in military 
operations. Drone Swarms represent a real threat and technologies 
to support their use are in major development. (Nichols R. K., et 
al., 2020), (Nichols R. , et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in 
Cyber Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets, 2nd Edition, 
2019), (Nichols R. K., et al., 2020), and (Nichols R. K., 2018) all devote 
considerable writing effort to the operation, organization, threat, 
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application, risks, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures required for 
Drone Swarms. 
 
Inspired by a swarm of insects working together, drone swarms 
could revolutionize future conflicts by overwhelming enemy 
sensors with their numbers and unrelenting mission devotion, or to 
effectively cover a large area for S & R missions[11].  They can reduce 
lives lost or cause more to be lost. 
The difference between swarms and how drones are used by 
the military today is that a swarm can organize itself based on 
the situation and through drone interactions with each other to 
accomplish its mission. (Marr, 2019) The reality of a swarm smart 
enough to coordinate (without human intervention) its own 
behavior is approaching. The thought of killer machines being able 
to “think” for themselves is fodder for nightmares and movies. (Marr, 
2019) Swarm technology is being deployed in all conflicts and will 
be in future conflicts. (Nichols R. K., et al., 2019) (Nichols R. , et al., 
2020) 
 
IoT and ASC Devices in the Home – The spy in the home 
For smart home devices to respond to queries and be as useful as 
possible, they need to be listening and tracking information about 
you and your regular habits. This is exactly what the ASC group 
does. When you added the Echo to your room as a radio and alarm 
clock (or any other smart device connected to the Internet via IoT 
or directly or wirelessly or Bluetooth or IR), you also allowed a 
spy to enter your home. All the information smart devices collect 
about your habits such as your viewing history on Netflix; where 
you live and what route you take home so Google can tell you how 
to avoid traffic; and what time you typically arrive home so your 
smart thermostat can make your family room the temperature you 
prefer, is stored in the cloud. Of course, this information makes your 
life more convenient, but there is also the potential for abuse. In 
theory, virtual assistant devices listen for a “wake word,” before they 
activate, but there are instances when it might think you said the 
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wake word and begin recording. Any smart device in your home, 
including gaming consoles and smart TVs, could be the entry point 
for abuse of your personal information. There are some defensive 
strategies such as covering up cameras, turning off devices when 
not needed and muting microphones, but none of them are 100% 
foolproof.  (Marr, 2019) 
 
Smart Electric Meters 
One of the most deceptive and invasive devices is the smart 
electricity meter. Modern meters can track not only when you’re not 
home, but what you’re up to when you’re there. When you are home, 
it can determine how many times you flush your toilet. [12] (Nichols 
R. K., Invited Speaker, (19 September 2018) Lions Club, speaking on 
Personal Privacy: How to Defend against Invasions of It, 2018) 
 
Consumers already face a laundry list of daily privacy issues 
ranging from Facebook’s failure to police how user data is abused, to 
ISPs that routinely track your every online movement down to the 
millisecond. 
But another, less talked about privacy problem has slowly been 
gaining steam: the modern, electrical utility smart meter. Modern 
electricity usage meters provide innumerable benefits to utility 
companies, including a variety of remote access and monitoring 
tools to better manage the power grid. They also dramatically 
reduce the cost of technician visits for on-location meter readings. 
The benefits to consumers have been less impressive, however. 
Some models have been found to interfere with some home routers, 
and, like so many internet-connected devices, other variants are 
easily hacked. But these devices also collect an ocean of private 
customer data, including detailed information that can be used to 
infer when you wake, when you sleep, and when you’re at home or 
away. In the past, electricity meters delivered a lump monthly KW 
use figure to utilities; but smart meters transmit data in granular 
detail, often in increments ranging from fifteen minutes to every 
few hours. This, in turn, has sparked concern from locals in places 
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like Naperville, Illinois, where, since 2011, one citizen group has 
been fighting the intrusive nature of the devices. Under the name 
Naperville Smart Meter Awareness, citizens sued the city over a 
policy mandating that all city residents must have smart meters 
installed by the local city-owned power utility. In their lawsuit, 
they argued that the city’s smart meter data collection violated 
their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. This week, the group notched a notable win when the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the Fourth Amendment 
does in fact protect energy-consumption data collected by smart 
meters. The ruling leans heavily on the Kyllo v. United States 
precedent that declared the use of thermal imaging tech to monitor 
citizens without a warrant also violates the Fourth Amendment. 
(Bode, 2018) 
 
The court was quick to point out smart meter data collection 
often provides much deeper insight than could be obtained via 
the thermal imaging tech that was at issue in the Kyllo ruling. In 
large part because modern appliances often have distinct energy-
consumption patterns or “load signatures” that not only tell the 
utility when you’re home, but precisely what you’re doing. (Bode, 
2018) 
 
“A refrigerator, for instance, draws power differently than a 
television, respirator, or indoor grow light,” the ruling notes. “By 
comparing longitudinal energy-consumption data against a growing 
library of appliance load signatures, researchers can predict the 
appliances that are present in a home and when those appliances 
are used.” The ruling could prove to be important for the growing 
number of homes that have smart meters installed. This is especially 
true given the growing interest among law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies in gaining access to this data without a 
warrant, and the apparent lack of interest in meaningful federal 
or state privacy protections for consumers. “The Seventh Circuit 
recognized that smart meters pose serious risks to the privacy of all 
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of our homes, and that rotely applying analog-era case law to the 
digital age simply doesn’t work,” Jamie Williams, staff attorney at the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, told Motherboard. “We hope that 
courts around the country follow the Seventh Circuit and find that 
the Fourth Amendment protects smart meter data,” Williams added. 
According to the U.S. Energy Information Association, roughly 70.8 
million smart meters were already deployed by the end of 2016, 
with roughly 88% of them in residential homes. It’s expected that 
about 80% of U.S. homes will have a smart meter installed by 2020. 
While this ruling generally only applies to government access to this 
smart electricity data, Williams noted that state regulators can also 
play a sizeable role in preventing corporate utilities from collecting 
and potentially selling this data without your permission. Said data 
could prove invaluable to data brokers that also traffic in cellular 
location data. In 2011, the California Public Utilities Commission 
passed regulations protecting the privacy and security of 
consumers’ electrical usage data. In 2014, the CPUC also passed 
rules that let users pay a fee to opt out of such data collection. 
California’s Pacific Gas and Electric wasn’t a fan; and was busted for 
spying on activists in a bid to undermine smart meter opposition. 
“In order to protect consumers, other state utilities commissions, 
including the Illinois Commerce Commission, should pass similar 
regulations,” Williams recommended. (Bode, 2018) 
 
Back in Illinois, the court warned that the entire fight could have 
been avoided if the city-owned utility had simply provided users 
with the option of using a traditional meter instead of forcing the 
upgrade. They also could have provided consumers the ability to 
opt out of data collection. “Naperville could have avoided this 
controversy—and may still avoid future uncertainty—by giving its 
residents a genuine opportunity to consent to the installation of 
smart meters, as many other utilities have,” the court said. (Bode, 
2018) 
As the country debates new privacy rules in the wake of endless 
hacking scandals, rampant social media and broadband ISP data 
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There are some useful applications for facial recognition. 
However, it can easily fall into sinster hands. China stands accused 
of using facial recognition technology for surveillance and racial 
profiling. They can spot Hong Kong protestors and monitor to 
control Uighur Muslims who live in their country. Russia’s cameras 
scan the streets for “people of interest”. Israel tracks Palestinians 
inside the West Bank. 
What about the US? 
A raging battle over controversial facial recognition software used 
by law enforcement and the civil rights of Americans might be 
heading to a courtroom. The latest salvo includes the American Civil 
Liberties Union suing the FBI, the Department of Justice, and the 
Drug Enforcement Agency for those federal agencies’ records to see 
if there is any secret surveillance in use nationwide. The lawsuit, 
filed Oct. 31, 2019 comes as organizations and law enforcement are 
going toe-to-toe over what is private and what isn’t. 
A facial recognition system uses biometric software to map a 
person’s facial features from a video or photo. The system then tries 
to match the information on databases to verify someone’s identity. 
(Collins, 2019) 
 
Police departments regularly use facial recognition to find 
potential crime suspects and witnesses by scanning through 
millions of photos; the software is also used to provide surveillance 
at public venues like concerts and schools and used to gain access 
to specific properties. But there’s organized opposition against it, 
buoyed after California passed a law that puts a temporary ban 
on police across the state from using facial recognition in body 
cameras. The move comes while more than half of Americans polled 
in a recent Pew Research Center survey trust that officers would 
use the software responsibly.  (Collins, 2019) 
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Apple’s iPhone uses its Face ID facial recognition authentication 
system to help unlock the device for users, and is the subject of a $1 
billion lawsuit. Social media giant Facebook uses facial recognition 
to recognize when members or their friends are tagged in photos. 
Some U.S. airports use facial recognition scanners in cooperation 
with the government to improve how travelers enter and exit the 
U.S., and some major airlines use facial recognition to help 
passengers check in flights, luggage, and boarding. The National 
Human Genome Research Institute also uses facial recognition to 
detect a rare disease that causes a change in appearance known as 
DiGeorge syndrome. (Collins, 2019) 
 
Currently, there are no federal regulations on the use of this 
technology for commercial or government use as several questions 
emerge about whether facial recognition violates the First 
Amendment, granting certain freedoms including speech, religion, 
assembly, and the press; the Fourth Amendment, which protects 
people from unlawful searches and seizure; and the 14th 
Amendment, which guarantees equal protection of the laws. 
(Collins, 2019)  Some companies may also use facial recognition to 
pitch products based on our social media profiles. This practice 
occurs despite the fact that many Americans despise the practice, 
according to the Pew Center survey; others may use the technology 
when it comes to people getting a loan to purchase a car or a house, 
and even hiring for jobs. (Collins, 2019) 
 
While Congress has held multiple hearings about whether to ban 
or regulate facial recognition, law enforcement contends that the 
software is an invaluable tool that can quickly root out dangerous 
people. 
According to a report from the Government Accountability Office, 
there are more than 640 million facial photos that are available 
for use that come from databases that can be searched by the 
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Facial Analysis, Comparison, and Evaluation, also known as FACE, an 
internal unit of the FBI. (Collins, 2019) 
 
In addition to tracking people without their knowledge, facial 
recognition is plagued by bias. When the algorithm trained to a 
dataset that is not diverse, it is less accurate and will missidentify 
people more. (Marr, 2019) 
 
Ransomware 
Ransomware is malware that is used to prevent access to a 
computer system to achieve criminal and malicious activities. 
According to CISA, It is on the rise and the ransoms cost less than 
just one year ago, because it is a popular scam and people pay. 
Scary as it is, standard encrypted backups of the user’s PC’s and 
networks to off-site and disconnected storage is a simple solution 
coupled with a complete wipe of the machines after infection.  Or 
pay the $500 dollars. Generally, the hacker will give you the decrypt 
key. And if you think you are not vulnerable later, well there is a 
bridge in…. Why? When the infection has been successful, the target 
generally does not remove the original vulnerability. So fake emails, 
spear phishing,  used to get private information are successful again 
and again and again. They have an “in” to the target. They usually 
leave backdoors. (Nichols R. K., Invited Speaker, (19 September 2018) 
Lions Club, speaking on Personal Privacy: How to Defend against 
Invasions of It, 2018) (Marr, 2019) 
 
Smart Dust ( MEMS) 
Nichols covers the use of MEMS technology for taking down 
malicious UAS by Accoustic or DEW means. (Nichols R. K., et al., 
2020) MEMS are Micro-Electro-Mechanical systems, the size of few 
grains of salt. They have sensors, communications mechanisms, 
autonomous power supplies, cameras and SCADA controls. (Nichols 
R. , et al., 2020) 
Another name for MEMS is motes, or smart dust, and the 
technology has many postive uses. It also can be used to invade 
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privacy practically without detection. This is an advanced 
technology and it is in play. (Rose, 2019) 
 
Fake News Bots 
GROVER is one AI system capable of writing a fake news article 
from nothing more than a headline!. The articles created such are 
believable.  Elon Musk created the “deepfakes for text” that 
produces news stories and fiction so effectively, the organization 
initially did not release the research to the public. (Marr, 2019) 
 
Lethal Autonomous Robots 
Our last disturbing, nightmarish technology is Killer Robots (real 
life terminators). Currently five countries are developing 
autonomous robots with the intent to use them in combat. Our 
friendly Amazon and Microsoft have already come up with 
prototypes of terminator robots! (Rose, 2019)  “Buy our product 
and we don’t break legs anymore, we have a new collector.” Can 
you imagine when one of these robots gets hacked? Hollywood has 





Technology is meant to make life simple, but it is imperative to 
make sure that these technologies are used only for good. This 
might mean regulations, new laws, restrictions on imports, quality 
checks, security audits, whatever. Per Neil Postman: “The effects of 
technology are not always unpredictable. But they are not always 





1) Review the list of Disturbing Technologies in the first section. 
Choose two that interest you. Develop the Risk profile for your 
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choices which includes the Risks , Threats, Vulnerabilities, Impact 
and Countermeasures for misuse of those technologies. [13] 
2) What is your prognostication about the misuse of social media? 
Where do you see the solutions? 
 
3) Choose your top three Disturbing Technologies, rank them, 
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[1] Disclaimer: This chapter contains opinions not necessarily 
endorsed by the author’s employer, clients, writing team or any 
entity quoted or cited. The author takes full responsibility for his 
opinions. 
[2] A Black Swan is an unpredictable event that is beyond what 
is normally expected of a situation and has potentially severe 
consequences. Black swan events are characterized by their 
extreme rarity, severe impact, and the widespread insistence they 
were obvious in hindsight. (Scott, 2021) 
[3] See (Nichols R. K., et al., 2020) Chapter 1 and Dr Ryan’s Chapters 
on Information superiority in (Nichols R. K., et al., 2020), (Nichols 
R. , et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems in Cyber Domain: Protecting 
USA’s Advanced Air Assets, 2nd edition, 2019), (Nichols R. K., et al., 
2019). 
[4] Author added to this citation. 
[5] See Contributors for a biography of this brilliant man. 
[6] One of my first assignments I give in my graduate Homeland 
Security classes is to not allow students to use their cell phones 
short of an emergency for the first weekend. A prize is given for 
the longest time reported without the phone. In a class of 22, only 
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1 student went the entire weekend. He was on his honeymoon. The 
rest of the class average was 2 hours or less. 
[7] ICG = Information Centers of Gravity. See Dr Ryan’s brilliant 
chapter in (Nichols R. K., et al., 2020) & (Nichols R. , et al., Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems (UAS) in Cyber Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced 
Air Assets, 2nd Edition, 2019) 
[8] Author interpretation / paraphrase of a Tom Selleck- Jesse Stone 
movie line. 
[9] The Carlisle Sentinel, Carlisle, PA 
[10] Two days later Twitter completely banned Trump and several of 
his major supporters. 
[11] S & R = Search & Rescue 
[12] How? Simple. Flushed water is measured in exact units of 1gpf 
or similar. Water comes to the toilet via a valve that is electrically 
controlled to determine how much hot water (sink, shower) is 
needed. The valve electrically opens or closes based on the need 
for hot water / cold water. It also measures the amount of water 
transferred and registered the minute amounts of electricity used 
to open or close the gate valve.  Trace the water back to the water 
heater. Heat is generated by electricity to the heating coils. The 
measurement of how much heat is required and the flow of water 
through the heater to the gate valve (regardless of other cleaning or 
purifying systems) is measured and logged by the smart meter. This 
system, in turn, can and has been hacked. Now the criminal knows 
your behaviors: microwave, TV, bed warming blanket, telephone, 
alarm system toilet, radio alarms, lights, internet, AC.. if its attached 
, it is measured, catalogued and discoverable. 
[13] Students will recognize that this is set up for parameters of the 
qualitative information Risk equations- the Ryan-Nichols equations. 
Where Risk = Threats x Vulnerabilities X Impact / 
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Countermeasures. And Risk ~ F( Threats / Countermeasures). The 
latter equation recognizes the differential state, where both Impact 
and Vulnerabilities are held constant with respect to time. See: 
(Nichols R. , et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in Cyber 
Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets, 2nd Edition, 2019) & 
(Randall K. Nichols, 2000) 
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9. Social Media - The Next 
Battlefield in Information 
Warfare [Lonstein] 
Student Learning Objectives 
This chapter will expose students to the design and deployment 
of information warfare throughout the annals of the history of war. 
We will examine concepts such as disinformation, censorship, 
suppression, consumption, dissemination of information, and their 
implementation throughout history. Next, we will introduce social 
media platforms as a ubiquitous form of communication. We will 
consider whether corporate control of the communication with no 
constitutional free speech protections, actions of de platforming 
and censorship, and their impact upon the 2020 United States 
Presidential election. Finally, we will consider possible methods to 
address the risks this new reality poses to various stakeholders 
ranging from individuals to governments, politicians, national 
security interests, and businesses. 
THE HISTORY OF INFORMATION WARFARE 
            According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, the 
definition of “information” is “knowledge obtained from 
investigation, study, or instruction.”  Conversely, the term 
“disinformation” is “false information deliberately and often covertly 
spread (as by the planting of rumors) to influence public opinion 
or obscure the truth.” (Merriam-Webster, 2020) While these 
definitions are the product of centuries of human experience with 
the dissemination of information from the days of cave drawings to 
the written, spoken, and eventually electronically transmitted, the 
reality is from a perspective of its use in warfare to at least the late 
400’s BC and the famed Military Strategist, Sun Tzu. In his treatise 
“The Art of War,” he postulated “all warfare is deception,” which is, 
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in essence, the seminal discussion of information or disinformation 
usage as a warfare tool. (Tzu, 1971) Over many centuries, Chinese 
military treatises include and expand upon this concept. For 
instance, in Essentials of Sun Tzu’s Art of War and Submarine 
Operations, a Chinese People’s Liberation Army publication 
highlighted four information/disinformation concepts espoused by 
Sun Tzu 
• “Show yourself to intimidate the enemy.” 
• “Show the false to confuse the enemy.” 
• “Create momentum to harass the enemy.” 
• “Deceive to obstruct the enemy.” (Shixin, 2002) (Metcalf, 2017) 
While ancient civilizations had minimal technology, written, and 
spoken communication was available and used just as effectively as 
today. Conflict was also a very significant reality in ancient China, 
with the conquest of adversaries a necessary and ever-present 
reality of any empire which sought to survive. 
 
Figure 9.1 (Voice of America, 1957) 
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According to Major Nathaniel Bastian, in the 18th century, 
Frederick the Great created a Prussian spy’s system that would 
gather information from travelers and conduct reconnaissance 
missions to determine infrastructure, weaponry, and other potential 
capabilities of its adversaries. He further references propaganda 
campaigns by Napoleon in the 1800s to publicly portray France 
as a victim of aggression by adversaries to craft public opinion in 
neighboring European countries. A few examples of this information 
warfare included domestic and foreign placards, articles and 
proclamations, and publications such as the “Bulletin de la Grande 
Armée” as examples of crafting public opinion, adversarial 
impressions of Frances military capabilities, and adversary’s 
responses to the information. (Bastian, 2019) 
In the 20th Century, World Wars I and II, as well as many other 
global conflicts, involved significant implementation of Information 
warfare whether it be an interruption of information flow via signal 
jamming, code-cracking, Office of War Information, Office of 
Strategic Services (now CIA), Voice of America and many 
more. (Crane, 2019). 
Figure 9.2 Social Media Collage (PressureUA/iStock, 2019) 
 
 





Later in the century, new technologies started to emerge, 
eventually leading to what is now commonly known as the internet. 
Names such as Compuserve, Usenet led to the introduction of 
GENie (General Electric Network for Information Exchange) and 
Listserv platforms of electronic mail lists, which started to rapidly 
gain popularity as the price and acceptance of connected 
technology led to ubiquitous acceptance. As the 1990s came and 
went, the first “Chatrooms” and employment sites such as the 
Palace, Friendster and LinkedIn were introduced and surged in 
popularity. By 2004 Facebook began to commercialize, quickly 
followed by YouTube, Twitter, and 100’s of others. (McFadden, 2020) 
Information warfare had evolved from a prehistoric display of cave 
art to an instant communication method, capable of being instantly 
and globally disseminated on a peer-to-peer or peer-to-billions 
basis. 
 
SOCIAL MEDIA TODAY –- INSTANT, PERSONAL, GLOBAL 
What is Social Media?  According to Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 
Social Media is “forms of electronic communication (such as 
websites for social networking and microblogging) through which 
users create online communities to share information, ideas, 
personal messages, and other content (such as videos)”  (Merriam-
Webster, 2020) For our examination Social Media is not a stand-
alone concept or technology; instead, it exists as part of a class 
of information dissemination referred to as Information and 
Communications Technology (“ICT”). According to Van Niekerk, 
Pillay, & Maharaj, ICT is “traditional mass media, online media, 
including social networks, and communications technologies such 
as mobile telephones.” (Van Niekwek, 2011) 
 
ICT in the digital age is ubiquitous, affordable, and widely 
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accepted. Even in the most remote and impoverished corners of 
the globe, the concept of connectivity via computer, smartphone, 
or other connected technology is a reality for most. Accordingly, 
the ability to control the access to, quality of, or the accuracy of 
the information has never been more critical when discussing 
Information Warfare (“IW”). In a military setting, information 
warfare is “a class of techniques, including collection, transport, 
protection, denial, disturbance, and degradation of information, by 
which one maintains an advantage over one’s adversaries.” (Burns, 
1999) 
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Dan Kuehl of the National Defense University provided another 
more succinct definition, who described IW as the “conflict or 
struggle between two or more groups in the information 
environment.” (Stupples, 2015)A close examination of Figure 9.3, 
created in 2011, reveals it is devoid of any substantive reference to 
Social Media and its role in Information Warfare. 
In mid-December 2010, a phenomenon known as the “Arab 
Spring” began in Tunisia. Essentially the “Arab Spring” consisted 
of an amalgam of disaffected youth, ethnic minorities, political 
outcasts, and academia engaging in demonstrations, protests, and 
ultimately revolutions. They were mainly protesting repression, 
censorship, lack of economic opportunity, and human rights 
violations in governments throughout North Africa and the Middle 
East. This movement was fueled in large part by leveraging the 
power and scope of mobile social media. The campaign almost 
immediately spread virally through real-time mobile phone video, 
tweets, hashtags, Facebook, and other social media tools. The 
governments of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen were left 
overthrown in its wake, with numerous others still embroiled in 
various unrest and even civil war stages. The speed with which the 
Arab Spring grew is a testament to mobile social media’s power and 
its ubiquitous instant access. Borders, oceans, and continents were 
no longer barriers to the transmission and viewing of live, first-hand 
accounts and media depicting the movement’s rapid growth and its 
efficacy in toppling governments. (Van Niekwek, 2011) 
The power of mobile social media continues to be felt far beyond 
the Middle East and North Africa. The influence of mobile social 
media will be felt long after the Middle East and North Africa events. 
In 2015 the murders of Journalists Allison Parker and Adam Ward 
were streamed online shortly after they occurred (Shear, 2016). The 
shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, the subsequent 
protests almost instantly rocketed social media streaming to new 
heights, not only as a media reporting tool but also as an 
organization and command and control tool for social information 
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operated by a diverse group of sources ranging from media 
reporters to citizen journalists, to activists.  (Solsman, 2014) 
Every corner of the globe began to feel the effects of social media 
as a tool of information warfare. Viewers saw live violence, political 
upheaval, and perhaps most tragically, actual death—those who 
wanted to terrorize orchestrated attacks to stream their final acts 
of horror to millions watching online. A few examples include the 
Livestream of a mosque shooting in New Zealand, The Bataclan 
Nightclub attack in France, and The Parkland High School shooting 
in Florida. 




            What started as an idea to allow people to interact with 
each other on an easy to use, instant platform with global reach 
seemed like a great idea when Facebook hit its stride publicly in 
2006. Soon Facebook started to understand its technology’s power 
to collect data regarding its user’s preferences, behaviors, and even 
darker sides. As did its social media brethren, it discovered that 
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its platforms were excellent marketing tools since they already 
collected massive amounts of personal data about its users. This 
acquired knowledge of the users, in turn, allowed the media to 
market products to the users based upon their profiles and custom 
design what news and information they see in their information 
feed further to embed themselves into the lives of billions globally 
Many believe that today’s Facebook marketing and influence model 
reflects Edward Bernays’ teachings, who is referred to as the “father 
of public relations.” (Gunderman, 2015) 
In his 1928 book “Propaganda,” Benays wrote: 
“The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized 
habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in 
democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism 
of society constitute an invisible government which is the true 
ruling power of our country. We are governed, our minds are 
molded, our tastes formed, and our ideas suggested, largely by men 
we have never heard of…. It is they who pull the wires that control 
the public mind.” (Bernays, 1928) 
Perhaps no other technology has ever been able to mold the 
“habits and opinions” at the speed, scale, and individualized 
sophistication of social media. While other forms of communication 
such as print, broadcast radio, and television have undoubtedly 
expanded the ability to reach masses globally, no technology was 
ever as inexpensive, simple, ubiquitous, and always in the palm of 
our hands as social media. 
                                    Figure 9.5 Social Media Adoption 2004-2019
(Chaffey, 2020) 
394  |  Social Media - The Next Battlefield in Information Warfare [Lonstein]
 
 
ENTER DONALD TRUMP – SOCIAL MEDIA DISRUPTOR 
            By 2015 it was apparent that social media was more than 
just a popularity contest where users could monetize pet tricks, 
extreme sports, memes, and other provocative content. With almost 
four billion users, social media represented entertainment and 
Donald Trump, a tool of disruption. In the final days of the Barack 
Obama administration, Donald Trump had become a vocal critic 
of its policies. While criticism of presidential administrations is 
nothing new, what was different about Trump was how he 
communicated his disagreement to the public. Previously critics or 
would-be presidential candidates would use television and radio 
appearances, write magazine or newspaper opinion pieces, or 
appear at events to help drive name recognition and following. 
Trump was different. On May 4, 2009, Donald Trump, or someone 
on his behalf, tweeted for the first time: “May 4, 2009, 01:54:25 
PM Be sure to tune in and watch Donald Trump on Late Night 
with David Letterman as he presents the Top Ten List tonight!” 
(Brown, 2020). In 2009, Trump was the host of his reality show 
“The Apprentice,” which was a huge success and was likely using 
Twitter and other Social Media to drive engagement and ratings. 
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In 2011 he started to tack his use of Twitter by criticizing Obama 
and commenting on political issues of the day. In March of 2011, he 
began to discuss the prospect of entering the 2012 
Presidential race. (Twitter, 2011) 
Figure 9.6 Trump 2011 Election Tweet – (Courtesy Twitter 
@realdonaldtrump)       
 
                       
What followed was nothing short of amazing. Trump decided 
not to run in 2011 however chose to enter the fray in 2015, which 
eventually led to his defeat of former First Lady and Secretary of 
State Hillary Clinton in the 2016 United States presidential election. 
The fact that a political outsider could win the Presidency was not 
the story. In the past, candidates ranging from Andrew Jackson & 
Lincoln to Coolidge and Carter positioned themselves as political 
outsiders. However, most had some degree of governmental or 
political service on their resume. (WNYC, 2015) Donald Trump 
indeed was an outsider, a real estate and business mogul, and 
celebrity; he was even different than former actor Ronald Reagan 
who ascended to the presidency having first served as Governor of 
California. 
While the broadcast media, who perceived him as a side-show 
and potential train wreck, during the Republican primary, it was 
only too quick to give Trump nearly unlimited press in the 2016 race. 
To that end it was clear that Trump was a social media juggernaut. In 
a 2016 election post-mortem, Barbara Bickart, Susan Fournier and 
former New York Times digital, CEO Martin Nisenholtz wrote: 
 
“Big-seed” marketing beats viral. Duncan Watts, a principal 
researcher at Microsoft Research, has been studying the sociology 
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of networks for decades. His notion of big-seed marketing suggests 
that a message can spread faster and more systematically if it is 
“seeded” among many people……….. Trump exploited Watts’s theory 
at scale. He began with an enormous seedbed: Just before Election 
Day he had more than 19 million Twitter followers, 18 million 
Facebook fans, and nearly 5 million followers on Instagram. The 
broadcast and cable networks — almost unwittingly — amplified 
Trump’s network capabilities. Every time they reported on a tweet 
or posting, they effectively seeded the message among millions of 
viewers, many of whom, in turn, shared these messages. This 
offline/online complementarity helped Trump double his Twitter 
following during the campaign. Social and broadcast media work 
hand in hand, and Trump understood this better than his rivals, 
gaining by some estimates almost $2 billion in free air time through 
March 2016.” (Bickart, 2017) 
 
THE 2020 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: DISRUPTING THE 
DISRUPTOR 
 
TAKE AWAY THE MICROPHONE 
Stopping Trump from being re-elected would require non-
traditional multi-faceted approach designed on the reality of how 
Trump totally disrupted the electoral process using social media as 
a primary tool to influence the coverage and behavior of traditional 
print and broadcast media. Before Trump is even inaugurated, the 
focus becomes clear, the 2020 United States Presidential Election 
would be less of a political campaign and more of an information 
warfare operation than even seen before in United States Politics. 
In early November 2017, an “accident” occurred at Twitter when a 
technology journeyman by the name of Bahtiyar Duysak, a German 
citizen of Turkish descent was working on a work and study visa 
at Twitters Trust & Safety department received a “report” of an 
offensive or otherwise unpopular tweet coming from the account 
of one @realdonaldtrump. Duysak just happened to have formerly 
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worked at Google and YouTube during the term of his visa and even 
more curiously this was to be his last day on the job at Twitter. 
In an interview with Tech Crunch, shortly after the event when 
he returned to Germany, Duysak recalled the how the events 
transpired: 
“His last day at Twitter was mostly uneventful, he says. There 
were many goodbyes, and he worked up until the last hour before 
his computer access was to be shut off. Near the end of his shift, the 
fateful alert came in. This is where Trump’s behavior intersects with 
Duysak’s work life. Someone reported Trump’s account on Duysak’s 
last day; as a final, throwaway gesture, he put the wheels in motion 
to deactivate it. Then he closed his computer and left the building.” 
(Lunden, 2017) 
 
Figure 9.7 TwitterGov on Deactivation of @realdonaldtrump 
(Courtesy Twitter 
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The events surrounding the deactivation of the 
@realdonaldtrump Twitter might be a case of coincidence, even 
though, according to Statista, it employed almost 4000 people with 
additional labor coming from independent contractors and 
employees or vendors. (Statista, 2020) The curious circumstance 
where the employee happened to be leaving the company and 
country almost immediately may suggest a trial balloon about 
censoring Trumps’ social media account. If “likes” are an indicator 
of reaction, it was undoubtedly positive since over 200,000 people 
liked the tweets. 
CREATE A BOTTLENECK 
What is clear is that Trump’s supporters, opponents, and neutrals 
all recognized his deft implementation of social media as a tool 
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to end-run, traditional media. Opponents became fixated on 
penetrating Trump’s “Silicon Curtain” of individual communication 
with many millions of followers and foes alike. 
 




By the time, the 2020 presidential election season had arrived, 
Trump’s Twitter account had an incredible 85.5 million followers 
who could instantly be accessed by his tweets. In contrast, 
according to the Neilson Company, the average combined 
viewership of the major broadcast and cable news channels in 
December 2020 was approximately 26.7 million viewers. (Schneider, 
2020) [1] 
According to George Lakoff, an emeritus professor at the 
University of California at Berkeley, and an expert in cognitive 
science and linguistics, “Trump uses social media as a weapon to 
control the news cycle. It works like a charm. His tweets are tactical 
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rather than substantive,” “He is as good as it gets [at using social 
media],” “He is not ranting, that is strategic. Even when he is ranting, 
it’s strategic. (Buncombe, 2018 ) 
The disruptive use of technology is nothing new when it comes to 
the presidency. In May of 1862,  Abraham Lincoln, an apparent fan 
of technology, adopted widespread use of the Telegraph to message 
Union troops rapidly and efficiently in the field, administration 
officials, and to the public. In a 2012 opinion piece in the New York 
Times, Tom Wheeler wrote, “ As he put down the message, Grant 
(General U.S.) laughed out loud and exclaimed to those around him, 
“The President has more nerve than any of his advisors.” He was 
correct, of course, but more important than the message was the 
media: he held in his hands Lincoln’s revolutionary tool for making 
sure that neither distance nor intermediaries diffused his 
leadership.” (Wheeler, 2012) As we will see later on, technology is 
only useful as long as information transmission is uninterrupted. 
 




On August 3, 2020, a group calling itself the Transition Integrity 
Project issued a report entitled “Preventing a Disrupted Presidential 
Election and Transition.” The first paragraph reads: 
“In June 2020, the Transition Integrity Project (TIP) convened a 
bipartisan group of over 100 current and former senior government 
and campaign leaders and other experts in a series of 2020 election 
crisis scenario planning exercises. The results of all four table-top 
exercises were alarming. We assess with a high degree of likelihood 
that November’s elections will be marked by a chaotic legal and 
political landscape. We also assess that President Trump is likely to 
contest the result by both legal and extra-legal means, in an attempt 
to hold onto power. Recent events, including the President’s own 
unwillingness to commit to abiding by the results of the election, 
the Attorney General’s embrace of the President’s groundless 
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electoral fraud claims, and the unprecedented deployment of 
federal agents to put down leftwing protests, underscore the 
extreme lengths to which President Trump may be willing to go in 
order to stay in office.” (Transition Integrity Project, 2020) 
 
Almost immediately upon its release, the media gave the report 
extensive coverage. One of its authors, notably Rosa Brooks, spent 
the better part of late summer of 2020 discussing her fears of a 
Rogue Trump losing the 2020 election by a narrow margin and how 
he might attempt to cling to power. Although carefully crafted as 
a “bipartisan” group of experts, in reality, the project members and 
its war-game participants were either democrats, former Bush and 
Obama Administration officials, or, as the term goes, “Never Trump” 
republicans. (Gerber, 2020) Former George W. Bush Press Secretary 
Ari Fleisher was even more concerned about the Transition Integrity 
Project’s dangerous narrative. 
“It strikes me in the era of Trump to be one of the most 
irresponsible statements I’ve ever heard,” said Fleischer, who was 
not part of the war games. “I’m perfectly willing, and I do so often, 
to criticize Donald Trump, but this is pernicious. This is beyond the 
call. You talk about being divisive. “He called the suggestion that 
Trump might not accept election results “dangerous.” “Where’s the 
evidence that this is what Trump is going to do according to his 
accusers? If the results are clear, the results are clear,” Fleischer 
said. (Garrison, 2020) 
In the age of social media, it has never been clearer that 
communication is not analogous with or necessarily intended to 
present facts or truth. Remember, as Bernays wrote, “We are 
governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, and our ideas 
suggested, largely by men we have never heard of…. It is they who 
pull the wires that control the public mind” (Bernays, 1928) Social 
Media has become the wires used in that process. It is hard to 
separate truth from fiction online, not to mention whether the 
content posted emanated from a person, a nation, an organization, 
or a machine. Suppose the public is unable to self-authenticate the 
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legitimacy and credibility of the author of online content. In that 
case, it’s undoubtedly going to be a challenge to verify the content 
they post as accurate or factual. A 2018 editorial on the Investor’s 
Business Daily website distilled the issue in a fashion that leads 
back to the only way to determine truth and accuracy is doing it 
ourselves. 
“As the Weekly Standard’s Mark Hemingway explained: “It’s 
basically a way for a bunch of reporters with no particular expertise 
to render pseudoscientific judgments on statements from public 
figures that are obviously argumentative or otherwise unverifiable. 
Then there’s the matter of them weighing in with thundering 
certitude — pants on fire! — on complex policy debates they 
frequently misunderstand.” In the end, the best way to judge the 
veracity of claims being tossed around is to become better informed 
about the issues, not contract out that job to people who aren’t 
necessarily qualified to do for you.” (Investors Business Daily, 2018) 
According to Paul Horner, an individual who enriched himself 
during the 2016 presidential election, Hemingway is correct. We 
have identified the fake news enemy, and it is us! In an interview 
with the Washington Post in November 2017, Horner blamed the 
reader’s laziness and bias for the proliferation of “fake news.” 
Essentially he accurately believes if someone tells you are right, you 
are much less likely to fact check them than someone who criticized 
you. 
“Honestly, people are definitely dumber. They just keep passing 
stuff around. Nobody fact-checks anything anymore — I mean, that’s 
how Trump got elected. He just said whatever he wanted, and 
people believed everything, and when the things he said turned out 
not to be true, people didn’t care because they’d already accepted it. 
It’s real scary. I’ve never seen anything like it. (Dewey, 2016) 
 
In this environment, it is easier to conduct information warfare 
using social media (which is now often picked up and repeated by 
broadcast and print media) to further a narrative throughout society 
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rapidly and at scale. People read it, like the content, believe it, and 
often spread it. 
MARGINALIZE THE MESSAGE – TOXIFICATION OF THE 
CONSUMER 
In October of 2020, the University of California, Berkeley, through 
its Othering & Belonging Institute, published an online book entitled 
“Trumpism and its Discontents,” a compilation of content by various 
authors who drill home the same theme. The forward, written by 
Professor John A Powell, Director of the Othering & Belonging 
Institute, contained the following statement: “If the rise of Donald 
Trump is not grappled with critically, we will not release ourselves 
from the social corrosion we are all acutely experiencing. The work 
will be difficult—for many reasons, the least of which is not that it 
demands a look inward. We must reconsider who we are and who 
we think we are and think more carefully about how we have tried 
to answer those questions through the creation and exploitation of 
other beings instead of by searching for ourselves in relationship 
with those believed to be the “other.” If we are to together forge a 
society in which a Trump phenomenon would not be possible, the 
conversation must be contextualized on these terms.” (Obasogie, 
Osagie K, 2020) 
 
The marginalization can be seen in hundreds of examples of literal 
claims of toxicity of Trump and his followers in the media here are a 
few: 
“NBC Boss: Trump Is Toxic, “Demented” April 13, 2017 Daily Beast 
(Daily Beast, 2017) 
Figure 9.9 Trump Is Toxic – Demented (April 13, 2017 Courtesy 
Daily Beast) 
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LET THE BATTLE BEGIN 
Caveat: Though this chapter mainly focuses on Twitter because 
they have, in the author’s opinion, been the most aggressive in 
taking remedial action for what it deems disinformation, violence, 
or other content of concern to it, it does not mean that it has taken 
steps other social media platforms have not. Facebook, Google, and 
YouTube streaming services, and many others have also engaged 
in and been subject to both praise and criticism for censoring, 
warning, or otherwise protecting what they feel is a public interest 
when it comes to content posted on their platforms. 
After a tumultuous four years of the Trump presidency, the plan 
was now clearly crystallizing, given the breadth of the president’s 
popularity, and following on social media. Leverage his following 
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through a three-step process could be successfully implemented to 
defeat his reelection. In 2019, Park Advisors prepared a report for 
the United States Department of State, entitled “Weapons of Mass 
Distraction: Foreign State-Sponsored Disinformation in the Digital 
Age.” 
 
Figure 9.10- Social Media Weaponization (Courtesy Daily 
Times.PK) 
 
Although the report’s focus was on the use of social media 
disinformation by Foreign States or their proxies, in reality, it laid 
out the roadmap of how to use the popularity of social media against 
one of its biggest stars to effectively silence his message. 
Spreading false narratives on social media relies on three main 
premises: 
1. The medium – the platforms on which disinformation 
flourishes; 
 
2. The message – what is being conveyed through 
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disinformation; and 
 





            Recall the events of November 2, 2017, when fate struck 
and a Twitter worker in his last hour of work gets an abuse report 
for a tweet from the president and disables his Twitter account for 
11 minutes. Is a simulated attack replete with penetration testing? 
Was it even possible to judge reactions to the occurrence to predict 
actual long-term censorship or disabling of President Trump’s 
Twitter account? Perhaps.   Other operations directed at the 
Presidents access to social media were ongoing since before his 
inauguration in 2017. On January 22, 2017, shortly after Trumps 
inauguration an individual by the name of Yoel Roth Tweeted as 
follows: 




While accusing the President of the United States of being a Nazi 
is distasteful for the office, it becomes especially problematic when 
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the person tweeting happens to be a part of the same Trust and 
Safety Team as Bahtiyar Duysak. They “mistakenly” deactivated the 
President’s Twitter account in November of 2017. In fact, during 
the 2020 election, Roth was the Head of Site Integrity at Twitter. 
(LinkedIn, 2020) 
In May of 2020, Twitter escalated its battle against what it called 
disinformation when for the first time, it placed a warning message 
on the President’s tweet regarding the issue of fraud and mail-in 
election ballots. 
 
Figure 9.12 Trump Tweet, May 26, 2020 (Courtesy Twitter 
@realdonaldtrump) 
 
Three days later, Twitter took a more aggressive stance when it 
hit a tweet from President Trump behind a warning. Twitter took 
this unprecedented action because it claimed: 
“This tweet violates our policies regarding the glorification of 
violence based on the historical context of the last line, its 
connection to violence, and the risk it could inspire similar actions 
today. 
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“We’ve taken action in the interest of preventing others from 
being inspired to commit violent acts but have kept the tweet on 
Twitter because it is important that the public still be able to see the 
tweet given its relevance to ongoing matters of public importance.” 
(TwitterComms, 2020) 




Perhaps the most telling salvo of the censorship war being waged 
by online and traditional media against the Trump campaign 
occurred on October 14, 2020, a mere three weeks before the 
Presidential election. According to the New York Post, it obtained 
a laptop believed to be owned by and dropped off for repair at 
a Delaware computer repair shop by Hunter Biden, son of then-
candidate Joe Biden. Upon examining the computer, the repairmen 
found what he felt were critical national security emails. He sent the 
laptop to the FBI after being unclaimed for many months and being 
treated as abandoned. Not hearing back from the FBI and knowing 
the contents of the computer were of critical national interest to 
the nation in light of ties between Hunter Biden and the Ukrainian, 
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Russian and Chinese governments and businesses, the repairmen 
provided a copy of the hard drive he had made to presidential 
attorney Rudolph Giuliani.[2] 
Giuliani and the Trump campaign then provided the hard drive 
image to the New York Post for confirmation and reporting. When 
the New York Post reported the story, it was big news. Almost 
immediately, the Posts’ Twitter account was banned, and Facebook, 
Twitter, and YouTube restricted sharing of the story, and broadcast 
media largely ignored the story. 
 
Figure 9.14 New York Post October 14, 2020 (Courtesy NY Post) 
 
Almost immediately, the Trump campaign and many print and 
online media outlets protested this unprecedented act of 
censorship, and Jack Dorsey, Twitter’s CEO, had to eat crow and 
admit that Twitter’s “actions” surrounding the New York Post article 
“were not great.” (Twitter, @jack Twitter, 2020) 
 
Figure 9.16 Twitter Apology New York Post October 14, 2020 
(Courtesy Twitter) 
410  |  Social Media - The Next Battlefield in Information Warfare [Lonstein]
Censorship was not the only weapon in the Information Warfare 
campaign during election 2020. In 2020 the term “disinformation” 
became widely used to suggest social media or online content 
contained much falsehood which, relates to many claims regarding 
the 2016 Presidential Election. See;  Russia’s Pillars of 
Disinformation and Propaganda Report.. (United States Department 
of State, 2020) Case in point, in the early summer of 2020, the 
Biden-Harris team launched an online pressure campaign targeting 
Facebook claiming, 
 
“Facebook…. It continues to allow Donald Trump to say anything 
— and to pay to ensure that his wild claims reach millions of voters. 
SuperPAC’s and other dark money groups are following his example. 
Trump and his allies have used Facebook to spread fear and 
misleading information about voting, attempting to compromise the 
means of holding power to account: our voices and our ballot boxes.” 
(Biden for President, 2020) 
 
This tactic relied upon classifying the message and the messenger 
to drive a narrative to the masses that Trump’s social media 
statement was, in fact, disinformation. This tactic’s objective was 
to create an assumption that all Trump posting was disinformation 
and, therefore, untrustworthy. After the election in January 2021, 
citing a violent protest at the United States Capitol, both Facebook 
and Twitter permanently banned the social media accounts of 
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Donald Trump. Mission accomplished. . (Twitter, 2021) (Zuckerberg, 
2021) 
HOW WILL LAW, POLICY AND MARKETS REACT? 
            As of January 1, 2021, Joseph Biden has been declared the 
2020 US Presidential election winner. Unfortunately, the issues we 
have examined in this chapter have led many Trump supporters to 
believe that big technology companies, broadcast, print, and social 
media placed a hand on the scales of fairness. Trump and his 
supporters claim that electronic voting technology, mail-in ballots, 
and early voting created a “perfect storm” of election fraud. 
They also claim sizeable financial assistance from social media 
companies and their executives negatively impacted his campaign 
in six “battleground” states where the margins of victory were very 
tight. To date, none of these claims have been proven in or accepted 
by a Court of Law. (Sheck, 2020) 
 
 
Many on both sides of the aisle suggest that social media 
companies enjoy unwarranted protection from liability for their 
actions under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. 
(Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, 2020) While reform 
of this law may bring some relief to those who claim injury caused 
by social media company activity, it certainly is under pitched 
debate in Congress. Still, it would fail to address social media 
companies outside the United States. 
Others say there needs to be legislation enacted which affords 
individual and companies the same protections afforded them 
under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
(United States Courts, 2020). By analogy, this type of oversight finds 
justification under the same theories which allow Public utility 
regulation. In 2018 Professor Anjana Susarla of Michigan State 
University was quoted as saying: 
“It is both an open platform for free expression of diverse 
viewpoints and a public utility on which huge numbers of people 
— and democracy itself — rely for accurate information……….. It’s 
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true that overregulation does run the risk of censorship and limiting 
free expression. But the dangers of too little regulation are already 
clear, in the toxic hate, fake news and intentionally misleading 
propaganda proliferating online and poisoning democracy. In my 
view, taking no action is no longer an option.” (Susarla, 2018) 
 
Recently a Justice Minister in Poland introduced legislation that 
would impose hefty fines on social media companies who 
wrongfully censor legal speech, (PolandIn, 2020) and Senator Mike 
Lee of Utah introduced the PROMISE ACT (Promoting Responsibility 
Over Moderation In the Social Media Environment Act). (Davidson, 
2020) While each of these regulatory adjustments may hold 
promise, in reality, in the heat of a campaign or while running a 
private business, being censored by social media can be disastrous, 
and merely waiting for new legislation or filing lawsuits may not 
prevent irreparable harm. 
The new reality is that social media censorship, primarily based 
upon opaque policies of conduct and arbitrary enforcement 
standards, amounts to the equivalent of a Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS) attack. 
The internet company Cloudflare defines a DDoS attack as: 
“A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack is a malicious 
attempt to disrupt the normal traffic of a targeted server, service 
or network by overwhelming the target or its surrounding 
infrastructure with a flood of Internet traffic. DDoS attacks achieve 
effectiveness by utilizing multiple compromised computer systems 
as sources of attack traffic. Exploited machines can include 
computers and other networked resources such as IoT devices. 
From a high level, a DDoS attack is like an unexpected traffic jam 
clogging up the highway, preventing regular traffic from arriving at 
its destination.” (Cloudflare, Inc., 2020) 
 
When it comes to social media and its 4 billion users, simply 
censoring information or de-platforming individual posters or users 
can have the same effect as a DDoS attack. When conducted 
Social Media - The Next Battlefield in Information Warfare [Lonstein]  |  413
independently or in coordination with the most significant social 
media networks, it creates de facto censorship of dissenting voices. 
Internet libertarian and free speech advocate John Gilmore once 
wrote, “The Internet interprets censorship as damage and routes 
around it.” In 2020 Brian Krebs, a noted cybersecurity expert, found 
his website taken offline when a massive DDoS attacked targeted 
his domain. His internet service provider informed him that the 
attack compromised their systems and customers, and therefore 
the website must remove its network. Krebs described the situation 
this way: 
 
“Censorship can in fact route around the Internet.” The Internet 
can’t route around censorship when the censorship is all-pervasive 
and armed with, for all practical purposes, near-infinite reach, and 
capacity. I call this rather unwelcome and hostile development the 
“The 
Democratization of Censorship.” 
Figure 9.15 the Democratization of Censorship (Courtesy Brian 
Krebs) 
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            What Krebs described in 2016 was eerily similar to what 
occurred to the Trump reelection campaign in 2020. The difference 
was that censorship and de-platforming were at the request of an 
internet service provider or Content Distribution Network (CDN); 
it was being waged actively and passively by social, broadcast, and 
print media companies. 
As you can see, there are many potential risks to using social 
media to conduct a political campaign, run a business, and conduct 
government operations. We now turn to countermeasures, risk 
mitigation, and related strategies to address this growing challenge 
to many people and entities maintaining an online or social media 
presence. 
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COUNTER-CENSORSHIP- SOCIAL MEDIA RESILIENCY 
STRATAGIES AND TECHNOLOGY           
P.A.C.E., what is it and why does it matter? 
PACE communications planning is a military-inspired concept 
designed to ensure a robust ability to effectively communicate 
during times when the unexpected happens so that panic, fear, 
and confusion do not compromise an organization’s operational 
readiness.  According to the Puget Sound Healthcare Emergency 
Communications Systems; 
“Developing comprehensive PACE plans will not ensure perfect 
communications in a disaster but helps to clear some of the fog 
and friction found in every emergency situation. Developing 
comprehensive PACE plans will not ensure perfect communications 
in a disaster but helps to clear some of the fog and friction found 
in every emergency situation.” (Puget Sound Healthcare 
Communications Systems, 2018) citing (Ryan, 2013) 
• Primary: The main form of communication. 
• Alternate: If the primary fails, this is your secondary form of 
communication 
• Contingency: Tertiary method of communication 
• Emergency: If all else fails, this is the worst-case option. (Fire 
Watch Solutions, 2018) 
The implications of a loss of communications are widely known, 
whether it be a military operation where command and control are 
lost, and aircraft are losing radio contact with ground controllers 
and other aircraft, or merely finding your internet service down. 
The first two are potentially fatal, the third a nuisance, but all three 
demonstrate without communication, it is challenging to function 
effectively in a data-driven world. 
Figure 9.17 PACE Planning (Courtesy Chris Littlestone, Life is a 
Special Operation) 
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Cyberspace makes the challenge of communication protection 
even more difficult. To have a practical strategy, students must 
consider some of the lessons learned in primary information 
security education, particularly the CIA Triangle. The CIA Triangle, 
in its traditional form, has three legs, Integrity, Availability & 
Confidentiality. 
Figure 9.18 CIA Triangle (Courtesy Infrosecuritybuzz.com) 
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Students will undoubtedly face challenges relating to the 
successes and failures of the 2020 Presidential election for years 
to come. As we have seen in the earlier parts of the chapter, it 
is relatively easy to weaponize social media in multiple ways and 
different combinations depending upon the objective. 
 
Figure 9.19 Social Media RACC Threat Matrix (Courtesy VFT 
Solutions, Inc.) 
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Removal from a social media platform can have a devastatingly 
significant effect upon a campaign, a business, or an operation that 
leverages one platform far over the others. The result can be an 
imbalance where the removal from the platform of choice, in 2020 
for President Trump it was Twitter can result in multiple hardships 
from merely communicating with supporters to redirect them to 
alternative media in time to avoid significant disruption and 
confusion.          
Toxification is a method to make all content posted online by a 
source to be suspicious and assumed to be untrue. The tactic can 
be more effective and less noticeable to the audience than outright 
censorship or removal from a platform because it is very passive and 
operates like a subliminal message. As the Nazi Propaganda Minister 
Joseph Goebbels is reputed to have said; 
 
“If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will 
eventually come to believe it. The lie can be maintained only for 
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such time as the State can shield the people from the political, 
economic and/or military consequences of the lie. It thus becomes 
vitally important for the State to use all of its powers to repress 
dissent, for the truth is the mortal enemy of the lie, and thus by 
extension, the truth is the greatest enemy of the State.” (Holocaust 
Education & Archive Research Team, 2010) 
 
On the other hand, disinformation posted online can have equally 
significant value since it can create damaging narratives that are 
difficult if not impossible to recover. A perfect example of this would 
be the 2017 “Dossier,” which allegedly detailed collusion between 
Russia and the 2016 Trump campaign. This narrative persisted 
through the entire first four years of the Trump presidency and 
though proven demonstrable false, still is used as a useful tool to 
fuel false narratives.[5] 
Censorship on social media is a complex issue. The platforms 
claim to be the sole judges of the content posted on their media 
since they are private businesses. Usually, the platform will tailor its 
Terms of Service to allow for them to decide what can and what 
cannot be posted and to change the rules without notice. As we 
discussed earlier, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 
at least in the United States, allows them to do so with impunity. 
Collusion, either overtly or de facto, has proven to be a 
devastatingly effective tool. When one social media platform uses its 
“Fact Checkers” to support content censorship, the adage strength 
in numbers applies. While there are many unknowns about Election 
2020, for now the following Social Media Information Warfare Cycle 
(Figure 9.20) appears accurate. 
Figure 9.20 Social Media Information Warfare Lifecycle 
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Suffice it to say that the challenges presented by social media are 
varied and will likely impact most student’s careers in one way or 
another. There are no definitive answers; however, to help address 
the challenge, the following steps may serve as Best Practices to 
minimize, if not secure online operations from social media risks 
mentioned above with impunity 
• Rapidly identify trending content that may be relevant to a 
particular stakeholder’s interest. Understand that push 
notifications can make posts go viral in seconds, and live social 
media streams to go from one to over one million viewers in a 
minute. As Churchill once said, “There are a terrible lot of lies 
going about the world, and the worst of it is that half of them 
are true.” (British Broadcasting Company, 2015) 
• Develop overlapping, multiple social media accounts on as 
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many platforms as possible. When it comes to social media live 
streaming, this task has become much simpler with stream 
casting technology. A single live or recorded stream can be 
simultaneously broadcast on multiple platforms, decentralizing 
a portion of RACC risk. Some technologies which can easily 
support this function include restream.io, Camera Fi, and 
melonapp, to name a few. See Figure 9.21. 
 
Figure 9.21 (Courtesy restream.io) 
 
• Standalone mirror platform. A standalone mirror platform is 
simply a proprietary asset owned by the stakeholder, which 
has all the features of a traditional social media platform. The 
difference is that content is curated, controlled, and owned by 
the stakeholder. Inexpensive live streaming and video on 
demand technology are now extremely affordable and 
straightforward to rapidly integrate into a website. This 
standalone should have a URL listed in the description of all 
social media accounts operated by the stakeholder as well as 
be reachable through SMS “text to” technology (i.e., Text 
CENSOR to 555221) 
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• Employ live message insertion technology. Live message 
insertion technology is a patented process whereby all social 
media is scraped in real-time using various search and 
recognition technologies to identify relevant content. After 
that, an automated or manual message is inserted on multiple 
social media streams simultaneously. This process redirects 
viewers away from disinformation to legitimate and accurate 
content. And they were coupled with a reverse distribution; 
this countermeasure can be deployed in a remote, distributed 
fashion globally, override and compete with other individuals, 
or collective censorship attacks. See Figure 9.22. 
 
 









            Technology changes at a rapid pace; social media 
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technology seems to change at the speed of light. This chapter’s 
content exposes students to a brief overview of the scope and 
breadth of how social media has changed and disrupted our lives. 
What may true today may be outdated or incorrect one hour from 
now; the key is for students to understand the rapidly shifting 
landscape and how such shift can impact personal inconvenience 
or benefit to global change or conflict. Technologists, security 
specialists, and other professionals would do well to stay abreast of 
this emergent technology, currently in individual use by over one-
half of the world population. 
QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER 
1. You are the global marketing president for Tesla Automobiles. 
As a popular automobile brand in the age of technology, green 
energy, and social awareness you learn the companies 
Chairman Elon Musk has made a politically unpopular 
statement regarding his fondness for eating foie gras. In 
response PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) 
calls for a boycott of all Tesla products as well as a delisting 
and censorship of all content and advertisements on social 
media. What steps would you take in order to mitigate risk to 
your global business, respond to the story, maintain social 
media contact with your loyal customer base? What steps 
would you take to protect if other nations who were pro-duck 
decided to block all social media companies doing business in 
their nation which allowed pro foie gras content to be posted? 
 
2. As part of your position as social media director of the local 
mayoral campaign, you are told to present a plan to create 
social media messaging to make your candidate look as if he 
supports gun control while painting the opponent as a 
supporter of full concealed carry weapons rights in public 
places including schools. How would you address the 
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opponent’s ten thousand social media followers? Would you 
post on his social media platforms? How would you fact check 
the information you intended to post? Would you post content 
that could not be 100% verified as accurate? What contingency 
plans would you create in case as a result of your postings, 
your candidate was de-platformed across social media? 
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10. Bioterrorism and 
Advanced Sensors [Sincavage 
& Carter] 
“History has shown us repeatedly, in terms of both human suffering 
and economic loss, that the costs of preparedness through vigilance 
are far lower than those needed to respond to unanticipated public 
health crises.” ~ RL Berkelman, RT Bryan, MT Osterholm, JW 
LeDuc, JM Hughes 
 
Student Learning Objectives – What Questions Will Be 
Answered 
1) How have pathogens shaped our history and will determine our 
future? 
2) What / why are biological weapons (BW) used by terrorists? 
3) What general taxonomy of BW is used by LEO / DHS in the 
field? 
4) What is the current bioterrorism defense for the U.S. 
homeland? 
5) What could be the long-term implications of compromised 
DNA data? 
6) How can nanotechnology impact the global BW threat 
landscape? 
 
BIOLOGICAL TERRORIST AGENTS (BTA) 
Biological terrorist agents (BTA) which are prima facia for 
development of biological weapons (BW) include any 
microorganism or toxin found in nature or derived from living 
organisms to produce death or disease in humans, animals, or 
plants. (Burke, 2017) (DrPH & Shiel, 2020). They are odorless, 
tasteless, and colorless if released in a biological cloud by terrorists. 
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All biological agents ( BA) have an incubation period, which will allow 
the terrorist time to escape before onset of symptoms. Anthrax, 
plague, and other BA are readily available in biological supply houses 
around the world outside the US. (Burke, 2017) There are good and 
bad bacteria naturally present in the environment and living 
organisms. The bad bacteria are referred to as pathogens because 
they cause death to a living organism. Disease-causing 
microorganisms (pathogens) are classified as 6.2 infectious 
substances under the U.N,. / DOT hazard class system.[1]  Toxins 
that are chemical poisons produced by microorganisms or plants 
are classified under the U.N. /DOT hazard class system 6.1 poisons. 
[See end note & reference (Evers & T.J. Glover, 2010)] There are 
other systems of classifications for specific audiences, ex LEO. [2] 
 
The biological threat agent can be introduced in the environment 
via asymmetric war or terrorist attacks. The threat of advanced 
biological warfare agents will continue to present challenges to 
developing effective strategies for defense and  countermeasures 
(vaccines, medicine, etc.) to combat the next level in 21st-century 
warfare. For those in the business of BW defense a solid reference 
for counterterrorism is by Burke. (Burke, 2017) 
 
Biological Weapons – A Historical Primer 
During medieval times, bodies diseased with plague were 
catapulted over walls protecting enemy forts and castles. Once 
inside, the disease would spread throughout the enclosed walls. 
Diseased bodies were also placed upstream from compounds, and 
the residents would drink the water full of deadly microorganisms. 
In the American Civil War confederate troops placed corpses of 
livestock into ponds and lakes, contaminating the water supply, 
which delayed the advance of Union troops. (Burke, 2017) 
 
During World War I, Germany used biological weapons on animals 
to impact Romania, Spain, Norway, the United States, and Argentina 
(Wheelis, 1998). The German biological weapons  program produced 
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bacterial and pathogen bioweapons of Anthrax, glanders, and 
cholera. 
France followed Germany with the development of its own 
bioweapons program in 1921, weaponizing the potato beetle. 
 
In 1928, The Soviet Union had one of the most powerful 
bioweapons programs during the cold war. They created the next 
level of weapon using genetically modified agents (Tucker, 1998). 
The U.S.S.R. created antibiotic-resistant strains for gland, anthrax, 
plague, and tularemia. There are three categories of Soviet 
bioweapons strategic, operational, strategic-operational.  The 
Soviets decided to develop biological weapons because their 
research showed them to be more efficient than toxic weapons. 
Biological weapons in massive amounts can create very high 
concentrations over a vast area. It is believed between 1988 and 1989; 
all Soviet bioweapons were destroyed on Vozrozhdeniye Island by 
Colonel Shcherbakov (Tucker, 1998). 
 
Japan was the only country to use biological weapons during 
World War II. The Japanese program began in 1933, testing 
biological warfare out on women (pregnant or not) and men, 
ranging from any age, from their population of prisoners, 
handicapped, and homeless. The Japanese lab, Manchuria 
Detachment “Unit 731”, tested many agents (ex: plague, anthrax, 
gonorrhea, syphilis) on prisoners of war. Prisoners were exposed 
aerosolized anthrax and died. Their bodies were dissected to 
determine the effects of anthrax.  Reports indicate that as many as 
3,000 prisoners might have died in BW research. It is also believed 
that the Japanese used BTA on Chinese soldiers and civilians in 
WWII. Bubonic plague, cholera, anthrax, and other diseases were 
released, killing tens of thousands of Chinese. (Burke, 2017) By the 
end of WWI, the Japanese had stockpiled 400 kilograms of anthrax 
to be used in specifically designed fragmentation bombs. (Burke, 
2017) 
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From World War I, the United States began research and 
development of biological weapons. The official start of the U.S. 
biological weapons program was authorized in 1943 by President 
Roosevelt. During World War II, the United States had an advanced 
bioweapons program that included both offensive and defensive 
components. During that time, The United States could mass-
produce pathogens such as anthrax and test spreading the bacteria 
in the form of a cluster bomb or anti-crop agent. Pathogens were 
weaponized at Fort Detrick in Maryland, then transported to the 
dugway proving grounds in Utah we’re open-air testing of the 
biological weapons took place (Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), 2015). 
After World War II, the United States expanded its biological 
warfare research based on information learned from Japan’s units 
731 (Imperial Japanese Army’s covert biological and chemical 
warfare research and development unit). However, the early U.S. BW 
program was created because of the anticipated German biological 
warfare threat rather than the Japanese. (Burke, 2017) The medical 
defensive BTA program in the U.S. continues today as the U.S. Army 
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). 
(Burke, 2017) 
 
During the Korean War, the United States was accused of using 
bioweapons, but it was proven to the World Peace Council; the 
allegations were Chinese government propaganda. Accusations 
followed in 1962 by the Cuban government. It was believed the 
United States used bioweapons against poultry and tobacco 
industries in Cuba. Cuba could not prove the allegations. In 1969 
President Nixon abolished all U.S. offensive biological weapon 
capabilities but retained the BTA defensive program. (watchdog 
-USAMRIID) 
 
After World War II, Disarmament Discussions began to be 
addressed in the United Nations. This included biological and 
chemical weapons. In 1968 the nuclear nonproliferation treaty was 
put into place. This Treaty’s focus was mainly on chemical weapons 
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and did not address the core of the biological weapons race. After 
negotiations by the U.S. and USSR,  the biological weapons 
convention was written in 1971. It was formally signed in 1972. At 
the signing event, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs, David Ennals, stated, “The Biological Weapons Convention 
is significant as the first measure, reached since the Second World 
War, involving the destruction of existing weapons. Biological 
warfare was potentially the most frightening method of armed 
conflict. Today, over 40 states are parties to this Convention and 
have both renounced this entire class of weapons and undertaken to 
prevent their future development by appropriate national measures. 
All governments for whom this Treaty formally enters into force 
today should gain satisfaction from having taken a step which will 
reduce the possibility of biological weapons being used in some 
future conflict.” (United Nations, 2021). 
 
During the mid-1990’s, the Aum Shinri Kyo Cult terrorist 
organization in Japan dispersed aerosols of anthrax and botulism 
throughout Tokyo on at least eight occasions. The attacks failed. 
John Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense studies found that 
given the right weather and wind conditions, about 110 pounds 
of anthrax released from an aircraft could spread nearly 12 miles 
downwind. The cloud would be colorless, odorless, and invisible. 
No warning systems would be activated until patients showed up 
in hospitals. (Burke, 2017) [3] During the fall of 2001, Biological 
terrorism struck U.S. letters postmarked Trenton, NJ, to various 
news organizations and political figures. The most potent of the 
letters went to the Senate with a highly refined dry powder 
consisting of 1 gram of nearly pure anthrax spores. Twenty-two 
people developed anthrax infections. Five Died. [4] (Burke, 2017) 
 
First Bioterrorism Attack in the United States 
 
The 1984, the Rajneeshee bioterror attack that impacted the 
Pacific Northwest of the U.S. The Rajneesh cult (Osho followers) 
Bioterrorism and Advanced Sensors [Sincavage & Carter]  |  437
conducted the first documented bioterror incident in the U.S. (CDC 
Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2003). The cult had been planned to 
influence the county election results by infecting residents with 
salmonella on election day. They first started to test their attack by 
contaminating salad bars at ten restaurants with S. Typhimurium 
(typhoid fever) on different occasions before Election Day (CDC 
Emerging Infectious Diseases, 2003). It came to light the cult was 
to blame when Osho fled the commune and voiced his concern 
about the leader Anand Sheela’s fascist beliefs. The FBI found a 
bioterrorism lab containing salmonella cultures and documentation 




On June 22nd and 23rd, 2001, the Johns Hopkins Center for civil 
biodefense strategies collaborated with other institutional 
institutions in a bioterrorism exercise, Dark Winter. The event 
simulated pandemic smallpox, focusing on the challenge’s 
policymakers would face if confronted with a bioterrorist attack. 
Dark winter was intended to bring awareness to the threat posed 
by biological weapons among senior national security experts (Tara 
O’Toole, April 2002). Dark winner simulated attacks involving 
smallpox on shopping malls in three different states resulting in 
3000 people becoming infected (Foley, 2017). The exercise resulted 
in: 
• 16,000 smallpox cases reported in 25 states 
• 1000 people had died 
• The health care system could not meet the patient load 
• Ten countries reported smallpox outbreaks, and Canada and 
Mexico had closed their borders (Foley, 2017). 
• The vaccine stockpiles for smallpox ran out with a month’s wait 
to replenish. 
• Food supplies we’re running low 
• Countries put travel restrictions in place the economy was 
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weak. 
What were the lessons learned from Dark Winter? Why was a similar 
simulation running again in the U.S.? Remember after September 11, 
2001, eyes turned to the United States and the use of biodefense. 
Shortly after 9/11, the United States encountered an anthrax attack 
against government officials  (described supra). Since the tragic 
historical event, the FBI create a specialized branch to focus on 
chemical, biological radiological, nuclear, and explosives. (Figure 
10.1) Later in 2006, it became the Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Directorate (WMDD). The branch links intelligence scientific and 
operational components to detect and disrupt the acquisition of 
WMDD against America. 
 
Between 2014 in 2016, the lessons of dark winter were not applied, 
and the nation faced the Ebola crisis.  When the outbreak began 
in West Africa, the world watched as it spread quickly through 
West African countries. 10,000 people were  infected with the Ebola 
virus, and more than half of that number died. It became a United 
States national security top priority, sending troops to assist with 
the $400 million humanitarian effort. When the virus reached The 
U.S. borders, it was not met with any sort of barrier requirements. 
The personal protective equipment could not protect against the 
pathogen, causing patients to be isolated. Quick reaction by the 
government and the medical community The United States suffered 
only 11 cases, which resulted in two deaths and nine survivors. 
Following the Ebola crisis, the House of Representative’s 
subcommittees examined pandemic /biological terrorist attack 
preparedness. U.S. presidential Directive (PPD)-39 outlined the 
responsibilities of five federal agencies regarding WMD exercises 
(Foley, 2017). The directive had assigned specific tasks to each of the 
five agencies. It did not provide a plan for a coordinated response to 
a biological attack 
Also, PDD-39 was at the federal funding level and did not account 
for the states (Foley, 2017). From 2004 leading up to the Ebola crisis, 
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the U.S. government spent over $78.8 billion in biodefense.  When 
examining the expenditures further, the majority was spent on 
multi-hazard programs, and only 17% went towards true biodefense 
(Foley, 2017). Biodefense continues to struggle through the budget 
from year to year. For example, the 2014 budget was $47.7 million 
less than the 2013 budget (Foley, 2017). Since 2017 several of the 
programs under the Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate 
(WMDD) were eliminated or reassigned to another division. The 
red team who conducted drills and assessments to help federal 
and local officials detect threats were eliminated. A part of the 
homeland unit that performs its exercises related to Weapons of 
Mass Destruction at all levels was reduced. And international 
cooperation division that worked with foreign counterparts and the 
United Nations nuclear watchdog agency was disbanded. The goal 
of this partnership was to stop and track the smuggling of nuclear 
materials. There was a cut in funding to mobile units that protected 
large public events by detecting biological threats. 
 
Figure 10.1 FBI WMD Investigation (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2021) 
 
The U.S. is one of the largest contributors to the G8 global 
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partnership against the spread of weapons and materials and mass 
destruction. This partnership with 29 other countries is critical 
in preventing the illegal trafficking of weapons mass destruction 
materials, dismantle and decommission nuclear submarines, and 
improve biosecurity. In 2004, the U.S. was a cosponsor for the 
United Nations Security Council resolution 1540. The resolution, “to 
prevent states from supporting non-state actors and development 
of weapons of mass destruction including biological weapons” 
(Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), 2015). In the United States, 
biological weapons programs are created, restructured, expand, and 
disbanded at the hands of different government administrations. 
In October 2019, a House Homeland Security Committee 
subcommittee held a hearing entitled “Defending the Homeland 
from Bioterrorism: Are We Prepared?” The answer was a resounding 
no (Rutschman, 2019). 
 
PATHOGENS 
There are several types of BTA (pathogens) used for biological 
weapons. Biological agents can be divided into several related 
groups (See Table 10.1). These include bacteria and rickettsia, 
viruses, and toxins.  Bacterial and viral agents cause disease and 
can multiply and spread beyond the initial attack.[5] Toxins are 
poisonous substances produced by living things, some of which are 
extremely lethal. Toxins are not contagious. Some of the bacteria 
that cause disease include anthrax, plague, cholera, diphtheria, 
tuberculosis, typhoid fever, typhus, Legionnaire’s disease, Lyme 
disease, and strep infections. Other bacteria produce toxins that 
are chemical poisons, such as botulinum. More bacteria exist in a 
handful of soils or in a person’s mouth than all the people who have 
ever lived on earth. When someone sneezes, over a million bacteria 
can be disseminated. Over 90% of all feces is made up of bacteria. 
More bacterial cells than human cells exist in your body. From 
300,000 to 1,000,000 different types of bacteria exist on Earth. The 
majority of common bacteria is not pathogenic nor parasitic. Some 
have mutated and learned to invade other cells and cause disease. 
Bioterrorism and Advanced Sensors [Sincavage & Carter]  |  441
Bacterial organisms have a nucleus, intracellular nonmembrane 
bound organelles ( a specialized cellular part that resembles an 
organ) , and a cell wall. (Burke, 2017) 
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Bacteria and rickettsia are single-celled microscopic organisms 
that can cause disease in plants, animals, and humans. 
Rickettsia are pleomorphic (varying sizes) parasitic 
microorganisms that live in the cells of the intestines of arthropods 
(invertebrates and man,  such as insects, spiders, and crabs, which 
have segmented bodies and jointed limbs. Some are pathogenic to 
man, where they are known to cause  the typhus group of fevers. 
Rickettsia are smaller than bacteria but larger than viruses. Like 
viruses, rickettsia are obligate ( they cannot exist on their own or in 
any other form); they are considered intra-cellular parasites. (Burke, 
2017) 
Viruses are very small submicroscopic organisms, smaller than 
bacteria and unable to live on their own. They must invade the 
host cell and make use of its reproductive mechanism to multiply. 
Many of the biological toxins are much more toxic than any of the 
chemical agents classified as chemical weapons (CW). See Table 
10.2 Lethality of Selected Toxins and Chemical Agents in Laboratory 
Mice (Burke, 2017) 
 
Table 10.2 Lethality of Selected Toxins and Chemical Agents in 
Laboratory Mice (Burke, 2017) 
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Agent LD50 (g/kg) Source 
Botulinum toxin 0.001 Bacterium 
Shiga toxin 0.002 Bacterium 
Tetanus toxin 0.002 Bacterium 
Abrin 0.04 Plant (Rosa Pea) 
Diphtheria toxin 0.10 Bacterium 
Maitotoxin 0.10 Marine Dinoflagellate 
Palytoxin 0.15 Marine soft coral 
Ciguatoxin 0.40 Marine Dinoflagellate 
Texilotoxin 0.60 Elapid snake 
C.perfringes toxins 0.1 to 5.0 Bacterium 
Batrachotoxin 2.0 Arrow-Poison frog 
Ricin 3.0 Plant (Castor beans) 
Alpha-Conotoxin 5.0 Cone snake 
Tiapoxin 5.0 Elapid snake 
Tetrodotoxin 8.0 Puffer fish 
Alpha-Tityustoxin 9.0 Scorpion 
Saxitoxin 10.0 Marine Dinoflagellate 
Inhalation 2.0 
VX 15.0 Chemical agent 
SEB 27.0 Bacterium 
Anatoxin-A 50 Blue-green algae 
Microcystin 50 Blue-green Algae 
Soman (SD) 64 Chemical agent 
Sarin 100 Chemical agent 
Aconitine 100 Plant (Monkshood) 
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Bacteria are single-celled organisms that range in size and shape 
from cocci (spherical cells)  with a diameter of 0.5-1.0 m 
(micrometer) to long rod-shaped organisms – bacilli – which can 
be from 1.5 m in size. Chains of bacilli have been known to exceed 
60 m in size. Some bacteria have the ability to change into spores. 
In this form, the bacteria are more resistant to cold, heat, drying, 
chemicals, and radiation than the bacterial form. When in spore 
form, the bacteria are inactive, or dormant, much like seeds of a 
plant. When conditions are favorable, the spores germinate just like 
seeds. (Burke, 2017) 
Bacteria has two methods by which it can cause disease in 
humans and animals. The first is by attacking the tissues of the host 
living thing. Secondly, all living organisms produce waste. Bacteria 
may produce a toxic or poisonous waste material that causes 
disease in the host. Some bacteria attack by both methods. When 
a terrorist selects a BTA, he wants the organism to survive under 
varied conditions and produce certain desired results from 
dissemination into the population. Genetic engineering may be used 
to create BTA from otherwise harmless bacteria. 
Bacteria can be created to be resistant to known antibiotics, 
extreme weather conditions, or aerosol dissemination losses. 
 
For a BTA to be effective, it must produce a specific effect: illness, 
disability, death, or damage to food chains. It must be produced 
in large amounts, and remain stable while manufactured, during 
storage, when weaponized, and during transportation. It must be 
easy to easy and effective to disperse and remain stable once 
disseminated.  It should have a short reliable gestation period and 
should be persistent. (Burke, 2017) 
Bacillus anthracis is the cause of anthrax, used by Robert Koch in 
1877 to develop a theory of disease (Bruce Budowle, 2020).  DNA is 
used to study bacteria’s evolution, giving the scientist the ability to 
identify different strands of viruses. As of 2018, 412 strains of anthrax 
have been identified, allowing a scientist to understand the bacteria 
for cures or weaponization (Bruce Budowle, 2020). The increase in 
Bioterrorism and Advanced Sensors [Sincavage & Carter]  |  445
DNA study using whole-genome sequencing of data has provided 
great insight into pathogens such as the plague. In 2002 two tourists 
visiting New York became ill with the first case of bubonic plague. 
Scientists were able to determine within a day the couple had been, 
in fact, it by bites from fleas in their backyard in New Mexico. The 
use of DNA leading to the progression of genotyping and analysis 
of a bacterial pathogen increases the chances of determining bio 
crimes. As with the good, there is the bad the advances in DNA study 
also increase the potential of an effective bioweapon. 
 
Anthrax is a good example of a  BTA. Its medical courses is 
instructive. There are three ways to die from anthrax. Most 
commonly the disease appears on the hands and forearms of people 
working with infected animals. Symptoms as a result of cutaneous 
exposure include: 
• Intense itching, followed by carbuncle formation 
• Formation of carbuncles (inflammation of hair follicles and 
surrounding tissue) 
• Swelling at the location of the infection 
• Scabs form over the lesions and turn black as coal[7] 
 
The mortality rate for untreated cutaneous anthrax is 20%. 
Inhalation exposure symptoms are flu-like: 
• Chills and mild fever 
• Malaise 
• Nausea and swelling of the lymph nodes 
• Fatigue 
• Myalgia (muscle pain) 
• Dry cough 
• Feeling of pressure in chest 
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Victims feel better ( known as anthrax eclipse) but in a few days 
the victim will get much worse with major pulmonary involvement. 
Mortality rate is nearly 100%. 
Anthrax can also be ingested. Symptoms resulting from ingestion 
exposure to anthrax include: 
• Abdominal pain 
• Acute inflammation of the intestinal tract 
• Nausea 
• Loss of appetite 
• Vomiting 
• Fever 
• Abdominal pain 
• Vomiting of blood 
• Severe diarrhea 
 
Approximately 25-60 % of those victims will die. 
All the pathogens in Tables 10.1 & 10.2 are medically described in 
detail in (Burke, 2017). Further properties -especially for LEO-  are 
listed in (Evers & T.J. Glover, 2010). 
 
Viruses / Viral Weapons 
Viruses are the simplest type of microorganism and the smallest 
of living things. They are much smaller than bacteria and range in 
size from 0.02 – 1.0 m (1m = 1,000 mm). One drop of blood can 
contain over 6 billion viruses! [8]  Every living entity is composed 
of cells except for viruses. They are inert until they come into 
contact with a living host. The infection point created from a virus 
occurs at the cellular level. Once the virus invades the cell, it can 
kill it. Common examples of viral agents include measles, mumps, 
meningitis, influenza, HIV -AIDS, HBV, HBC, and the common 
cold. (Burke, 2017) 
 
Most likely virus candidates for terrorist agents would include 
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Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE), smallpox,  and the class called 
hemorrhagic fevers. The latter group includes Ebola, Marburg, 
arenaviridae, Lassa fever, Argentine and Bolivia, Congo-Crimean, Rift 
Valley, yellow fever, and dengue. (Burke, 2017) 
Viruses are infectious agents that require a host for propagation, 
a trait that has caused them to excel at finding new hosts (Clare 
E. Rowland, 2016). Whereas many of the weaponized bacteria are 
not as effective in transmission from person to person, viruses are 
the pathogens that generate pandemics (Clare E. Rowland, 2016). 
The CDC has classified multiple viral agents as potential weapons 
of mass destruction or agents for biologic terrorism (Bronze, 2002). 
Viruses are significant; they are quickly produced and spread (i.e., 
Ebola, coronaviruses, smallpox). In 2009, the U.S. government 
launched USAID PREDICT to search for unknown viruses that can 
cross from animals to humans resulting in a pandemic.  The 
PREDICT program identified nearly 1,000 new viruses, including a 
new strain of Ebola; trained roughly 5,000 people worldwide to 
identify new diseases; worked with 31 countries, and improved or 
developed 60 research laboratories (Global Biodefense Staff, 2020). 
In China, PREDICT detected a novel coronavirus clustering with 
the SARS-like coronaviruses in Rhinolophus bats from Guangdong. 
Further characterization of this Beta Coronavirus is underway, 
including sequencing of the spike protein, to determine if it has the 
potential to infect other hosts. USAID PREDICT in 2017 and 2018 
reported on the cross-contamination of coronaviruses among bats, 
camels, and livestock. In 2019, USAID PREDICT had reached the 
end of its ten-year funding and was scheduled to be disbanded in 
March 2020.  On November 21, 2019, Senator Angus S. King wrote 
Mark green, the administrator for the United States Agency for 
International Development, questioning the closure of PREDICT, 
questioning if other agencies would inherit the project’s initiatives, 
and asked if Congress would be consulted before decisions were 
made regarding the reassignment of PREDICT Initiatives. On 
January 30, 2020, Senate representatives, including senator King 
wrote mark green again and wrote Homeland Security requesting 
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updates on the coronavirus and USAID PREDICT response. April 
1, 2020, the USAID PREDICT project was extended by six months. 
On May 7, 2020, the United States Agency for International 
Development announced USAID PREDICT project replacement, 
STOP Spillover. The $100 million replacement project was awarded 
to Tufts University to implement STOP Spillover with a consortium 
of universities worldwide. STOP Spillover is a critical next step in 
the evolution of USAID’s work to understand and address the risks 
posed by zoonotic diseases that can “spillover” – or be transmitted 
(USAID , 2020).  A member of the debunked USAID PREDICT, Kevin 
Olival is a disease ecologist at the EcoHealth Alliance, expressed, 
“…what is needed is detailed knowledge of local ecology, maps of 
species distributions, an understanding of people’s behavioral 
interactions with other species and an awareness of the cultural and 
economic drivers of the animal trade.” 
 
Galveston National Laboratory 
Galveston National Laboratory is one of the most extensive active 
biocontainment facilities on a U.S. academic campus. On March 23, 
2013, GNL reported a vial of the GUANARITO virus missing from 
the secure research lab. Guanarito virus, a rat-borne pathogen that 
can infect humans, could potentially be weaponized as an aerosol 
spray causing hemorrhagic fever. Similar to Ebola, the virus causes 
bleeding under the skin, and internal organs were from body 
orifices like math eyes or ears, a 33% chance of death. The virus is 
typically contracted in South America, specifically Venezuela. GNL 
maintains there was no breach to the facilities and no indication 
that wrongdoing was involved. The lab believes the vial had been 
accidentally dropped on the floor then destroyed in the incinerator, 
but there is no record. 
 
Biological Toxins / Toxic Weapons 
Biological toxins are defined as any toxic substance occurring 
in nature produced by an animal, plants, or microbe (pathogenic 
bacteria) such as bacteria, fungi, flowering plants, insects, fish, 
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reptiles, or mammals. They are classified as poisons under 
U.N./DOT 6.1. Unlike chemical agents such as sarin, cyanide, or 




Table 10.3 Comparison of Chemical Agents and Toxins (Burke, 
2017) 
Toxins Chemical Agents 
Natural Origin Man-made 
Difficult small-scale production Large scale industrial operations 
None volatile Many volatile 
Many are more toxic Less toxic than many toxins 
Not dermally active * Dermally active 
Legitimate medical use No use other than many toxins (except murder) 
Odorless and tasteless Noticeable odor and taste 
Diverse toxic effects Fewer types of effects 
Many are effective immunogens ** Poor immunogens 
Aerosol delivery Mist/droplet/aerosol delivery 
*Exceptions are trichothecene 
mycotoxins, lyngbyatoxin, and some 
blue-green algae.  Cause dermal injury 
to swimmers. 
**The human body recognizes 
them as foreign material and 
makes protective antibodies 
against them 
 
Toxins are unlike chemical agents in that they vary widely in their 
mechanism of action. ( Table 10.4) Length of time from exposure to 
onset of symptoms also varies significantly. In battlefield scenarios, 
preparations can be made for treatments and preventive measures. 
However, in a terrorist threat, preparation is not as easy, because it 
is unknown when or where the terrorist will strike, or which agent 
would be used. (Burke, 2017) 
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Table 10.4 Comparison of Chemical Nerve Agent, Botulinum 
Toxin, and Staphylococcal Enterotoxin B Intoxication following 
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Toxins, produced by living organisms, are materials that can be 
connected to several types of industrial operations and 
bioterrorism.  Unlike the other bioweapons, toxic weapons are not 
contagious. The toxin ricin is a natural byproduct creating Castor oil 
from Castor beans. Castor beans are processed worldwide, resulting 
Bioterrorism and Advanced Sensors [Sincavage & Carter]  |  451
in millions of tons readily available. In 1978 during the Cold War, 
Bulgarian dissident Georgi Markov was assassin by a poke of an 
Umbrella that contained tiny pellet ricin. It was reported during the 
Iran Iraqi war that ricin might have been used.  Ricin has also been 
detected in the mail received at the U.S. Senate office complex in 
2004 
 
In general, governments have found BTA unsatisfactory as 
battlefield weapons because they are difficult to deliver efficiently 
while protecting their own troops and because of treaties and 
conventions signed among participants.  However, they may be 
more attractive to terrorists because they have a potential to cause 
casualties, and to instill fear and panic in a general population. 
(Evers & T.J. Glover, 2010) BTA is definitely a global phenomenon. 
Table 10.5 Biological agents (BTA) as a function of global 
development / use. (Clare E. Rowland, 2016) 
. 
Table 10.5 Biological Threat Agents as a function of global 
development / use (Clare E. Rowland, October 2016) 
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Biological attacks using bacteria or viral agents are likely to 
escape detection for a time period corresponding to the incubation 
period for the disease they cause, anywhere from hours to weeks. 
Toxins typically act much faster. Doctors’ offices and emergency 
rooms are considered most likely to be the “first responders” in case 
of a bacterial or viral attack. (Evers & T.J. Glover, 2010) 
Law enforcement officers (LEOs) are most likely to encounter 
attacks with toxins. They will be at more risk of exposure to 
bacterial or viral agents when investigating suspicious activities or 
where terrorists were observed or caught in the process of 
disseminating the agent. (Evers & T.J. Glover, 2010) 
 
 
Existing U.S. Biodefense – BioWatch 
 
Post 9/11, the United States created the BioWatch program. 
BioWatch is slow and cannot provide comprehensive attribution 
information, which leaves the U.S. population vulnerable to deadly 
biological agents and contributes to the nation’s overall biological 
unpreparedness and vulnerability (Mojidi, 2019). (See Figure 10.2) 
This surveillance system uses more than 600 sensors in over 30 
major cities across the U.S., including throughout city transport 
systems (Mojidi, 2019). The samples are obtained by monitoring 
the air quality via a specialized filter (Mojidi, 2019). The filter is 
tested for pathogens using the Polymerase Chain Reaction, which 
directly identifies pathogenic genes from a list of predetermined 
highly infectious diseases (Mercer, 2016). 
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Figure 10.2 U.S. Biological Surveillance Process (Mojidi, 2019) 
 
It can take from days to weeks before the U.S. government can 
coordinate an effective interagency response to bioterror events 
through the unsecured BioWatch portal. BioWatch program 
reported between 2003 to 2011 having 56 false alarms. Thus, putting 
the credibility of the BioWatch program in question. The U.S. started 
development on a Generation-3 system 
 
Figure 10.3 BioWatch Gen 2 Aerosol Collector (Mercer, 2016) 
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Figure 10.4 BioWatch Gen 2 Aerosol Collector (Mercer, 2016) 
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Biowatch Gen 2 detection capabilities consist of outdoor aerosol 
collectors whose filters are manually retrieved for subsequent 
analysis in a State or county public health laboratory that is a 
member of the CDC Laboratory Response Network. The results 
are generally received 8-10 hours after sample delivery to the 
laboratory. Biowatch Gen 2 is labor-intensive, and products may not 
be available until 12-36 hours after a biological agent’s release has 
occurred. (See Figures 10-3 & 10.4) 
 
Biowatch Gen 3 was canceled in 2014 when the Government 
Accountability Office reported the program’s upgraded capabilities 
from Gen 2 were not worth the investment price.  In 2011 the U.S. 
Committee on Effectiveness of National Biosurveillance Systems 
said, “Generation 3 involves improvements that include replacing 
the existing air samplers, which require manual retrieval and 
laboratory analysis of filters, with automated detectors capable of 
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onsite sample analysis and an anticipated expansion of the 
BioWatch system’s coverage. Over the next decade, such upgrades 
will more than double the program’s direct cost to $200 million on 
an annualized basis. The expansion of coverage mainly drives the 
higher cost. As shown by comparing the Generation 2 scenario to 
a scenario in which the Generation 3 technology is used without 
expanding the number of jurisdictions or deployed detectors, the 
cost of acquiring and fielding new technology is largely offset by 
the cost savings associated with automated analysis of the detector 
samples” (Institute of Medicine (US) and National Research Council 
(US) Committee on Effectiveness of National Biosurveillance 
Systems, 2011). Biowatch Gen 3 was to operate 24 hours a day year-
round, continuously monitoring the air for agents and expanding to 
other areas. The BioWatch program is the only U.S. initiative in place 
for bio surveillance. 
In the private sector, when an audit is conducted internally or if 
a third party and critical items are identified, the offender needs 
to have an immediate mitigation plan and resolve the issue in a 
reasonable amount of time. We can see this across the financial 
health care and retail sector with the enforcement of different 
federal regulations that must be compliant for the business to 
remain in business without incurring a fine or completely shut 
down. A security audit completes in 2017 found the BioWatch 
website to be critical in high risk of vulnerabilities, including weak 
encryption that made the website susceptible to online attacks. The 
website was also noted not to have any protective monitoring. The 
data on that website included some of the Biowatch air samplers’ 
locations, which are installed throughout the United States. The 
results of the Biowatch air samplers and possible pathogens they 
detect in response plans were available on the website. The website 
was run by a private company, Logistics Management Institute 
(LMI), and was considered a (dot)org versus (dot) gov website. James 
McDonnell, assistant secretary of Homeland security counter 
countering weapons of mass destruction office, stated the data was 
housed outside the secure government firewall and were not 
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significant enough to cause a national security threat (Baumgartner, 
2019). A security scan found Up to 41 vulnerabilities and attempted 
access to the portal by unauthorized users. The website was retired 
in May 2019; however, at the time of this writing, with the Wayback 
machine, image captures return a positive result except for the final 
capture taken in April 2019. (Figure 10.5) 
 
At the House Homeland Security Committee subcommittee 
hearing fall of 2019, experts testified that our biodefense system has 
been vulnerable and outdated over the past ten years (Rutschman, 
2019). 
 
Figure 10.5 BioWatch Portal Snapshots Remain (by Author) 
 
 
NEXT GENERATION – DNA to GENOME 
In 1997, the JASON group (a group of academic scientists who 
advise the U.S. government in science and technology), focused 
on genetically engineered pathogens and biological weapons. The 
group came up with six potential threats: binary biological weapons, 
designer genes, weaponized gene therapy, stealth virus-host 
swapping diseases, and designer diseases. At the time of their study, 
some of the technology existed to produce such threats. 
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Science evolved, presenting commercial opportunities to collect 
consumers’ DNA to help complete the puzzle of family members’ 
heritage. The consumer agreed to the fine print ,in the excitement 
to find out their origin, but also surrendered their personal (private) 
data to be used for research. As a result, DNA is used by several 
different industries to profit from the information available from the 
DNA data collected. The marketing industry launched large-scale 
consumer advertising companies such as Airbnb© and Spotify©. 
They use collected DNA datasets to attract customers. The genetic 
data can give creative strategies to leverage customers’ 
requirements(and company profits) based on their genomes. [9] [10] 
 
DNA collection can occur for medical reasons.  DNA data can live 
on the physical computer systems of the lab, a medical professional 
or their gloves, treatment center/hospital, health care company, 
university, and in some cases, a state. It was confirmed in 2017 by 
news reports that Asian based firms have obtained U.S. DNA data 
and plan to collect additional Americans DNA through commercial 
and medical means (Javers, 2017). Since that report, several 
healthcare companies, facilities, and organizations have suffered 
data breaches. [11] 
 
Genomic data can be digitized. With quantum computing,[12] we 
can understand the genetic development of living organisms, how 
they are vulnerable to diseases, and how they would respond to 
drugs and treatments.  Genomic research has increased the 
development of medicines and vaccines dramatically. For example, 
a vaccine was created in less than three months for the mutated flu 
virus strain H7 N 9.  This converging technology also poses a BW 
threat when it is used to identify harmful genes or DNA sequences. 
 
There are risks and benefits to dual use DNA collection. The 
primary concerns are the amount of data being collected; who 
collects and filters /categorizes the data; who owns the data; where 
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is it stored; and can it be resold. Another issue is can the collected 
databases be hacked. Data collected by Cambridge Analytics 
through social media for elections was weaponized and published. 
 
DNA can lead to a designer bioweapon, to affect genocide. Our 
DNA data can be used to understand how our mind and body will 
react. Synthetic viruses or genes combined with the use of quantum 
dots, nanoparticles, and 3D printer materials to create a bioweapon 
/ biodefense agent to target a population or protect that same 
population. DNA technologies are disturbing and will have a future 




In 2005, research was completed on the concept of using 
nanowires, as ultrasensitive electronic sensors to detect biological 
and chemical agents (Fernando Patolsky, 2005). Dr. Charles Lieber 
and Professor Fernando Patolsky discuss the creation of a sensor 
that’s configured with nanowire with the natural oxide coding. The 
aforementioned receptor construction is more efficient than the 
current modification of glass or a Silicon oxide to create the sensor 
(Fernando Patolsky, 2005). When a virus particle binds to an 
antibody receptor on a nanowire device, the conductance of that 
device will change from the baseline value. When the virus unbinds 
again, the conductance will return to the baseline value (Fernando 
Patolsky, 2005). When the nanowire encounters influenza the 
nanowire reflects accurate characteristics that are consistent with 
influenza viruses. The sensor is able to produce optical and 
electrical data it receives from the nanowire as the virus diffuses 
near the nanowire device (Fernando Patolsky, 2005). The Harvard 
team was able to determine the difference in distance of spacing 
the nanowires over different size areas when the sensor could 
encounter and detect two other viruses. Dr. Charles Lieber and 
Professor Fernando Patolsky concluded that nanowire sensors 
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could be key for virus sensing devices for the medical community 
and used to detect bioterrorism (Fernando Patolsky, 2005). 
Advances in nano-biosensor technology offer the ability to alert 
LEO / DHS to a biological weapons attack. This early warning 
system permits enactment of  countermeasures such as 
containment. Dr. Jing Wang of the Swiss Federal Laboratories for 
Materials Science and Technology (Empa, ETH Zurich) and Zurich 
University Hospital was tasked with creating a sensor to detect 
SARS-COV-2. In January 2020, the team began testing sensors to 
see if they could differentiate bacteria and viruses transmitted in 
the air (Global Biodefense Staff, 2020). The goal of the sensor was to 
be used in places like train stations or hospitals. It would measure 
the virus concentration in the air in real-time (Global Biodefense 
Staff, 2020). Doctor Wang and his team developed a sensor that 
combines two different methods to detect viruses using optical 
and thermal means. The sensor is based on tiny structures of gold 
nanoislands on a glass substrate (Global Biodefense Staff, 2020) . 
Artificially produced DNA receptors that match specific coronavirus 
sequences of SARS CoV-2 are grafted onto the nanoislands (Global 
Biodefense Staff, 2020). The coronavirus virus genome does not 
consist of the DNA double-strand as in living organisms. The virus 
has the DNA of a single strand (Global Biodefense Staff, 2020). 
Therefore, the receptors on the sensor can identify the virus. The 
optical component, localized surface plasmon resonance (LSPR), 
can be used to measure whether the sample contains RNA strands 
of SAR-CoV-2 or SARS-COV. The thermal component, plasmonic 
photothermal (PPT), can detect whether the DNA strand is single 
or double using localized heat produced by a laser of a specific 
wavelength (Global Biodefense Staff, 2020).  The sensor is in the 
early phase of development and not ready for measurement of 
COVID-19. When the sensor is completed testing it could be applied 
to two other viruses. Dr. Wang’s sensor was featured as part of 
the science -Switzerland April – May 2020 report, sponsored by 
Swissnex. (Fernando Patolsky, 2005) 
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Conclusions 
• Pathogens are continuing to grow and disembogue into the 
human population 
• Biodefense is essential in defending the U.S. from adversaries 
and preservation of American lives. It represents a significant 
Disturbing Technology for all three theaters: Airline, Marine 
and Defense. (Mauroni, 2014) 
• Funding for the scientific community is essential for further 
discovery, tracking, understanding, and constructing 
countermeasures against pathogens. 
• Lessons can be learned from past reductions in funding for 
bioterrorism.[13] 
• Nanotechnologies are the next generation of technology that 
can contribute significantly to several different fields, 
including medical and bioterrorism defenses. 
• Cybersecurity plays a critical role in preventing bioterrorism. 
There needs to be an understanding of adversarial use of the 
data collected in the public and private sector and stored and 
transmitted securely. 
 
Post Analysis from a Terrorist Point of View 
Terrorists like Disturbing Technologies because they make their 
mission / goals of population disruption manageable. Biological 
agents and toxins are the most likely terrorist weapons for the 
future. They are inexpensive, do not require a great deal of technical 
expertise or equipment to manufacture, and can be produced 
without creating a lot of attention. Biological agents  have the best 
potential as weapons of mass destruction or disruption. They have 
the ability to inflict extremely high levels of casualties on a target 
population. It has been estimated by WHO that 50 kilograms of 
aerosolized anthrax spores dispensed 2 kilometers upwind of a 
population center of 500,000 unprotected people in an ideal 
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meteorological condition, would travel greater than 20 kilometers 
downwind, and kill / incapacitate up to 125,000 humans in the path 
of the biological cloud. It is estimated by the Defense Department 
that the amount of anthrax equal to a five-pound bag of sugar in 
size would be enough to kill half the population of Washington, 
DC. (Burke, 2017) 
 
To be effective against large numbers of people, biological agents 
must be properly disseminated. Conventional explosives could be 
used for this purpose, along with common agricultural and home 
garden spraying equipment modified to generate the smaller 
particle size of biological materials.  Motorized vehicles, boats, and 
airplanes could also provide effective dissemination. Spray devices 
would need nozzles in the 1- 10-micron range for optimum 
dissemination. Weather conditions are critical for the effective 
deployment of biological agents as aerosols. The ideal weather 
would occur during the early morning or evening hours. (Burke, 
2017) 
 
The federal government has clamped down on the sale and use 
of biological agents in research facilities. A program has been 
developed to control the “Transfer or Receipt of Select agents.” 
(Burke, 2017)The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
of 1996 requires regulation of shipment and receipt of certain 
microorganisms and toxins. Regulations are detailed in Appendix E 
of (Burke, 2017) This reference also give over 20 pages of resources, 
websites, agency contacts, notifications to gain more information or 
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[1] The HAZARD Classification System divides dangerous goods into 
nine classes of materials for purposes of transportation, 
identification, and placarding: Class 1- explosives; Class 2 -gases; 
Class 3-Combustable liquids; Class 4-Flamable solids & water 
reactive; Class 5- Oxidizing substances; Class 6- Toxic & Infectious 
substances; Class 7 – Radioactive materials; Class 8 – Corrosive 
substances & Class 9 – Miscellaneous Hazardous materials. The 
entire system is further divided into compatibility groups (letters) 
and special placarding restrictions on all DOT or vehicles in DOT 
jurisdiction must comply. If it moves it falls under these 
restrictions.  See (Evers & T.J. Glover, 2010) 
[2] Center for Disease Control (CDC) Taxonomy for LEO  of 
Biological Weapons – Along with the HAZMAT U.N. DOT 
classification system, there are other classification systems. CDC 
uses a general system for LEOs (Evers & T.J. Glover, 2010) where: 
 
CDC Category A 
These organisms pose a risk to national security because they can 
be easily disseminated or transmitted from person to person. They 
result in high mortality rates and have the potential for major public 
health impact and might cause public and social disruption. They 
require special action for public health preparedness. 
CDC Category B 
These are moderately easy to disseminate and result in moderate 
morbidity rates and low mortality rates. They require specific 
enhancements of CDC’s diagnostic capability and enhanced disease 
surveillance. 
CDC Category C 
These agents include emerging pathogens that could be 
engineered for mass dissemination in the future because of 
availability, ease of production and dissemination, potential for high 
morbidity 
and mortality rates, and major health impact. 
Type 




R = Rickettsial 
Precautions 
Consult with current CDC guidelines. (CDC, 2021) Also, Chapter 
4 on BTA from (Burke, 2017) discusses precautions and protective 
equipment in detail. 
Dissemination 
Dissemination is most likely by aerosol; some could also be used 
as food or water contaminants; Inhalation is the mist deadly route 
of exposure in all cases. (Evers & T.J. Glover, 2010) 
More official information about biological hazards falls under 
DOT HAZMAT Guide 153 available in (Evers & T.J. Glover, 2010). 
From a LEO, forensics, protective gear perspective, one can consult 
Practical Crime Scene Investigations for Hot Zones. (Fish & R.N. 
Stout, 2011) 
Table 10.2 shows the Biological agents as a function of global 
development / use. 
[3] The James Bond movie Goldfinger had toxins released from crop 
dusters on Fort Knox troops. 
[4] There is a detailed discussion of this incident in (Burke, 2017). 
[5] It can be argued and there is corroborative Open-Source 
evidence to support the theory that COVID-19 was in 2020 a 
human-engineered / developed bioweapon (BW) in a Chinese Lab 
in Wuhan, China The postulate is that  it escaped its containment 
apparatus and spread to the world causing unintended grievous 
harm and death. Whether this BW theory true, partially true, 
negligence or intentionally delivered does not really matter because 
as of this writing (1/16/2021)  92,775,578 cases have been reported 
with 1,986,842 COVID-19 deaths. About 29% of reported cases are 
attributable to North America with 569,333 lost souls. This is a 
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solid example of what a BW can do if not contained or breached 
countermeasures. (Google, 2021) 
[6] LD50 of as toxin, radiation, or pathogen is the dose required to 
kill half the members of a tested population after a specified test 
duration. LD50 figures are frequently used as a general indicator of 
a substance’s acute toxicity. A lower LD50  is indicative of increased 
toxicity. (Evers & T.J. Glover, 2010) 
[7] Anthrax is the Greek word for coal 
[8] Virus is Latin for “poisonous slime.” 
[9] Think movie Minority Report where Tom Cruise replaces his 
eye to bypass biometric security controls and as he passes optical 
readers at a mall, the stores pitch him for their goods based on the 
wrong profile. 
[10] Recognize that the government and LEO all have access to 
this data. LEO does use DNA data responsibly to solve outstanding 
felony cases. However, it is up for grabs whether we believe that the 
government is so attentive and responsible with our private data. 
[11] There is little definitive proof that the breaches were related to 
the DNA data thefts. 
[12] Quantum computing is in its infancy. There is plenty of research 
money and a few startups making a run for this technology. There is 
lots of hype but not much “commercial beef.” 
[13] For example, USAID PREDICT received approximately $200 
million over ten years, a fraction of the $2 trillion in emergency-
relief spending authorized by Congress as a response to COVID-19 
as of March 2020 (Schmidt, 2020). 
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